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A sweeping examination of Ottoman plague treatise writers 
from the Black Death until 1923
Were you aware that many of the greatest and most colourful Ottoman statesmen 
and literary figures from the 15th to the early 20th century considered plague as 
a grave threat to their empire? Did you know that many Ottomans applauded the 
establishment of a quarantine against the disease in 1838 as a tool to resist British and 
French political and commercial penetration? Or that later Ottoman sanitation efforts 
to prevent urban outbreaks would help engender the Arab revolt against the empire in 
1916? This book explores these facts in an engaging study of Ottoman plague treatise 
writers throughout their almost 600-year struggle with this epidemic disease. And it 
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The right of Birsen Bulmuş to be identifi ed as author of this work has been asserted in 
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
BULMUS PRINT.indd   iv 06/03/2012   16:34
Contents
Acknowledgements vi
Map showing the Ottoman Empire, 1914 viii
1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1
2. CONCEPTUALISING PLAGUE IN OTTOMAN ISLAMIC 
THOUGHT 15
3. PLAGUE AND OTTOMAN MEDICAL THOUGHT 39
4. MAGIC AND PLAGUE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 68
5. HAMDAN BIN EL-MERHUM OSMAN AND THE OTTOMAN 
QUARANTINE REFORM 97
6. PLAGUE AND QUARANTINES IN THE COLONIAL ERA 130
7. PLAGUE, SANITARY ADMINISTRATION AND THE END 
OF EMPIRE 152
8. TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF PLAGUE AND 
QUARANTINES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 177
Bibliography 181
Index 191
BULMUS PRINT.indd   v 06/03/2012   16:34
vi
Acknowledgements
This book is the product of many years of labour, and evolved out of my PhD 
thesis, ‘Plague in the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1838’, which I completed at the 
Department of History, Georgetown University in May 2008. I would have not 
completed my work without the encouragement of my mentor, Dr Kathy Olesko, 
and that of the other members of my PhD dissertation committee, Dr John O. 
Voll and Dr Carol Benedict. I have also been guided by a wide range of scholars 
in Ottoman, Middle Eastern and European history, Turkish studies and historical 
sociology. These include: Dr Sandra Horvath-Peterson, Georgetown University; 
Dr Özkul Çobanoğlu, Hacettepe University; Dr Kelvin A. Santiago-Valles, 
Binghamton University; Dr Halil İnalcık, world-renowned scholar and my great 
MA mentor at Bilkent University; and Dr Ali Doğramacı, Rector of Bilkent 
University. I also feel an enormous debt of gratitude to Dr Farhan Ahmad 
Nizami, director at Centre for Islamic Studies and Dr Eugene L. Rogan, Faculty 
of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, for their assistance following my visit 
to Oxford in the summer of 1996.
I have also been the benefi ciary of support from a number of research insti-
tutions, whose help was absolutely critical to the successful completion of my 
book. These include the Ankara University Faculty of Divinity Library, Atatürk 
Library, Devlet Library, Hacı Selim Ağa Rare Manuscript Library, Millet Rare 
Manuscript Library, National Library, Religious Affairs Library, Süleymaniye 
Library, T. C. Prime Ministry State Archives, Turkish Religious Foundation 
Centre for Islamic Studies (İSAM) and Turkish Historical Society Library, all 
in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey. I also benefi ted greatly from collections at 
the Georgetown University Library, Library of Congress, National Library of 
Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries and New York Public 
BULMUS PRINT.indd   vi 06/03/2012   16:34
 Acknowledgements vii
Library. I would like to thank several librarians and related offi cials, particularly 
Servet Arıtürk, İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality; Salih Gülen, Editor and 
Chief of Hazine Yayınları; Ebubekir Kaya, İstanbul University Central Library; 
Erdem Selçuk, Beyazıt State Library; Perihan Sezen, İstanbul University 
Medical School Hulusi Behçet Library; and Mustafa Birol Ülker, Director of 
the Turkish Religious Foundation Centre for Islamic Studies. I am also very 
grateful to Crystal Smith and Karen Pitts from the National Library of Medicine, 
Washington, DC.
I have also benefi ted recently from continuous feedback from my friends, 
especially my fellow colleagues in the Department of History at Appalachian 
State University, particularly Dr Lucinda McCray, who shares a common inter-
est in the history of medicine, Dr James Goff, Dr Tim Silver and Dr Michael 
Wade. I also have gained much encouragement in recent months from Mehmet 
Ali Akat of Paterson, New Jersey and Orçun Temizkan of Charlotte, North 
Carolina. Mohamed Ben Yahia of Fairfax, Virginia has also been a great friend 
and has provided generous time in reading relevant Arabic texts related to my 
project.
In addition, I would especially like to thank Dr York Norman of Buffalo 
State College for his generous support during all stages of this project, including 
his patient editing of my work and his translations of relevant materials from 
Bosnian and German to English.
I am also very grateful to Dr Nancy Gallagher of the University of California-
Santa Barbara and Dr Colin Imber of the University of Manchester for their 
reviews of my work.
Nicola Ramsey, Senior Commissioning Editor, and her colleagues at 
Edinburgh University Press were ultimately also key to the successful  completion 
of the book.
BULMUS PRINT.indd   vii 06/03/2012   16:34
Map showing the Ottoman Empire, 1914 (United States Military Academy)
BULMUS PRINT.indd   viii 06/03/2012   16:34
BULMUS PRINT.indd   ix 06/03/2012   16:34





One day in the summer of 2004 I wandered down to the shores of Istanbul’s 
Golden Horn and saw a peculiar sight: a grand, yellow, nineteenth-century build-
ing sitting directly on top of one of the district’s most famous mosques. Right 
next to it was an equally elegant red-brown offi ce, directly on the shores of the 
bay. International travellers to the city who come by boat have to go to these 
buildings even today in order to undergo medical inspection to see if they have 
contracted any epidemic disease. Certainly, most travellers to Istanbul before 
the mid-twentieth century would almost certainly have been familiar with the 
compound, as ships were the mode of overseas travel.
After learning from the guards that the buildings were constructed in the mid-
nineteenth century, I, as a student of the history of medicine in the Middle East, 
wondered why the Ottomans had waited so long. Travellers began to complain 
of plague spreading from the district’s docks to the surrounding city shortly after 
Sultan Mehmed II’s conquest of the city in 1453, and yet it took about 400 years 
for a quarantine to be built. I wondered, then, to what extent geopolitical and 
cultural infl uences explained this development.
I remembered that the Ottomans essentially remained a premodern state 
until Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt in 1798 forced the Sultanate to embark on 
modernising reform in order to save the empire from disintegration. Istanbul and 
the realm’s other major port cities had relatively few Muslim merchants and a 
comparatively weak navy, and relied on non-Muslims and foreigners to develop 
their overseas trade. The result was a lack of both a politically conscious Muslim 
middle class and a lively press culture that expressed interest in modernising 
reform and economic development.
I had the impression from the Ottoman primary sources that I looked at 
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over the next few months that the Istanbul quarantine facility was one of many 
innovations partially inspired by the Europeans. Anton Lago, an Austrian doctor 
who worked for the Ottoman Sultan Muhmud II, wrote a famous work in 1836 
that argued that the Ottomans should construct the quarantine facilities. Like 
most European advocates of quarantine until that time, Lago maintained that 
the plague was an ether-like substance that spread to humans either by person-
to-person contact or by exposure to plague-infested materials such as wool and 
cotton. I also realised that Ottoman writers centuries before Lago’s time were 
aware of the European experience with epidemic disease. İlyas bin Abram 
Al-Yahudi (d. 1513), a Jewish refugee who fl ed from the Reconquista to offer 
services to the Ottoman court, wrote a medical treatise on his experience with the 
plague in Spain. İdris-i Bitlisi (d. 1520) similarly wrote about how the Europeans 
used mercury to cure the plague and urged his Ottoman audience to do the same.1
Europeans had also written extensively about plague in the Ottoman Empire. 
A number of key English authors blamed the great plague of London in 1665 and 
the 1720 Marseille outbreak on unregulated imports of plague-infested cotton 
and wool. These accusations helped to justify the construction of quarantines 
by the late sixteenth century that not only guarded borders against disease, but 
also gave their sovereigns greater control over foreign trade and any monopolies 
associated with it. The quarantine had the potential to help to promote domestic 
production in the name of public health and, thus, could be of great institutional 
importance in promoting mercantilism. Quarantine reform was also often used 
to categorise certain groups that were more likely to spread the plague. These 
reforms empowered state offi cials to medically police the poor and immigrant 
populations in thriving port cities like London from the sixteenth to the early 
twentieth centuries.2
Until 1838, British critics of these measures pointed to the Ottoman Empire 
as a positive example, since there was no quarantine there. In their opinion, 
the quarantine and sanitary police were cruel and unnecessary measures that 
hindered trade and humiliated many. It was no coincidence that liberal British 
writers would condemn the Ottomans after 1838 for repeating their own 
‘mistake’.3
I still wondered, however, whether there was more to this story of the 
Ottoman quarantine than simply Mahmud II’s acceptance of Lago’s European-
style quarantine in 1838. I had also read the treatise of Hamdan Bin El-Merhum 
Osman Hoca (1773–1840), a contemporary of Lago who also wrote a key text in 
1836 advocating quarantine reform to the sultan. Hamdan, an Algerian notable 
who fl ed to the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the French occupation, was 
mainly concerned with convincing Muslim elites within the empire about the 
necessity of the reform.4
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One key argument for Hamdan was that the new institution was fully justifi ed 
according to Islam. He often referred to earlier Ottoman plague treatise writers. 
These included famous sixteenth-century fi gures. Bitlisi vigorously defended 
his avoidance of plague in Damascus after performing his ritual pilgrimage to 
Mecca in 1512 from his critics. Ebussuud Efendi (1491–1574), the single most 
infl uential Ottoman Islamic jurist of the sixteenth century, also supported fl ight 
from plague as a justifi able precaution. Bitlisi and Ebussuud – and Hamdan – 
could also cite pre-Ottoman Islamic thinkers to support their opinions. They 
would at times mention Lisaneddin Al-Khattib (d. 1375), an Islamic scholar who 
advocated medical precautions after witnessing the 1348 outbreak of the Black 
Death, and the famous Sufi  mystic, Abu Hamid Ghazali (1058–1111), who wrote 
of the need for human compassion for plague victims. They would reference 
Caliph Umar (634–44), who also fl ed the plague, as well as selected sayings of 
Muhammad, to justify their positions. In addition, Hamdan cited earlier Ottoman 
medical treatises on plague that justifi ed medical treatment. Such earlier works 
not only dealt with fl ight – the most controversial of topics during the sixteenth 
century – but also with prescriptions and fumigation. These treatments often 
paralleled those of premodern European medical writers on plague.5
Hamdan was different from many of these earlier writers in at least one 
key respect: he did not ever view plague in mystical terms and shunned the 
use of magic or ritual prayer to ward off the disease. Writers like Bitlisi, 
Ebussuud Efendi and Kemaleddin Taşköprüzade (d. 1621) included such ele-
ments within their treatises as one of many ways to fi ght the disease. Ahmed 
Efendi Müneccimbaşı bin Halil er-Rumi (d. 1748) had gone so far as to write an 
entire work on plague and the elemental magic of talismans in 1667–8.6 Hamdan, 
like most modern European plague reformers, abandoned magic in favour of 
 empirically proven scientifi c principles.
One European innovation that Hamdan did not introduce was the use of 
quarantine as a social disciplinary tool to police the poor or other subject groups. 
Hamdan, like Turhan Pasha (d. 1914), a later Ottoman medical reformer, may 
have opposed the measure out of religious conviction, as such policing treated 
segments of the population as virtual subhumans. It is also quite likely that he 
recognised that medical policing might lead to authoritarian tendencies in gov-
ernment: a problem for the Europeans who fi rst developed the sanitary police.7 
In fact, no major Ottoman quarantine offi cial embraced discriminatory measures 
until 1894 – including the famous former chiefs Ahmed Midhat (1844–1912) 
and Besim Ömer (1862–1940).
Hamdan and his audience were concerned about increasing foreign pen-
etration. While many Muslims were afraid that the Ottoman Empire might 
share Algeria’s fate as a colony, others pointed to the increasing infl uence of 
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British and French loans and commercial infl uence, while yet others pointed to 
European support of Muhammad Ali of Egypt (1769–1849) as a rival to their 
own sultan. Hamdan implied that quarantine would help to defend Ottoman 
sovereignty in resisting these tendencies. Quarantine could potentially assist the 
native textile producers by controlling British and other European imports as 
‘suspected goods’, affording the Ottoman authorities the possibility of taxing or 
even banning these goods.8
Unsurprisingly, the Europeans – particularly the British – protested that the 
establishment of the Ottoman quarantine in 1838 was clearly contrary to the 
Ottomans commitment to free trade. Lord Ponsonby (1770–1855), the British 
ambassador to the Sublime Porte, having imposed the Balta Liman unequal trade 
agreement on the Ottomans that year, succeeded in forming the Constantinople 
Superior Health Council, an international body, to supervise the quarantine. The 
British would also prompt other major European powers to gather a series of 
international sanitary conferences to which the Ottoman quarantine would also 
be subject. As these developments indicate, the Ottoman and foreign govern-
ments would struggle during the ensuing eighty years over who would ultimately 
control the quarantine, its policies and revenues.
The French and British reacted to the 1838 Ottoman quarantine by embrac-
ing a new understanding of plague as infectious in places where fi lthy and 
unhygienic conditions propagated the disease. This understanding, pioneered by 
French doctors Antoine Clot (1793–1868) and Louis Aubert-Roche (1810–74) 
in Egypt in 1841, was in contrast to the previous view of plague as being spread 
from person to person or through infected goods. They advocated increased 
medical policing of at-risk populations, such as Egypt, India, China and the 
Ottoman Empire – all non-European countries. Advocates of this new school 
of thought argued that the Ottoman quarantine was not enough to get rid of the 
disease. They supposed that only the Europeans themselves had the means and 
technological know-how to improve sanitation, building codes, sewage and 
water supply systems in order to transform the infested areas into hygienic living 
space. These views helped to justify colonial control of public health in Egypt, 
often humiliating the native population as coming from an inferior, diseased 
culture.9 The British institutionalised these practices in Egypt’s major cities and 
in medical inspection stations set up along the Suez Canal after they declared 
Egypt a protectorate in 1882.
The British and French held a number of international sanitary conferences 
in 1892, 1894, 1897 and 1903 to institutionalise medical inspection procedures 
with regard to the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. The Europeans claimed 
the pilgrimage routes – often with crowds of over 100,000 pilgrims per year – 
were unsanitary and spread plague and cholera. Many of the pilgrims were from 
BULMUS PRINT.indd   4 06/03/2012   16:35
 Preliminary Remarks 5
colonised countries, and the ruling European powers believed that the colonis-
ers and the colonised were both at risk. The Europeans sought strict regulations 
on the pilgrim traffi c. Every pilgrim would not only have to pre-pay his or her 
ticket, but would also have to undergo a series of medical inspections at the Suez 
Canal and along the Red Sea, and also before and after departure to the Hijaz, 
the Ottoman province of western Arabia.10 Alexandre Yersin’s discovery of the 
bubonic plague bacilli as the biological cause of plague in 1894 only slightly 
changed these regulations to include inspection and fumigation for rats and rat-
infested materials. The medical offi cials at the time believed unhygienic condi-
tions and poor sanitation were responsible for spreading plague from rats and 
fl eas to human populations.
The conferences did not resolve the underlying political tensions between 
the Ottomans and the European powers. The British, in control of the Suez 
Canal, the sea lanes and major shipping companies, gained greater leverage 
over distant Ottoman territory, leading Muslims to question whether the Empire 
retained its sovereignty as the premier Sunni Muslim state. The Europeans 
also had political considerations in mind. Knowing that Sultan Abdulhamid 
II (r. 1876–1909) promoted a message of pan-Islamist unity in the face of 
European colonialism, they feared that colonial subjects who visited might be 
incited to rebel at home.
Kasim İzzeddin (1859–1926), the leader of the Ottoman sanitation effort 
after 1894, made the fateful decision to adopt medical inspection methods. 
In contrast to Hamdan and his successors, İzzeddin would not only maintain 
maritime quarantines in the major ports of the Ottoman Empire, he would also 
oversee new urban plans, construct new water supplies, sewage systems, hos-
pitals, urban shelters and – very importantly – police the poor and the pilgrims.
İzzeddin’s reforms targeted two critical frontier districts: the Hijaz, home to 
Mecca and Medina; and southern Iraq, where the Ottomans oversaw an annual 
pilgrimage of Shia Muslims from Persia and Russia. These efforts embittered 
the relationship of the Ottoman central authority with local populations. Both 
the Bedouins of the Hijaz and the Shia of southern Iraq felt that they were being 
systematically discriminated against, and may well have questioned the value of 
their continued loyalty to the Ottoman state. İzzeddin, a Lebanese Sunni Muslim 
who also feared foreign encroachment of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire, 
thought that centralisation through sanitation reform would help to consolidate 
Ottoman rule once railway lines had connected Mecca, Baghdad and Basra to 
the main Ottoman grid.11 Oddly enough, these efforts won considerable interna-
tional support, particularly from the British. İzzeddin and the Ottomans would 
be dependent on British coal, machinery and transportation and this increased 
British leverage in these frontier areas; at least until the railway was established, 
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when these materials could be sent over land and not by sea through British-
dominated waters.
After November 1914, when the Ottoman and British empires found 
themselves at war, the British cut off this technical and logistical support, and 
İzzeddin’s efforts were doomed to failure. The local Bedouin population rebelled 
in the Hijaz, and the Shia of southern Iraq put up no major resistance against the 
British when they invaded in 1916.
After the First World War and the brief British occupation of Istanbul and 
the Straits, Atatürk and the new Turkish Republic asserted its control over the 
quarantine facilities in Turkey. The new regime abolished all foreign oversight, 
but kept its administrative headquarters in the Golden Horn complex I fi rst saw.12
This book will elaborate on the long and intricate geopolitical history of 
plague, national sovereignty and quarantine in the Ottoman Empire from 1300 
until the end of the First World War by delving into the writings of the main 
actors in this drama. These treatise writers included not only Hamdan and his 
contemporaries, but also other Ottoman thinkers and statesmen throughout this 
time period. I will additionally consider works by British, French and other per-
tinent Western travellers, doctors, diplomats and scholars that infl uenced or were 
analogous to Ottoman conceptions of plague and the quarantine and sanitary 
reform movement.
Indeed, historians have highlighted plague’s role in the rise and fall of 
empires and states in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. As Lawrence 
Conrad has shown, the fi rst outbreak of plague occurred in 541–2 during the time 
of the Byzantine emperor Justinian, and had a devastating impact on the seden-
tary population of the fertile crescent, key to maintaining Constantinople’s rule 
in the area. Plague deaths in major cities like Antioch and their grain-producing 
hinterland weakened the Byzantines’ economic and military ability to retain the 
province. The Byzantines soon came to rely upon the trading and military skills 
of the Bedouin, who moved into the area from the nearby Arabian Peninsula. 
The Bedouin, like the Ottoman Turks nearly seven centuries later, would use 
their predatory skills to found an empire of their own. The early Islamic empire, 
founded by Muhammad and his companions, would dominate the region until 
the end of the Umayyad dynasty in 750. Oddly enough, a second great out-
break of plague may well have hastened the end of the dynasty, since the newly 
entrenched Arab elites in Damascus had themselves become sedentarised and 
therefore more vulnerable to an epidemic.13
The importance of plague to the rise of the Islam, as Conrad illustrates, can 
even be seen in the Quran itself. In the 105th chapter, Al-Fil (The Elephant), the 
Quran talks about the fate of an Abyssinian army that sought to subject Mecca 
and take over the Kaba on the eve of Muhammad’s birth:14
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Hast thou not seen the people of the elephant, how dealt with them the Lord? Did 
not He make their plot to end in ruin abhorred? When He sent against them birds, 
horde on horde, and stones of baked clay upon them poured, and made them as 
leaves of corn devoured.
Conrad postulates that these lines are, in fact, a metaphorical reference to an 
outbreak of plague that was visited upon the Abyssinians by divine intervention, 
an immediate sign of God’s presence in history. The common traditional Muslim 
attribution of plague to the work of angel-like genies (jinn), and the view that 
those who died from plague were martyrs to God also coincides with this belief.
Yet Conrad also demonstrates that Muhammad and his companions some-
times advocated taking physical precautions to avoid the disease. Muhammad 
commanded at one point that ‘if it (plague) is in a land, do not enter it’. He also 
alluded to fl ight as an option to avoid contagious disease when he instructed 
the faithful to ‘fl ee from the leper, as you would fl ee from a lion’. Admittedly, 
Muhammad made other injunctions to the contrary, positing that there was 
no contagion, that one should not leave a plague-infested area, and that God 
was the ultimate cause of disease. Still, all of these statements need to be put 
in their proper context. Conrad points out, for example, that Muhammad’s 
assertion of ‘no contagion’ was likely part of a broad condemnation of nature 
worshipers, who saw contagious disease as divine.15 Conrad shows that popular 
beliefs in contagion continued to persist, stating: ‘the Umayyad poet Jarir sang 
of a “spreading contagion quickly communicated [to others]”, while his rival 
Farazdag spoke of how “contact with her infects the healthy”.’16
This ambivalent attitude towards contagious disease was most famously dis-
played after the outbreak of plague in Amwas, a town near Damascus, where, in 
638, Abu Ubaydah, one of Caliph Umar’s commanding generals, was ordered 
to leave the vicinity to go to the more distant town of Serag after plague was 
discovered in the area. Ubaydah argued against fl eeing, saying it was God’s will 
for him to stay. Umar then told him through a parable that God had ordained that 
he should take precautions:
Yes, we are fl eeing from the will of God, to the will of God . . . Suppose you have 
camels which come into a valley with two slopes, one lush with pasturage and 
the other barren; if you graze them on the lush slopes, would that not be by the 
will of God, and if you graze them on the barren slope, would that not also be by 
the will of God?17
Authors from this time onwards would cite this exchange as demonstrat-
ing the righteousness of their cause. Those who argued for precaution referred 
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to Umar’s parable, his leadership as caliph and the fact that Abu Ubaydah 
ultimately obeyed his command. Others countered that Abu Ubaydah’s initial 
protest was valid, and that he in fact regretted obeying Umar.
My work is aimed in large part at explaining this tension throughout Ottoman 
history, following Conrad’s call for greater elaboration on the subject: ‘To assert 
that “Islam” denies contagion is therefore to miss the essence of what was in 
fact a complex and diffi cult debate that has continued through most of Islamic 
history, involving contributions by individuals too numerous to consider here.’18
Conrad’s work is also infl uential for establishing that early Muslim physi-
cians differentiated plague from other contagious diseases. According to Imam 
Nawawi (1234–78): ‘Every plague (taun) is a pestilence (waba), but not every 
pestilence is a plague.’19 To Conrad, early Islamic physicians saw taun as a 
physical reference to buboes, a clear proof that the disease was indeed bubonic 
plague, whose biological agent was discovered by Alexander Yersin and 
Kitasato Shibasaburo in Hong Kong in 1894.
Yersina pestis was a seemingly harmless non-motile cell that, in the right 
conditions, quickly and uncontrollably reproduced in the warm, moist blood of 
its victims. The bacilli was largely confi ned to populations of black rats (rattus 
rattus), which Conrad argues were prevalent in the premodern Middle East both 
in urban areas and their agricultural hinterlands. Moreover, fl eas, particularly 
the variety Xenopsylla cheopis, which was particularly fond of black rat blood, 
had a tendency to pass on Yersina pestis to other rats. Although Yersina pestis 
almost always peacefully co-existed with its rat and fl ea hosts, rare outbreaks 
of the disease could occur. When they did, x. cheopis fl eas became particularly 
virulent, as the Yersina pestis gathered and multiplied in its black rat blood-
fi lled stomach. This would ‘block’ the fl ea from swallowing more food, making 
it bite its victims much more frequently, dramatically increasing the chance it 
could pass on the disease. While for most of the time the affected rat popula-
tion was isolated from humans, disaster would strike when people came into 
close proximity with infected fl eas, as fl ea bites were the most common means 
of contracting the plague. Yersina pestis would then grow uncontrollably in the 
bloodstream, where its gel-like shell prevented it from being eaten by ‘the human 
body’s normal defences’, the bacilli-eating phagocytes.20
If the body’s lymphatic system carried the Yersina pestis cells to exterior 
lymph nodes, ‘the hordes of bacilli collected in these nodes and created a case 
of bubonic plague with characteristic swellings or “buboes” in the groin and 
armpits and behind the ear’, refl ective of an unrestricted growth of cells that 
usually killed the victim within six to eight days.21 If the bulk of the Yersina 
pestis were instead transmitted to interior lymphatic nodes, as was usual in 
5–15 per cent of cases, the victim would die from septicemic plague without 
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swellings, as the cells would quickly would block the circulatory system, fatally 
damaging the heart and other vital organs. Rarely, Yersina pestis was inhaled 
directly into the victim’s lungs, without contact with a fl ea, eventually causing 
suffocation from pneumonic plague.22
According to Conrad, tracing the disease according to premodern Muslim 
sources would always be problematic, given the inability of the authors to 
understand the disease’s biological origin. Thus, they might be able to deci-
pher the buboes, fever and other bodily symptoms, but would not recognise 
the bacilli as the cause of the disease or rats and fl eas as its vectors. Instead, 
they looked at the plague as a materialistic phenomenon that originated in an 
elemental-based miasmatic eruption that could be transmitted by corrupted 
physical elements.
In contrast to Conrad, Michael Dols’ account of the 1347–8 outbreak of the 
Black Death in Mameluke Egypt posits that Islamic societies in general reacted 
to the plague passively, believing that it was sinful to interfere with the disease 
as it was God’s will. Dols argued that this dogmatic perspective triumphed over 
the immediate post-1348 accounts like those of Ibn Al-Khatimah (d. 1369) and 
Al-Khatib, who, like their western European counterparts, shared a miasmatic 
understanding of the disease.23
In Dols’ opinion, the Islamic belief that God created a spiritual agent, a genie 
(jinn), who caused the plague to strike, was essential to suppressing miasmatic 
accounts. This otherworldly view became widely pervasive within a generation 
of the 1347–8 outbreak, and continued to dominate legal scholars, rulers and 
the population at large until the modernising reforms of the nineteenth century, 
which abandoned Islamic law in favour of secular Western-inspired models. 
To Dols, even later Ottoman accounts like Tas ̧köprüzade’s were essential to 
illustrating how this orthodoxy promoted popular practices, such as the use of 
‘number magic’ and ritual prayer instead of taking physical precautions, like 
fl eeing, or fumigation or other medical remedies. The result, in his view, was the 
overall decline of the Mamlukes, the Ottomans and other Islamic societies – a 
key contrast to the West, where views on plague transmission led to extended 
debate, and the continuing push for reform. He even goes so far as to claim that 
Western religious treatises on plague, which argued that the disease was God’s 
punishment for sin, was a motivation for moral reform; yet another sign of the 
Europeans’ activist approach towards natural disaster. In his opinion, this activ-
ist drive for reform was fundamental to the Western conquest of the disease, 
progress which culminated in the discovery that the plague was, in fact, caused 
by Yersina pestis.24
Heath Lowry’s recent article on the plague in the Ottoman Empire in the 
fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries largely confi rms Dols’ views. Lowry seconds 
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the notion that Islamic societies, particularly the ‘core Arabic lands’, were domi-
nated by a fatalistic view of Islam that persisted in the succeeding centuries. To 
Lowry, the Ottomans were an exception to this rule from Osman’s founding of 
the empire in 1300 until Sultan Selim’s incorporation of these lands in the wake 
of the Battle of Çaldıran in 1517. Until this time, ‘practical’ rulers like Mehmed 
II, known as ‘the Conqueror’ of Constantinople in 1453, took activist measures, 
such as seizing the strategic island of Lemnos – the source of ‘Lemnian earth’, 
a popular ingredient in plague medicines – as well as continually repopulating 
his new capital after it was devastated by the disease.25 After 1517, however, the 
Ottomans embraced orthodox Islam and abandoned an activist approach:
One might well query what, if any, preventive measures did the Ottomans 
[post-1517] come up with in an attempt to thwart the periodic ravages caused 
by the plague? The answer is: none whatsoever. It was only in the 1830s that 
they fi nally adopted a quarantine regime, a practice which had been in place 
 throughout Western Europe for over 200 years.26
Lowry bases these conclusions, like Dols before him, on narrative literature, par-
ticularly fi fteenth-century Byzantine chroniclers and sixteenth-century Western 
traveller literature and diplomatic accounts.27 They coincide with the general 
claim that the Ottoman Empire, considered by most of its European neighbours to 
be the gravest threat to Christendom from Mehmed’s conquest of Constantinople 
until Suleyman the Magnifi cent’s siege of Vienna in 1528, had entered a period 
of stagnation, military defeat, socioeconomic decay and gradual dismemberment 
that would characterise its history until its ultimate dissolution in 1923.28
The most infl uential work on Ottoman plague during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Panzac’s Le Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman (1985), almost 
entirely fi ts within the historiographical framework that Dols and Lowry have 
laid out. Panzac argues, on the basis of extensive French and British consular 
records and traveller accounts, that the Ottomans adopted the maritime quaran-
tine only after extensive European pressure to do so. This European infl uence 
was felt in both diplomatic and medical circles. The Europeans, particularly the 
Habsburgs and the French, apparently suggested both maritime and domestic 
quarantine in order to combat plague and cholera, a newly emerging epidemic 
menace in the 1830s. European-trained doctors and newly available published 
European medical literature popularised quarantine among Ottoman reformers.29 
Panzac concludes that, regardless of Ottoman hesitations, the empire’s adop-
tion of the maritime quarantine in 1838 led to the end of this state’s dubious 
 distinction as the ‘sanctuary of plague’.30
Two key works that have explicitly dealt with the critical question of how 
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early nineteenth-century Islamic governments implemented maritime quaran-
tine reform are LaVerne Kuhnke’s Lives at Risk: Public Health in Nineteenth-
century Egypt (1990) and Nancy Gallagher’s Medicine and Power in Tunisia, 
1780–1900 (1983).31 Kuhnke’s work illustrates that it was Muhammed Ali, and 
not the British or French ambassador to Cairo, who initially implemented the 
maritime quarantine, and, at the same time, the Egyptian Academy of Medicine. 
These indeed, were key institutions in Muhammad Ali’s grand projects of 
modernisation.32 The Ottoman sultan Mahmud II, who carried out a similar 
modernisation programme and implemented the maritime quarantine in Istanbul 
some seven years after Muhammed Ali’s foundation of one in Alexandria, 
very likely followed the same pattern. Just as Muhammed Ali hired foreign 
medical experts like Clot, so too Mahmud II employed the Frenchman Sade de 
Galliere, the Viennese Karl Ambroso Bernard, and the Austrian Anton Lago to 
help implement the medical reforms.33 Kuhnke does not discount the fact that 
the Egyptian medical school, like its Ottoman counterpart, trained new gen-
erations of native-born graduates to continue the medical reforms. They may 
have initially been trained in French, but the language of instruction quickly 
shifted to Arabic in Cairo and Ottoman Turkish in Istanbul. Despite the gradual 
decline of these institutions after both the Egyptian and Ottoman governments 
faced European fi nancial and diplomatic pressure, Kuhnke’s fi ndings lead us 
to believe that the maritime quarantine reform might have been an example of 
Western-inspired reform. However, the Egyptian maritime quarantine was part 
of a project of native-led state formation fundamentally distinct from colonial-
imposed Westernisation.34
Gallagher’s work alludes to a similar situation in Tunisia, where the local 
governor Hamuda Bey (1782–1814) initiated a maritime quarantine in 1784–5. 
Interestingly, Hamuda Bey launched the quarantine with a host of other meas-
ures that restricted French infl uence over Tunisian exports and imports, all in 
the name of public health. These mercantilist policies met fi rm resistance by 
the French, who publicly protested them by 1828 to Husayn Bey (1824–35), 
one of Hamuda Bey’s successors.35 While Gallagher, like Kuhnke and Panzac, 
documents her study with western European language sources, she also makes 
a serious effort to include relevant Arabic primary source materials, such as 
Husayn Bey’s response to the French protest in 1828, that speak to the issue of 
quarantines as part of a nativist response to colonial intervention.36
This book has benefi ted tremendously from this historiographical debate, 
beginning with Conrad’s arguments that there was no prevalent dogmatic atti-
tude towards plague among Muslims and that one needs to look at the particular 
circumstances of each author. Dols’ counter-argument that Muslim plague trea-
tises almost universally favoured a fatalistic view has justifi ed the tendency to 
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examine Western travellers, diplomats, politicians and physicians as the primary 
historical sources about outbreaks in the region.
However, as Gallagher has shown, the most engaging sources were often 
written by Muslim medical thinkers and statesmen, who hoped to use quaran-
tines and other preventative measures as part of a countrywide policy of modern-
isation. Unsurprisingly, these reformers would often run into opposition by their 
western European counterparts, who were frequently attempting to dominate 
the politics and economy of the region. The common European refrain that the 
Muslim reformers failed to grasp a truly scientifi c understanding of the disease 
often revealed a political subcontext that begs further explanation.37
This book seeks to contribute to this scholarship by fi rst looking at the history 
of plague in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1838 and exploring its relevance to the 
quarantine reform movement. Chapter 2, ‘Conceptualising Plague in Ottoman 
Islamic Thought’, examines how Hamdan’s religious justifi cation for the 1838 
reform related to prior Islamic thinkers. Hamdan’s arguments and the opposition 
to them were also similar to religious debates on plague and public health in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England. Chapter 3 ‘Plague and Ottoman 
Medical Thought’, compares Ottoman medical conceptions of plague with that 
of Europe. The chapter explores the ties between England, which developed 
the quarantine in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the Ottoman 
Empire, which did not pursue similar efforts. Chapter 4, ‘Magic and Plague in 
the Ottoman Empire’, looks at the continued Ottoman practice of religious ritual 
and magic to combat plague in contrast to early modern Europeans – particularly 
the English – whose press culture and religious wars led to increasing repression 
of individualistic mystical beliefs that defi ed centralising authority.
The next chapters are dedicated to describing how quarantine reform affected 
the Ottoman history of plague from 1838 until the end of the empire. Chapter 
5, ‘Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman and the Ottoman Plague Reforms’, deals 
specifi cally with Hamdan’s efforts to establish the quarantine, and contrasts his 
views to that of British and American writers with regard to sanitary policing. 
Chapter 6, ‘Plague and Quarantines in the Colonial Era’, highlights the con-
tinuing struggle between the Ottoman authorities, who maintained Hamdan’s 
vision for the quarantine, with that of the British and French, who fundamentally 
reformulated their conception of plague and the medical institutions connected 
with them. Chapter 7, ‘Plague, Sanitary Administration and the End of Empire’, 
details İzzeddin’s fi nal gambit of accepting European social disciplinary methods 
as part of quarantine reform, underlining how his alienation of the Bedouin of 
the Hijaz and the Shia of southern Iraq led in part to the disintegration of the 
Sultanate. Chapter 8, ‘Towards a New Understanding of Plague and Quarantines 
in the Ottoman Empire’, wraps up the book with a concluding analysis of the 
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legacy of the quarantine reform movement – Istanbul’s maritime quarantine – 
evident in Golden Horn facilities to the present day.
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Conceptualising Plague in 
Ottoman Islamic Thought
Introduction
Religious debates on plague and the measures to take against it were of utmost 
importance in the Ottoman Empire until the 1838 quarantine reforms. Osman 
bin Süleyman Penah (d. 1817), a prominent medical offi cial during the reign 
of Selim III (1789–1807) and an opponent of quarantine, understood that the 
best way to prevent the reform was to undermine its religious legitimacy. The 
Ottomans, the premier Islamic state from their conquest of Mecca in 1517 until 
the dissolution of the Empire in 1923, were vulnerable to his criticism that the 
plague was a blessing from God, to which all Muslims should resign themselves. 
Selim III was deposed within three years of Osman’s pamphlet on the subject; 
and the rebels successfully gained popular legitimacy by accusing the ruler of 
abandoning his faith by pursuing modernising reforms.1
Yet Osman’s dogmatic argument that any precaution against the plague 
and other epidemic diseases was a betrayal of the Muslims’ trust in God’s fate 
(tevekkül) had limited currency among Ottoman plague treatise writers. The 
majority of authors countered this fatalist position by noting that taking precau-
tions fulfi lled God’s obligation on people to take the initiative in dealing with 
worldly trials and tribulations. The fi rst such advocates of individual action 
(kaza) in the Ottoman literature on plague, such as İdris-i Bitlisi, an Ottoman 
statesman from the turn of the sixteenth century, and Isameddin Ahmed bin 
Mustafa Taşköprüzade, a prominent mid-sixteenth-century Ottoman judge and 
scholar, focused more on individual reactions to plague; namely, in the form of 
seeking medical treatment or attempting to fl ee a plague-infested area.2 Later 
the early nineteenth-century reformer Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman Hoca 
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would push for broader public health policy measures, such as defi nitively defi n-
ing plague as a materially infectious disease and proposing that the Ottomans 
 implement a quarantine to protect their subjects.3
The views of these authors do not form a consensus. The debate on whether 
Islamic law sanctioned material measures against plague continued up until quar-
antine was implemented in 1838. What this chapter will argue, however, is that 
the proponents of proactive measures were able to create a suffi cient argument 
for Hamdan’s implementation of quarantine in 1838. Hamdan benefi ted greatly 
from the efforts of earlier authors, such as Ebussuud Efendi, the chief religious 
offi cial in the Ottoman Empire from 1545 to 1574, who sanctioned fl eeing as a 
method of preventing plague deaths as permissible under Islamic law.4 My fi nd-
ings illustrate that Hamdan and earlier advocates of proactive measures were 
able to navigate Islamic legal sources, namely, the Quran, Islam’s holy book, 
the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (hadis) and the earlier experiences of the 
Muslim community to justify reform.
This trend towards reform was not unique to an Ottoman Islamic context and 
compared with even highly developed western European states, such as England. 
Here, too, religious dogmatists, this time Protestant Christians, opposed medical 
reforms like fl ight and quarantine, and denied that God sanctioned individual 
and state attempts to overcome epidemic disease. English revisionists also made 
the case for reform, mindful of a possible public backlash. This chapter, towards 
the conclusion, will reference such debates to view the Ottoman case in a greater 
comparative context.
By focusing on questions of fate as opposed to individual actions, the 
legitimacy of the medical profession, the natural transmission of plague, fl eeing 
plague-infested areas, and the civic duty to protect the Muslim community, the 
following chapter will show that Ottoman Islamic writers from the fourteenth 
century onwards, like their English counterparts, generally responded to plague 
and other issues of human suffering by carefully balancing the needs of faith, 
namely, the belief that diseases and humans alike were God’s creation, and the 
sanction of human reason’s attempts to overcome suffering.
Fate and Individual Action
Ottoman scholars most often framed their discussion of plague around the ques-
tion of how should humans respond to the suffering caused by the disease if 
God determines everything? One such answer, seen by the dogmatic Osman, 
was that God’s omnipotence precludes all individual action. He cited a hadis 
where a Bedouin with a herd of sickening camels and sheep said to the Prophet 
Muhammad: ‘The camels are sitting on the sand and passing on a disease called 
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mange (carrab) to the sheep.’ Muhammad then asked: ‘Who got the sick-
ness fi rst? How did the camel get mange?’ Osman’s conclusion was that ‘God 
imparted the disease to each of the animals’ rather than the disease transmitting 
itself from one animal to another. To him, the fact that the victims in this case 
were animals and not humans made no difference. God, in his view, thus acts 
without any intermediary, human or otherwise. Anyone who believed otherwise 
and/or took precautions cast his own faith in doubt. To him, such beliefs or 
actions led to the delusion that humans could act like God.
For Osman, a Muslim’s only proper response was to resign him- or herself to 
fate (tevekkül), believing that God has extended His blessing if he or his family 
are struck by plague. If the affl icted was a pious Muslim, then he or she had 
nothing to fear, since plague was in fact ‘a blessing and a martyrdom’ in that 
it dispatched the believer to heaven. Conversely, if a non-Muslim died from 
plague, it would be a torment, since he or she would be sent to hell. Osman cited 
the hadis where Muhammad stated:5
plague (taun) is both God’s punishment and blessing. If you are in a place where 
the plague strikes, you should stay and wait patiently. Nothing will happen to you 
except God’s will. God will give you the same place as a martyr.
Osman further posited that plague was, in fact, the equivalent of holy war. 
He cites another hadis where Muhammad prayed: ‘Oh God, please let my 
people (ümmet) die for you in war or in plague (taun)! They should die by a 
thrust (ta’n) of the enemies of religion or of taun. That way they may become 
martyrs.’ Here he noted that linguistically the Arabic terms for thrust (ta’n) and 
plague (taun), or ‘one who has been pierced’ are variants of the same root. At 
another point, Osman quoted Ebussuud Efendi, the greatest Ottoman Islamic 
jurist of the sixteenth century, who in a legal advisory (fetva) was asked if 
martyrs of battle and of plague (taun) were equal to each other. Ebussuud 
repeated (Imam) Ahmad bin Hasan’s fi nding that martyrs from plague and war 
had the same type of wounds, even down to the scent of their blood. Osman 
then pointed out that Muslim scholars (fukaha) and traditionalists (muhaddisin) 
approved of the ruling.6 Thus, Osman inferred that the pious Muslim should 
enthusiastically embrace plague in the same way as he was called upon to fi ght 
Islam’s enemies.
Others supplemented such arguments by claiming that God punished sinners 
with plague. For instance, Bitlisi alluded to God in the Quran punishing the 
Pharoah and the Egyptians for keeping Moses and his people as slaves (Surah 7: 
133): ‘So We sent plagues unto them: wholesale death, locusts, lice, frogs and 
blood: signs openly self-explained: but they were steeped in arrogance, a people 
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given to sin.’ Hamdan similarly pointed out that Ömer bin Elasin’s statement 
that plague resembled ‘a fi re that spread through the mountains’ was ‘a sign of 
God’s punishment’. Osman concurred, stating that God’s punishment would be 
tantamount to defying His will.7
Such dogmatic conclusions about plague were also fairly common among 
Muslim thinkers. To Michael Dols, Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani (d. 1449) was an 
exemplary of ‘Orthodox Islamic’ beliefs that only God can cause plague, that 
death from plague was ‘a blessing and a martyrdom’ for Muslims and God’s 
punishment for the infi dels. Osman’s views also echo the tenth-century Asharite 
school, a widespread reaction throughout the Muslim world to the Mutazilites, 
an earlier Abbasid rationalist school of theology. The Asharites denied that 
humans, or nature itself, had any power of causation. Habits of God formu-
lated all events, atomising time and space, and making autonomous natural law 
impossible.8
Certain Ottoman scholars dissented from these fatalistic arguments. Bitlisi, 
who wrote an extensive defence of his personal choice to avoid plague in 
Damascus when he was returning to Istanbul from pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
Hamdan, an exile from Algeria, who came to the Ottoman Empire after openly 
defying the French occupation of 1830, believed that natural laws of causation 
had an autonomous place in the cosmos. To Bitlisi, God created natural reactions 
that no one should deny: ‘One who drinks water is satisfi ed, but one who denies 
becomes thirsty. Similarly, a person who sees mortal danger, like the outbreak 
of plague, naturally becomes afraid.’ Bitlisi saw such reactions as being in tune 
with both worldly and divine needs.9
Hamdan took Bitlisi’s arguments a step further in an extended article on 
plague in Takvim-i Vekaye (The Calendar of Events), the offi cial Ottoman 
gazette, when in 1838, he wrote a justifi cation for implementing the quarantine 
system:10
No one in the world can any longer ignore that God established connections 
between different objects he created, a kind of reciprocal need and dependence 
on each other. Thus, for instance, hunger is only stopped by feeding; water 
quenches thirst; sorrow follows a mistake; the salvation of man depends on wor-
shiping the true God and being true to His laws. At the same time, He assigned 
all inanimate beings appropriate characteristics, such as the stars, minerals, 
vegetables and numerous species of animals. [For example], fi re burns and water 
quenches thirst. It is true that the Almighty, if He wishes, can suspend the effect 
of his laws as happened to Ibrahim. However, that is an exception. [In general], 
these laws are invariable, as needs can only be satisfi ed by way of analogous 
means. That is because hunger requires feeding, thirst water, disease medicine.
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Here Hamdan claimed that natural causation explained far more than simple 
individual reaction to stimuli. He posited instead that the natural laws that 
governed such causes showed a world where the divine played a limited role in 
earthly events. God’s power was superior, but rarely exercised.
Both Bitlisi and Hamdan also argued that human initiative was key to enact-
ing God’s will in such a world. For instance, Bitlisi believed that God gave 
human beings the gift of rational thought in the expectation that they would use 
these facilities when in danger. A person’s choice of responses in this situation 
ultimately conformed to God’s will. If the individual chose properly he or she 
would have taken the elected path (ihtiyar-i vacib). If, however, he or she chose 
a response counter to the divine will, God’s will would nonetheless prevail. 
Hence, choosing the right path would confi rm rather than contradict the idea 
of resigning oneself to God. Choosing the wrong path would not conform to 
 resignation, but ultimately would be insignifi cant.11
Hamdan, who seconded these notions, claimed that those who argued about 
God’s other-worldly purposes were betraying His will by refusing to deal with 
material realities. This diversion into fantasy was contrary to true resignation. In 
his opinion, resignation meant taking precautions and leaving its ultimate impact 
up to God.12
To both Bitlisi and Hamdan, the most imperative of God’s commands was to 
use one’s rationality to avoid danger. For example, Bitlisi invoked the Quranic 
injunction to eat forbidden food if need be (Surah 16: 115): ‘He has only forbid-
den you dead meat, the blood and the fl esh of the swine and any food over which 
the name of other than God has been invoked. But if one is forced by necessity, 
without wilful disobedience, then God is oft forgiving, most merciful.’ Bitlisi 
believed wholeheartedly that eating forbidden food when one was in danger of 
starvation was very much akin to a person who was in peril of losing her or his 
life to plague. Thus, a Muslim could take a measure to save his or her life, even 
if it was against Islamic tradition.13 Hamdan similarly stated: ‘Take precaution 
and get ready by any means but do not put yourself in harm’s way: God created 
you and your actions.’14
This focus on human initiative paralleled Hamdan’s and Bitlisi’s reliance 
upon Muhammad’s and his companions’ actions to understand and overcome 
nature. The main message was that mankind needed to control its own fate, a 
humanistic argument seen among Islamic thinkers. Moreover, adherents of this 
view believed that humans could not only understand natural logic – the limits of 
the created – but even comprehend the limits of the Creator and His need for man 
as an independent actor. The result for the Ottoman revisionists was a secular 
understanding of the world that complemented the divine.
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Justifying Medicine
Osman, however, saw no divine sanction for human efforts to overcome the 
terrible disease. Instead, Osman believed that only prayer directed at fulfi lling 
God’s will was an acceptable response. Here, he cited a hadis about Muhammad 
and his wife, Ayşe, attending to three companions, who came down with a 
fever shortly after immigrating to Medina. When Ays ̧e came to visit the sick, 
her father Ebu Bekir, one of the companions, asked her to recite a verse. The 
other companions responded similarly. Ays ̧e, concluding that the verse they 
had given her made no sense, approached Muhammad to work out what to do. 
To her, Ebu Bekir and the companions effectively said that ‘if God wants, He 
will show you the right path’. Osman heartily agreed with such sentiments, but 
disputed the conclusion of the earlier scholar Ebu Harrire, who pointed out that 
Muhammad then ordered a prayer to dispatch the fever away from Medina. To 
Osman, Muhammad’s prayer was coincidental. Osman claimed that the only 
time people prayed to escape plague was in 1349. This incident led to denials that 
the outbreak was anything other than a blessing. He also disputed Al-Asqalani’s 
conclusion that private prayers were permitted. Osman commented that no one 
prayed when plague broke out later in the second half of the eighteenth century.15
Other Ottoman scholars disagreed. Some, like an anonymous eighteenth-
century Ottoman writer, believed that prayer and a pious lifestyle were wholly 
legitimate ways to combat plague. He listed a thirteen-point guide in this regard, 
saying that a Muslim could get rid of plague by:16
(1) being completely clean; (2) asking for God’s forgiveness; (3) gratefully 
praising God; (4) asking for Muhammad’s intercession while praying; (5) eating 
according to Islamic law (halal); (6) not owning questionable property; (7) not 
desiring to acquire things; (8) having a peaceful heart and clean ideas; (9) having 
hidden pleasure; (10) avoiding taking refuge in worldly matters; (11) having 
healthy beliefs; (12) not being [hypocritical]; and (13) having God illuminate 
one’s heart.
This harkens back to earlier fourteenth-century literature on the Prophet’s 
Medicine, which, as Fazlur Rahman mentioned, allowed ‘the general educated 
public easy access to preventive and curative measures’.17 Ottoman schol-
ars endorsed these measures as a supplemental method of combating plague. 
Ebussuud, for example, argued that prayers and other good actions, such as 
being clean, dressing properly, using exulted speech, giving alms to the poor, 
 worshiping God and bearing witness to the faith helped stop plague.18
A host of scholars also judged that prayers and other pious activities were 
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permissible. Ghazali argued that prayer against plague was the ideal means to 
avoid imminent death. Tas ̧köprüzade quoted Süleyman Darafani on the impor-
tance of praying against plague, and said that it was more effective on the holiest 
days and times. Hamdan proclaimed prayers as permissible according to the 
Hanafi  tradition, the dominant judicial denomination of the Ottoman Empire. 
Such prayers typically begged God to stop the deadly disease. For example, 
Bitlisi and an anonymous eighteenth-century writer both called out: ‘Oh God, 
You are the protector! Please make the disastrous plague go way!’19
Most Ottoman scholars further posited that Islamic law sanctioned medicine 
as a legitimate means of helping the sick and needy. For instance, Taşköprüzade 
alluded to a hadis from Ebu Harrire where Muhammad was trying to take care 
of two companions of his who suddenly became sick. Muhammad brought two 
physicians to see the patients, but who objected to treatment saying that one 
should trust in God. Muhammad demanded that the physicians give them medi-
cation proclaiming that: ‘He who created the problem also created the cure.’20 
This hadis illustrates that physicians play an important role in bringing about 
God’s will. The general consensus among Ottoman scholars was that physicians 
had a legitimate role to play within Islamic society. In this regard one anonymous 
author wrote that ‘acting according to physicians’ suggestions is not considered 
taking refuge in worldliness as opposed to God’.21 Hamdan similarly concluded 
that the knowledge of medicine was just as legitimate as that of Islamic law.22
Hamdan also called for Islamic thinkers to accept that physicians could 
come up with more effective treatments based on their own experience: ‘There 
is no need to deny things proven by experience.’ He went on to conclude that 
new precautions based on experience were not innovation (bidat): medical 
knowledge was separate from religion and inspiration. Both spiritual and experi-
mental sources were acceptable cures for disease as long as they did not openly 
 contradict the faith.23
Muslim thinkers like Hamdan would use such arguments to praise the work 
of quarantine and public health policy offi cials, as well as plague doctors, since 
their pious work was just as necessary to society as that of any imam. It was also 
an argument that Ottoman reformers would use to justify the state control of a 
profession that previously worked under the roof of Christian and Islamic pious 
foundations.
The Natural Transmission of Disease
Ottoman scholars also thoroughly debated whether plague or other diseases 
could be transmitted naturally. Osman, the Ottoman dogmatic who did not 
believe in natural transmission, recalled the hadis that ‘there is no contagion 
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(edva), no augry, and no bird of death’. Citing the interpretation of the Abbasid 
scholar Imam Turpeşti, Osman claimed that Muhammad’s prohibition was defi n-
itive. An anonymous Ottoman writer confi rmed this hadis. Some questioned 
the context of the hadis, however, especially since the statement was directed 
‘against heathen divination still in use at the time’. There is also a question about 
translating the term edva as ‘contagion’. The term most often used for contagion 
was sariye.24
Proponents of contagion cited two hadises that testifi ed to the spread of 
disease among animals. In the fi rst, Muhammad commented about an animal 
who became sick after drinking water at a well with another sick animal, pro-
claiming: ‘Do not have the sick interact with the healthy!’ The second hadis is 
where Muhammad told the Bedouin with the sick camels and sheep to fi nd the 
camel that fi rst got the disease. Osman protested that contagion did not explain 
either case since the exact term sariye was never used explicitly. Others took a 
different view. Tas ̧koprüzade believed that God may have started the disease, 
but it spread from animal to animal thereafter. He traced his opinion to Imam 
Turpeşti.25
Hamdan added his own insights on rabies (mümriz), questioning those schol-
ars who believed that the spread of disease was limited to animals and not to 
human beings. Although Hamdan readily admitted human superiority, the fact 
that rabies spread from animals to humans proved that the natural transmission 
of disease occurred between all God’s creatures. He therefore concluded that 
empirical observation shows that intermingling spreads disease.
Ottoman scholars focused their attention on a list of transmissible diseases 
that the Abbasid scholar Tabid Ibn Qura (d. 901) passed on to his fellow prac-
titioners of medicine. According to Osman the list included leprosy (cüzzam), 
scabies (uyuz), smallpox (çiçek), measles (kızamık), eye pain (göz ağrısı); bad 
breath (ağız kokusu) and a variety of plagues (emraz-i vebeviye). The most con-
troversial disease from this list was leprosy. Those who believed in contagion 
most often quoted Muhammad’s saying that ‘one should escape from leprosy 
like you would from a lion’. Hamdan, citing Al-Asqalani, argued that it showed 
Muhammad’s wish that people should avoid harm. Osman countered that 
Muhammad’s directive to leave the leper may have been translated incorrectly. 
In his mind, Muhammad’s directive to leave was most likely due to a cause unre-
lated to disease, such as going to a more agreeable climate.26
Those who questioned the natural transmission of leprosy most often cited 
the case where the Prophet had a dinner with a leper. Osman argued that his 
action showed that the disease was not contagious. Hamdan also believed that 
leprosy was not contagious while the victim lived, but following his or her death 
it was passed on to another victim. An anonymous Ottoman writer maintained 
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that the question of contagion was irrelevant in the light of Muhammad’s charita-
ble action. In his opinion, the moral of the story was that people should take care 
of the sick regardless of personal danger.27
Ottoman scholars also examined plague as a naturally transmissible disease. 
One such instance is the statement by Ömer bin Al-As (573–664) that ‘plague was 
a fi re that spread through the mountains’. Rather than focusing the above-men-
tioned notion that the spread of plague was a punishment from God, Süleyman 
Ibn Ahmed Al-Tabarani (873–970) thought that nothing would happen to those 
who got out of the way of plague. Hamdan concurred with this interpretation, 
adding that the spread of plague could be explained by natural means.28
In addition, Taşköprüzade pointed to a hadis about a tribe, who, after com-
plaining to Muhammad about the epidemic, were told to leave since they were 
likely to catch the disease if they remained in the vicinity. Muhammad warned 
that ‘those who remained close would perish’. Osman disputed that Muhammad 
was referring to the transmissibility of plague, but, as with leprosy, was refer-
ring to possible changes in the weather. Here he hinted at another hadis where 
Muhammad ordered a tribe to change the weather after they had said that they 
were upset with it.29
One may conclude, therefore, that scholars came to no clear consensus 
over whether diseases like plague were transmissible or not. Islamic legalists 
like Osman never accepted that Muhammad sanctioned the transmissibility of 
disease; if Muhammad did, it would have shown the limits of divine power. 
Nevertheless, the clear majority of Ottoman scholars accepted the counter- 
argument that diseases were, in part, a natural phenomenon. This left the door 
open for active precautions against the plague.
On Fleeing
The most common precaution people took in the Empire to ward off plague 
was to fl ee an area once the plague had struck. Osman’s late eighteenth-century 
 testimony bears witness to this development:
Some look outside and inadvertently imagine that this terrible disease spreads. 
If someone in a household is struck by the plague (taun), they decide to fl ee due 
to the fear of contagion and they go to another location. Sometimes those who 
remain are fi rm, and do proper supplication to God and do not change their loca-
tion. Consequently, three to four die in their household. People are perplexed 
as a result of these deaths, and change their location in order to expel the terror. 
The majority of the population surmises [that the disease] is contagious . . . They 
prefer changing location and have come to support fl eeing out of fear. 30
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This statement verifi es that most Ottoman subjects understood plague as a natu-
rally occurring phenomenon that required a physical response; namely, leaving 
the area.
Ottoman statesmen and thinkers had long condoned such practices, however. 
Bitlisi’s defence of his decision to avoid plague in late fi fteenth-century Damascus 
was followed by legal decisions which permitted fl eeing on a broader scale. The 
mid-sixteenth-century Law Code of Süleyman the Magnifi cent took up the ques-
tion of epidemics and whether the public should take steps to avoid the disease:
What is taun? Is it recurring? Is it legal to fl ee and how should those who have 
fl ed be judged? According to the sayings of the Prophet and the Muslim com-
munity, plague [taun] is a jinn which has affl icted the Muslim community with 
God Almighty’s permission. A prior case judged that fl eeing is not prohibited. 
However, it is also right for one to pray for God’s mercy.31
The Code, implemented on an empire-wide scale, condoned fl eeing as a permit-
ted custom among the people. The reference here to the spiritual nature of plague 
should not be confused with the acknowledgement that the disease was, in part, 
an earthly phenomenon. Ebussuud Efendi, the author of the Code and the single 
most infl uential Islamic jurist of his time, further clarifi ed the urgency of sanc-
tioning fl eeing when he was asked ‘if according to Islamic law plague breaks out 
in a village if it was permitted for Muslims, their wives and their children to go 
to a non-Muslim village’. His answer was that ‘it was permitted if they trust in 
God Almighty’.32 This opinion indicated that fl eeing should be allowed even if 
it transgressed traditional religious principles; namely, that Muslims should live 
separately from their non-Muslim counterparts.
Opponents of fl eeing – like Osman – had a very diffi cult time dealing with 
such legal precedents. Osman could only respond by disputing the authenticity 
of the statement that ‘fl eeing from plague was acceptable’. He claimed instead 
that Ebussuud was really referring to leaving a ‘wicked place’. This revised 
understanding would allow Osman to assert that God was directly responsible 
for transmitting plague rather than admitting natural transmission as the cause. In 
other words, fl eeing was a response to God’s direct spiritual action.33
Bitlisi took the opposite tack. To him, plague may have been created by 
God, but once it appeared on earth it took a natural form that required a physi-
cal response, most often fl eeing. Fleeing, he believed, was an obligatory act of 
human reason in the face of deadly danger. Someone who successfully fl ed from 
plague thereby demonstrated the superiority of his or her rational choice to one’s 
mere animal-like nature. God pre-ordained such a choice, a step that allowed the 
chooser to become an instrument of divine will.34
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Bitlisi, together with Tas ̧köprüzade and Hamdan, justifi ed fl eeing using 
Islamic sources that discussed entering or leaving a plague-infested area. The 
fi rst of the two main sources to discuss the prohibition on entering a plague-
infested area is the previously discussed controversy surrounding Caliph Umar 
(634–44), and his decision to avoid a plague which had struck Damascus in a 
place called Amwas in 639.35
Ottoman scholars hotly debated the signifi cance of the Amwas incident. On 
the one hand, Bitlisi, Tas ̧köprüzade and Hamdan argued that Umar’s choice not 
to enter Amwas set a legal precedent that Muslim jurists should obey.36 On the 
other, Osman cited Ubaydah’s dissent as the real moral of the story, claiming 
that what Umar did was in fact a grave sin. Osman further asserted that Umar 
later regretted the decision when he went back with his army to Medina. Umar 
apparently declared to his companion Kasım bin Muhammad: ‘O God, please 
forgive me for my return from Serag!’ Osman thereafter condemned the major-
ity of Islamic thinkers for omitting this part of the story in order to justify the 
prohibition on entering a plague-infested area.37
The second source is the hadis where Muhammad declared ‘if you hear of 
plague (taun) occurring somewhere, do not go to the place’. This prohibition 
was cited by numerous Islamic scholars from Abdurrahman bin Awf (d. 652), 
Abu Muslim Al-Khawlani (d. 684) and Imam Bukhari (810–70) to Bitlisi, 
Taşköprüzade and Hamdan as the defi nitive word for those who wished to avoid 
a plague-infested area. Osman bitterly contested this judgement. He fi rst argued 
that the hadis itself was not properly documented. In this regard, he claimed 
that Imam Bukhari, the fi rst to record the hadis, received the material sixth-
hand: Bukhari was told it by Hafs bin Umar, who heard it from Sabe, Sabe from 
Habib bin Evi, Habib from Ibrahim ibn Saad, Ibrahim from Usama bin Zeyd, 
and Usama from Saad. He contended that this chain of reporters (isnad) was 
defective, and therefore should not be accepted as a valid saying of Muhammad. 
However, Osman did not specify who falsifi ed the account, and thus did not 
provide adequate proof to discount the saying.38
Osman then made three further counter-arguments. First, Osman said that 
even if Muhammad’s prohibition on entering a plague-infested area was true, 
Muhammad must have had an ulterior motive: He was concerned about relatives 
and friends who would claim their loved one died because they had entered. 
Such gossip, in Osman’s opinion, would only encourage people to give into 
the temptation to fl ee death. Second, he claimed that a person who thought 
that entering a plague-infested area would lead to death was in fact betraying 
his faith in God’s divine providence. Thus, this saying was blasphemy. Third, 
Osman argued that one could enter a plague-ridden area if one’s trust in God 
was strong. If a person is destined to die, his or her fate would guarantee that 
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person a place in Heaven. If he or she was not struck down by plague it would 
be an act of God’s mercy.39
Hamdan also wished to loosen the prohibition on entry, albeit for entirely dif-
ferent reasons. He agreed that the bulk of the population should not be allowed 
to enter a plague-infested area, but he wished to make an exception for state 
offi cials, particularly those who would implement public health measures like 
a quarantine. He argued that those offi cials should be allowed into walk into 
danger in order to protect the Muslim community.40 This assertion built on 
Ebussuud’s sanction of fl eeing and prayer for the common good.
Arguments about prohibiting leaving a plague-infested area rely on two of 
Muhammad’s other sayings. In the fi rst, Muhammad exclaimed: ‘Whoever is 
fl eeing from plague (taun) is like someone who is fl eeing from an enemy on 
a battlefi eld. If you are a patient with plague, you are like someone struggling 
with the enemy.’ Muhammad’s wife Ays ̧e apparently added that those who fl ed 
plague were like deserters from battle. Critics of fl eeing emphasised Ayşe’s 
interpretation, believing that taking precautions was, in effect, abandoning one’s 
duty to struggle (jihad). To Osman and others like him, the moral was to abandon 
precaution and resign one’s fate to God.41
Supporters of fl eeing, namely, Bitlisi and Hamdan, ignored Ayşe’s commen-
tary and tried to work their way around the prohibition. They believed instead 
that Muhammad sanctioned fl eeing as a way to ‘arm oneself for the holy strug-
gle’. They each cited Ghazali’s statement that God predestined both the plague 
and the prayer meant to repulse it: if plague was a shaft, prayer was its arrow. 
Hamdan elaborated: ‘When you are fi ghting in war and kill people, it is actually 
God who kills, not you. When you strike an enemy on the battlefi eld, it is really 
God who did it, not you.’42
Bitlisi and Hamdan used Ghazali’s images to alter the interpretation of the 
battlefi eld saying in two fundamental ways. First, they have taken Ghazali’s 
endorsement of prayer to ward off plague as implying that physical precau-
tions like fl eeing from plague were equally valid. This is ironic given Ghazali’s 
standing as the great mystic of his age, who spent much of his time critiquing 
philosophers who argued in favour of experience and innovation. Second, Bitlisi 
and Hamdan used Ghazali’s imagery of spiritual precaution as a weapon to turn 
Ayşe’s ‘deserter’ into a ‘holy warrior’. Bitlisi believed himself to be a perfect 
example of such a ‘holy warrior’. Hamdan argued that it was the Muslim com-
munity that could become holy warriors by leaving a plague-infested area. This 
once again showed his attempt to transform the Ottomans’ belief in jihad as a 
justifi cation for holy war into a legitimisation of society’s struggle for a better 
way of life.43
Ottoman supporters of fl eeing similarly tried to bend the meaning a second 
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hadis where Muhammad warned people ‘not to leave a plague-infested area’. 
Ebussuud attempted to redefi ne Muhammad’s warning as a ‘reprehensible’ 
(mekruh) rather than a forbidden act (haram). He argued that plague was a 
punishment from God that was not always meant for everyone in the area it 
struck. Therefore, those who were not the targets of God’s wrath should fl ee the 
premises. Osman countered Ebussuud’s argument by looking at the case of the 
guilty who likewise tried to fl ee. Since these people were also targeted for divine 
punishment, they may well spread the plague to other areas. Hamdan dismissed 
both of these arguments and believed instead that God would strike those who he 
had intended without regard to the innocent. Fleeing, like all precautions, ‘was a 
habit whose impact is left to God’.44
Hamdan then took another angle by introducing medical experience as a 
reason to loosen the prohibition on leaving a plague-infested area. He posited 
that physicians had recently shown that those who left an area immediately after 
a plague had broken out stood a greater chance of escape if they left immediately. 
Those who could not go should be left behind.45
One may draw a number of conclusions from these extended debates. 
First, both those who favoured and those who opposed fl eeing as a precaution 
against plague were forced to contradict Muhammad’s sayings. Those who sup-
ported fl eeing may have accepted Muhammad’s sayings not to enter a plague-
infested area without question. But at the same time they contradicted those of 
Muhammad’s sayings which prohibited people to fl ee from a plague-infested 
area. Similarly, opponents of fl eeing defended Muhammad’s prohibition on 
leaving an area, but denied prohibitions on entry.
Both sides used arguments about predestination to bolster their opinions. 
Both sides agreed that plague tested those who were nearby when it struck. To 
opponents of fl eeing like Osman, a Muslim ‘passed’ the ‘test’ by not giving in 
to his fear, and remaining in the vicinity of the plague-infested area. Those who 
‘failed’ gave in to their temptation and fl ed. In making this decision they gave up 
their spiritual beliefs in order to save their lives. This would be futile, since God, 
the direct cause of the disease, would take all He wished.
To proponents of fl eeing, the ‘test’ was using one’s reason to avoid harm. 
To Bitlisi and Hamdan those that ‘passed’ realised that plague may have been 
initiated by God, but was in fact a natural phenomenon that acted according to 
natural laws, including transmission. God expected dutiful Muslims to realise 
this and respond by fl eeing: a physical precaution. There was no spiritual con-
sequence for those who failed, but their natural lives may have been at stakes.
Both sides contradicted these arguments at times. If we take Osman’s posi-
tion,46 for instance, how could a person who was targeted by God spread the 
disease to someone who was not? If this was so, would not this mean that plague 
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was spread by natural transmission instead of by divine purpose? Conversely, 
Ebussuud said that those who were not targeted by God had the right to fl ee a 
plague-infested area.47 This would make no sense if plague was spread simply 
by divine purpose. He instead implied that plague worked by natural and divine 
means simultaneously. Similarly, Hamdan’s point that precautions were predes-
tined leads one to think that humans could ultimately not understand the ration-
ale God used to organise and interact with the world.48 Would not recognition 
of God’s inherent superiority lead people to conclude that human rationality was 
limited? It seems that Hamdan instead laid the foundation for rationalising the 
sources of faith to justify his own reform programme.
Finally, one wonders why Bitlisi and Hamdan so strongly advocated fl eeing 
as a way of avoiding plague given their personal motives. Bitlisi certainly 
refused to enter Damascus when he found out it was plague-infested, but he did 
not ‘fl ee’ since he was never there in the fi rst place. Hamdan’s idea of quarantine 
did not technically involve fl eeing: those who were caught in a plague-infested 
area should stay and those who were outside should not enter it. Thus, it is puz-
zling that Hamdan argued in favour of a person’s right to leave an area the plague 
had struck. The only hesitation Hamdan seems to have had was the need of state 
offi cials to enter a plague-infested zone for the good of public health.
Nevertheless, one should highlight a central difference between the pro-
ponents and opponents of physical precaution against plague: the proponents 
actually carried out reforms. Just as Ebussuud legislated fl eeing as an option 
for Ottoman subjects, so, too, Hamdan implemented quarantine as a part of the 
nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms. Bitlisi and Hamdan faced opposition from 
some Islamic jurists, but ultimately their ideas won out. Despite Osman’s oppo-
sition, Hamdan’s work was the fi nal word on Islamic law and offi cial measures 
against plague.
Civic Duty
The last problem that proponents of reform needed to overcome was that of civic 
duty: if people fl ed a plague-infested area en masse, who would care for those 
who were left behind? Even proponents of fl eeing, like Bitlisi, Taşköprüzade, 
Ebussuud and Hamdan, raised doubts. All argued that the poor and the sick 
would suffer if everyone left them; the dead would not be buried; and strategic 
places could fall into the hands of the enemy. Moreover, those who fl ed might 
truly regret their actions after they heard of the plight of their neighbours and 
loved ones.49
In this sense, Prophetic Medicine, which prescribed charity as a primary 
component, played a critical role. Ghazali, the advocate of prayer as a means 
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to combat plague, argued strongly that it was the moral duty of Muslims to 
take care of their own. Hamdan concurred. One could not ignore Muhammad’s 
injunction that Muslims should help each other, that they should take care of 
the sick, and properly bury their dead. Proponents of fl eeing reluctantly agreed. 
Bitlisi claimed that fl eeing was sanctioned only if most stayed behind to take 
care of the rest. Taşköprüzade stated that one should not fl ee a plague-infested 
area if it caused disorder, either in one’s household or in the community at large. 
Ebussuud also hinted at the need of the state to maintain social order.50
Some even went so far as to argue that charitable action would also protect 
someone against plague. Our anonymous eighteenth-century writer claimed that 
‘those who help plague victims with food and sustenance will be protected’ and 
that one who ‘gives alms by meeting the funeral expenses of a plague victim 
will be saved from the disease’.51 Here Osman’s call for people to simply resign 
themselves to fate had little resonance. To Hamdan, only a saint could endure 
such hardship. This lifestyle, however, was not meant for the common people. 
The moral of the argument was that the response to plague always had to take 
society’s most vulnerable into account. As Ghazali stated: ‘You should act prop-
erly towards the weak among you’ and ‘walk at the same pace as the weakest 
among you’.52
The answer to resolving doubts about the needs of the poor was state inter-
vention. Ebussuud pointed out in the mid-sixteenth century that the state would 
continue to meet society’s needs even when people had fl ed from plague. 
Hamdan’s reform-era quarantine was a far more ideal solution. People did not 
have to fl ee, but in the worst case would be confi ned to their homes in neigh-
bourhoods. Quarantine stations would target travellers, foreigners and merchants 
far more than common subjects. In time, the Ottomans would come to regard 
the quarantine system as a mere extension of the welfare state. Nevertheless, 
Hamdan’s quarantine reform helped to convey the powerful understanding that 
the Muslim community’s ‘greater jihad’ was its internal struggle for a life free 
of suffering; a key justifi cation for social reform, particularly in the nineteenth 
century, when the Ottoman Empire had given up any hopes of dominating its 
European rivals.
Fazlur Rahman pointed out that there is a rich stream of hadises that support 
social activism, and potentially public health measures such as the quarantine 
that Hamdan was proposing. At one point Muhammad asked: ‘Did you see the 
one who gives the lie to the faith?’ He answered that: ‘It is he who maltreats 
orphans and works little for the feeding of the poor. Woe betide, then, those who 
pray yet are neglectful of their prayers.’ He later stated bluntly that ‘When an 
orphan cries, God’s throne shakes’ and that ‘a person who helps the widows and 
helpless is waging jihad’.53
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English Comparisons
One should consider such discussions on fate and individual action, justifying 
medicine, the natural transmission of disease, fl eeing and civic duty outside 
a purely Ottoman or Islamic context. For instance, one fi nds many parallels 
between the above arguments on fate and individual action among Protestant 
English religious thinkers from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. One 
constant line of argument among the English echoed Osman’s dogmatic view 
that God was omnipotent and directly responsible for choosing who contracted 
and died from the plague. These English dogmatists further posited that God 
alone was aware of the ultimate causes and purposes behind a plague outbreak. 
In their eyes, humans could not necessarily understand, for example, what sin a 
plague victim was being punished for, when God had determined that a person’s 
time on earth was at an end, or if dying from plague was a blessing since a worse 
fate was in store for the survivors.
Again like Osman, the English dogmatists argued that the worshiper should 
resign him- or herself to God’s fate rather than dwelling on imperfect, fi nite 
human logic, or the emotional distress of losing a loved one. The focus for 
both visions was clearly on God rather than on His prophets or, in the Christian 
case, Jesus Christ. The English dogmatists, like Islamic thinkers, would cite the 
example of God punishing the Pharaoh for enslaving Israel by striking down the 
Egyptians with plagues, particularly the fi nal one brought by the Angel of Death 
which killed the fi rst-born male of every family. The Angel, who acted directly 
on God’s orders, may have killed ‘innocent’ children, but the action served the 
teleological purpose of saving God’s chosen people. Denying God’s agency and 
justice was blasphemy.54
These views found a ready audience in England. The majority of printed works 
on plague are sermons which refl ect such lines of argument. The sermons, like the 
other English literature on plague, were mainly published during plague years 
(for example, 1625, 1636, 1665 and 1720), when public concern was undoubt-
edly high. One also sees that the authors of such texts were often dissenting 
English Puritan Protestants, who differentiated themselves from the state- oriented 
Anglican Church of England. Unsurprisingly, their criticism of individual action 
to prevent plague deaths dovetailed with their general condemnation of High 
Church, pro-quarantine rulers (for example, Charles I and Charles II).55
Opposing the English dogmatists were those who maintained that God was 
purely good, but did not determine all events. These English ‘revisionists’ admit-
ted that plague was evil in the sense that it caused suffering and death. Plague, 
like other evils, was the consequence of mankind’s fall from grace in the Garden 
of Eden; an agent that destroyed the fl awed, compromised and imperfect.56
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God had created man in His own image, and, having placed him above all 
other creatures, gave him the task of using his reason to prevent such human 
misery. If man, the steward of nature, were to do nothing but resign oneself to 
God’s fate, he would in fact be betraying God’s trust. He should instead put his 
knowledge into practice by following the example of Jesus Christ, the Second 
Adam, whose example of individual action would pave the way for mankind’s 
rehabilitation. He should bear in mind Jesus’ continual healing of the sick, 
his watching over his followers and the downtrodden, and above all, his self- 
sacrifi ce even when he could count on God the Father for divine intervention. 
This is perhaps best illustrated when Jesus, after being tempted by the Devil 
to cast himself down from the Temple Mount to be rescued by God, refused, 
saying that this would be giving into sin by needlessly taking advantage of his 
divinity.57
One sees once again similar discussions on the function of prayer and justi-
fi cations for medicine in the English literature on the subject. One witnesses, for 
instance, that English prayer writers also sought to mobilise their worshipers’ 
sense of moral reform in order to combat the disease. This can be seen, at least 
indirectly, in a 1561 ‘parody on such nostrums’:
Take a pound of hard penance, and wash it down well with water of your eyes, 
and let it lie a good while at your heart. Take also of the best fi ne faith, hope and 
charity that you can get, a like quantity of all mixed together, your soul even full, 
and use this confection every day in your life, while the plagues of God reigneth. 
Then, take both your hands full of good works commanded by God, and keep 
them close in a clean conscience from the dust of vainglory, and ever as you are 
able and see necessity to use them. This medicine was found written in an old 
Bible book and it had been practiced and proven true of many, both men and 
women.58
This ridicule of prayers for spiritual renewal in such times of adversity is also 
witnessed in modern scholarship’s condemnation of such ‘Prophetic Medicine’ 
as a denial of the natural world. This strong materialist bias often misses the 
social importance of beliefs; namely, as a disciplinary tool to maintain order in 
a time of crisis. One sees this tendency when Charles II’s public proclaimed a 
general fast when the great plague of 1665 broke out in London. One could well 
imagine a similar call by the sultan when plague broke out in his realms.
Unsurprisingly, English prayers on plague, like those of their Ottoman coun-
terparts, were extremely popular. The contents of these prayers, however, refl ect 
the greater debate between dogmatists and revisionists that we also saw in the 
Ottoman case. A minority, largely made up of non-Anglican English dissenters, 
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took up Osman’s view that the plague was either God’s judgement or bless-
ing and should not be avoided. One prayer published in the wake of the 1720 
Marseilles outbreak exemplifi es this point of view:
I bow myself, Oh righteous Lord to thy blessed will; and acknowledge this 
my visitation to be the just reward of my sins; O visit me here, that I may not 
suffer for them eternally hereafter; and grant, that I may so truly and earnestly 
repent of them, so meekly submit to thy chastisement, and have such steadfast 
faith in Christ my Saviour, that through his death and passion I may obtain the 
remissions of my sins, and everlasting life after death. Amen, merciful Father, 
Amen.59
The majority of the prayer publications, sanctioned by the offi cial Anglican 
Church, recall the mainline Ottoman supplication for God to stop the plague:
Have pity upon us miserable sinners, who are now visited with great sickness and 
mortality; that like as though didst then command then accept of an atonement 
and didst command the destroying angel to cease from punishing so it may now 
please the Lord to withdraw us this plague, and grievous sickness, through Jesus 
Christ Our Lord. Amen.60
One other prayer, published in 1793, goes so far as to acknowledge plague as an 
infectious disease rather than simply a punishment:
All reason it is, that we offer unto Thee our most sincere and hearty thanks, for 
mercifully assuaging the grievous and infectious sickness, with which of late we 
have been so sorely affl icted, and for restoring again the voice of joy and health 
to our dwellings.61
Here context is once again vitally important. The writers of this passage included 
it in a collection of common prayers at a time when quarantine reformers and 
their state sponsors sought to broaden their public appeal. One cannot fi nd an 
identical validation of contagionist reforms in the plague prayers as they predate 
the Ottoman quarantines reforms of Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II 
(1808–39).
One also fi nds that many English plague pamphlet writers justifi ed medical 
practice in religious terms similar to that of their Ottoman counterparts. Reacting 
in large measure to claims that ‘physicians [were] . . . [of] no value’ since 
they did not understand God as the primary cause of the disease, these English 
 revisionists posited that God sanctifi ed the physician’s work:
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Such an inquiry after natural and second causes, is more proper for a man of skill 
in physick and philosophy, who may now show their love to mankind, if they can 
trace the intricate workings of this subtle disease, and prescribe suitable remedies 
to prevent or relieve – for human means must act their part with God’s blessing 
upon them.62
This passage reminds us of the fundamental Protestant notion of ‘a priesthood of 
all believers’, where every calling was equal before the eyes of God – even those 
based on secular, experimental knowledge.
There is no major theological discussion about contagion among the English 
authors. They were more interested in the larger question of whether plague was 
of natural or divine origin. Those who made the distinction between contagionist 
and miasmatic causes looked towards experience, prior physicians and philosoph-
ical works rather than scriptural justifi cations. This stands in contrast to Ottoman 
Muslim authors who debated the issue more extensively, although they largely 
concurred that the plague was indeed contagious. The only exception among the 
English religious pamphlets was one by James Balmford in 1625. Balmford cited 
leprosy as a biblical example of contagion, since it mentions that people tried to 
avoid ‘the unclean’. This he argued should be extrapolated to include plague, 
since it was proven to be contagious by natural reason and expense.63
Nevertheless, it is also interesting to consider Hamdan’s remark about 
rabies passing from animal to humans, as this widened the concept of contagion 
beyond mankind. This idea largely paralleled early modern English thinkers, 
who gradually deconstructed the classical Aristotelian dichotomy of humans as 
rational/spiritual creatures who stood distinct from irrational, non-soul possess-
ing animals in favour of a new understanding that blurred these categories.64 
Hamdan seemed to be taking a similar line of argument with an added implica-
tion: how could a disease be a punishment from God if animals, who could not 
think or sin, were also among its victims? This reasoning led to a more naturalis-
tic view of disease. Contagion as a rational concept had therefore begun to defy 
both biological and religious divides.
There is a fairly sharp contrast between Ottoman and English religious think-
ers with regard to fl eeing. Although both English and the Ottomans wrote on 
the topic largely during the sixteenth century, the English and other European 
writers almost uniformly condemned the practice as un-Christian, citing in 
part that it was a spontaneous reaction by a population fearing death. Beza, for 
example, condemned fl ight as a betrayal of one’s sense of charity, and Jesus’ 
command ‘to do unto others as you would have them do unto you’.65
Benjamin Newton, an English writer, reacted with a similar argument on the 
plight of the plague victim:
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How far [will the fear of contagion] drive far from him all assistance, and relief; 
how, when he most of all stands in need of help, he shall fi nd none that will 
venture to administer it to him; [he] shall fi nd no ties of humanity, or kindred 
strong enough to hinder all mankind from abandoning, and fl ying from him.66
One should not conclude that Ottoman justifi cations of fl ight necessarily con-
tradicted these views. It should be remembered that Muhammad’s and Umar’s 
commands not to enter a plague-ridden area were directed at the community and 
did not relate to spontaneous actions to avoid plague out of fear. Bitlisi alone 
cited fear and individual instinct as a justifi cation for his own personal case. The 
only writers to second this opinion were Ottoman or English treatise writers, 
who wrote from a purely experience-based, natural perspective that fl ight was an 
effective method of avoiding the disease.67
Moreover, many English religious thinkers pushed for quarantine reform by 
positing that God only sanctioned orderly attempts to protect the community. 
This is very much in line with Muslim arguments emphasising that Muhammad 
and his successors acted to ensure the welfare of the faithful. There is no mis-
taking the English writers’ reference to Moses instructing the Jewish people 
to protect themselves from plague in Egypt by painting a sign of faith on their 
doors when the Angel of Death was about to pass. At least some pastors recog-
nised that the English practice of quarantining the sick in houses marked by a 
cross followed this example. The early eighteenth-century preacher O. Hughes, 
for instance, explained that both Moses and the reformers protected private 
households:
Enter into thy chambers, and shut the doors about thee. The Hebrew word, which 
we translate as chambers, signifi es the innermost and safest part of any house; 
and as much as men usually choose such a part to rest in, the word often in scrip-
ture is used to denote the bed-chamber. So that here good men are directed to get 
into the safest and most secret places, and to shut their doors, to make all safe 
about them.68
This statement did not recognise a crucial difference between the Biblical and 
English practice. Moses’ mark was meant to ward off plague, where the English 
cross was meant to prevent the sick from going outside the house. Ironically 
enough, the symbol of a cross also took on new, morbid meaning. One could 
see it as a symbol that Christ paid for the sins of the affl icted or dying. Thus, 
the government used the popular fear of suffering and death to reinforce their 
measure.
One also sees many references among the English to reform the nation during 
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times of plague. The English religious writers had a variety of causes, such as the 
need to unite as a nation to protect their ‘unique’ religious and political values:
There is no nation upon earth that has had greater experience of the divine good-
ness, than we have had. We have long enjoyed the inestimable blessing of a 
free and legal government, while other nations have groaned under the violence 
of arbitrary oppressions. We have had the free use of our reason and the Holy 
Scriptures allowed us, which under other governments, which yet call them-
selves Christian, have, for many ages together, been persecuted even to death.69
Inherent in such statements is the need to distinguish oneself from others. In this 
case, it was ‘papist’, ‘arbitrary’ continental Europe (read: France);70 in another it 
would be the so-called fatalistic Ottoman Empire:
The [Ottoman] public government [makes] . . . no provision to keep this fatal 
distemper at a distance from their country, nor may private persons withdraw 
themselves from the impending danger. With a kind of pious gravity, or shall I 
not rather call it an enthusiastic stupidity? They will ask, can you fl ee from God? 
Or hide yourself from His omnipresence? Will He not fi nd you out in your closest 
retirement? And can He not reach you at the greatest distance? If your time be 
come, if the determined period of your lives be at hand, it is vain to seek security. 
Fate is unalterable, and its stroke inevitable. Allow only the principal, and the 
conclusions are indisputable.71
Conclusion
Contrary to this mischaracterisation, this chapter has established that most 
Ottoman religious writers across many centuries were not dogmatic, essen-
tialist Muslims who uniformly denied proactive measures against plague as a 
natural disease. The only well-known ‘dogmatist’ to espouse these views was 
Osman, himself a one-time reformer under Sultan Selim III. Although Osman 
was often able to draw on the Quran and other Islamic authorities to support his 
case, Ottoman revisionists were usually in the majority. By 1838 – a time when 
the new Sultan Mahmud II was intent on modernising the Empire and resisting 
revolt and colonisation – Hamdan was able to convince a receptive audience 
of the need to support quarantine and other new medical innovations. Osman’s 
earlier appeal to divine authority alone in opposition to such measures may even 
be viewed as a desperate attempt to derail the bureaucratic effort by provoking 
popular outrage against the government. The reformers attention to seeking 
greater public support seemed to have largely defused such efforts.
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This gradual consensus compared well with even the most ‘enlightened’, 
‘reform-minded’ European countries, such as England. Key English authori-
ties were able to deftly construct religious rationales for quarantine and related 
medical reforms as they did for other natural sciences from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries. The English opposition largely echoed Osman and the 
Islamic dogmatic objections towards plague – especially with regard to God’s 
omnipotence and their denial of the natural world. Admittedly, there were differ-
ences. Osman, like earlier Islamic dogmatists, raised specifi c objections to con-
tagion, while English dogmatists categorically disputed the natural explanation 
of disease. Likewise, the Ottoman revisionists until Hamdan debated the merits 
of fl ight from plague, where English revisionists instead approved the quarantine 
even by the late sixteenth century. Yet the degree to which both the Ottomans 
and English used similar arguments – on the importance of individual and state 
efforts to combat human suffering by mastering natural medical science – illus-
trates that these differences cannot fundamentally be explained in religious 
terms. Both Islam and Christianity provided modernisers with a path towards 
reform.
Notes
 1. Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanī, p. 1291.
 2. Bitlisi, Hısn ül-veba; Ebu’s-suud Efendi, Risale-i Ebussuud; Kemaleddin Taşköprüzade, 
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Plague and Ottoman Medical 
Thought
Introduction
Although both Ottoman and European religious leaders often sanctioned the fi ght 
against epidemic diseases from the sixteenth century onwards, the Europeans 
undoubtedly adopted quarantine long before the Ottomans. Renaissance writers 
from Boccaccio to Fracastoro wrote of the contagious nature of plague, and a 
number of Italian city-states established quarantines as early as the fi fteenth 
century to isolate those sick with plague.1 Other European states – particularly 
maritime powers like England and France – adopted the institution during the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. London’s great plague of 1665 and the 
Marseilles outbreak in 1720 convinced many of the need to more strictly enforce 
isolation measures in order to protect people from exposure to deadly diseases 
from overseas. Even expatriate merchant communities from these countries 
sought to avoid plague in the Ottoman cities of Cairo, Smyrna and Istanbul by 
quietly implementing their own quarantines there.2
Yet the differences between the Ottomans and the European maritime 
powers were much more subtle than fi rst meets the eye. Ottomans and other 
Middle Eastern Muslim plague treatise writers from 1347 to 1600 did not fun-
damentally differ from their western European counterparts. Both Europeans 
and Muslims often understood plague in contagionist terms and circulated their 
works in narrow courtly or academic circles. In fact, European and Muslim 
scholars would often interact in a way that made it hard to differentiate between 
the two ‘civilisations’, as they freely borrowed new concepts, experiences and 
 comparative models from each other.
The gap between the European and Ottoman Muslim perceptions of plague 
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only occurred between 1600 and 1800 with the rise of mercantilism and overseas 
commercial development in north-western Europe. Institutional reforms like 
quarantine came as a result of a state-led programme of economic development 
and radical social change, beginning with maritime states such as England. 
English plague treatise writers in particular participated in this evolving system. 
One witnesses fundamental changes in both their social context – an emerging 
commercial print culture – and ideological content – the mercantilist economic 
values of their works. In short, they would become new willing contributors to a 
national economic agenda that would justify mercantilist reform in the name of 
public health.
Strikingly, the Ottomans did not directly respond to the newer European 
quarantine and mercantilist discourse until after 1800, when plague treatise 
writers like Hamdan began to call for reform. The Ottoman government simply 
did not implement a state-led modernisation programme, much less a quarantine. 
There were comparatively fewer seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman 
plague treatise writers than in the sixteenth century, although they too remained 
limited to courtly and academic circles. Thus, unlike their English colleagues, 
they did not participate in print culture or refl ect new commercial interests. 
Nevertheless, their differences with mercantilist plague treatise writers were 
more economic than cultural, as they, like their sixteenth-century predecessors, 
remained receptive to new ideas and innovations. The Ottomans had a contin-
ued commitment to proactive measures directed at protecting health, and had 
at least a limited discourse with the outside world. Still, European mercantil-
ist success would eventually pressure the Ottomans by exposing them to new 
commercial and military threats. Commercially, the new mercantilist powers, 
especially England, would disrupt the Ottoman economy and even threaten its 
sovereignty in the name of modern, western European public health. Politically, 
this ideological threat would lead to growing demands for the empire’s partition 
and colonisation.
Early Medical Contributions
Scholars have argued that western Europeans had responded differently to 
plague than their Muslim counterparts ever since the initial 1347–8 outbreak. 
The fi rst evidence they point to is Europe’s popular reaction to plague as a con-
tagious disease.3 Boccaccio, who wrote his famous Decameron in the immediate 
aftermath of the Black Death in Florence summed up this attitude:
What gave more virulence to this plague, was that, by being communicated from 
the sick to the hale, it spread daily, like fi re, when it comes in contact with large 
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masses of combustibles. Nor was it caught only by conversing with, or coming 
near the sick, but even by touching their clothes, or anything that they had 
touched before.4
As a result, people ‘[avoided] the sick, and everything that had been near 
them . . . Others . . . in greater numbers left the city, their houses, relations 
and effects, and fl ed into the country’. Boccaccio decried these practices as 
utterly inhumane, since the sick and poor were often left to fend for themselves, 
without proper care, food and water. He believed that many died needlessly as 
a result.5
Most scholars see the establishment of quarantines in places like Florence 
and other Italian city-states within a generation of the 1347–8 outbreak as a 
natural response to these threats to the social order. Containing the disease within 
restricted areas, such as boats and guarded hospital wards, where plague victims 
could be isolated but cared for, seemed to resolve the problem.6
Most historians of the plague admit, albeit reticently, that early modern 
medical thinkers generally did not accept such notions. Instead, they, like a 
number of their Muslim colleagues, came to a different consensus about the 
plague’s causes, preventive measures and cures. In their opinion, plague was 
originally a corruption of the air that disturbed all creatures’ natural humoral 
balance. Earthquakes, fetid water, rotten corpses, a southerly wind or intemper-
ate weather could all cause the ill-wind to blow, forcing frogs, rats, insects and 
birds to fl ee and striking down all who remained. Once a victim breathed in the 
poisonous air, the heart, the chief organ of the body, would overheat and lead to 
a mortal fever. The victim would display a variety of other agonising symptoms 
before death, including headache, light-headedness, sore throat, buboes, cough-
ing up blood, profuse sweating, pain and discolouration on the side, the armpits 
and the groin.7
The medical writers also prescribed uniform preventive measures and recom-
mended specifi c dietary measures that would strengthen one’s humoral balance 
and the heart, such as fi gs, dates, raisins, nuts, pomegranates, light white wine 
and fresh spring water. They prohibited certain foods, such as leguminous veg-
etables, meat, milk and fi sh since they were prone to spoil quickly, and were 
affected to a much greater degree by the corrupt air.8
Furthermore, the writers believed that one could prevent plague by chang-
ing the environment. They believed, for instance, that those who sought higher 
ground could avoid plague, since the corrupt air tended to remain in low places. 
Those who had to stay in affected areas could still burn incense or dry, aromatic 
wood and herbs. Additionally, people should avoid bathing, as this would open 
one’s pores to the moist, sickly air.
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Cures were also aimed at restoring the victim’s humoral balance, although 
the writers conceded that these were desperate measures. They included blood-
letting or ‘cupping’, classical medical ingredients like rose water, vinegar, 
lemon, Armenian earth and spices like black pepper.9
Historians of medicine ironically note that Al-Khatimah and Al-Khatib, 
both Muslim writers from the Umayyad kingdom of Granada, would be among 
the fi rst medical thinkers to mention the contagious nature of the disease. Like 
Boccaccio, both Al-Khatimah and Al-Khatib wrote their works in the immediate 
aftermath of 1347–8. Al-Khatimah, wrote, for instance, about his own personal 
encounters with the plague:
The best which long experience has taught me is that when anyone comes into 
contact with a sick man, forthwith the same disease seizes him, with the same 
symptoms; if the fi rst sick man has spit blood, he also spits it; if the former was 
hoarse, he likewise becomes hoarse; if with the fi rst buboes appeared on the 
groin, so do like buboes appear in the same place with the other; if with the fi rst 
a boil arose, there arises with the second in a like boil; also the second sick man 
carries the sickness on farther. The family suffers in the same way, shows the 
same symptoms; if the sickness of one member runs a fatal course, the others 
suffer the same fate; if the sick man is saved, so they also escaped death. In this 
way on the whole, with slight differences, has it gone in our city.10
However, Al-Khatimah would later go on to deny the contagious nature 
of disease, since he contended that contagion was contrary to Islamic law. 
Historians cite this reversal as a key point in the history of medicine, as it showed 
that Muslim religious orthodoxy stifl ed the development of critical, experimental 
thought.11
Al-Khatib, a friend and close companion to Al-Khatimah, heartedly objected 
to such restrictions:
If one asks ‘How can you admit the assertion there is infection, when the 
revealed word denies this?’ We answer: that infection exists, [and] is confi rmed 
by experience, research, insight, observation and through constantly recurring 
accounts. These are the elements of proof. For him who has treated or recog-
nised this case, it cannot remain concealed that mostly the man who has had 
contact with a patient infected with this disease must die, and that, on the other 
hand, the man who has had no contact remains healthy. So it is with the appear-
ance of the illness in a house or quarter because of a garment or a vessel; even 
an earring can destroy him who puts it in his ear, and all the inhabitants of the 
house.12
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European writers, beginning with Fracastoro, picked up on these ideas in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Fracastoro argued specifi cally that 
‘seeds of contagion’ were responsible for the spread of the plague, and not just 
moist, corrupt air that passed from person to person. Modern authors judged that 
Fracastoro’s prediction that germs were responsible for the spread of disease 
presaged the end of the Galenic system of thought.
Many scholars also see Fracastoro as an almost revolutionary fi gure who 
bridged the gap between popular contagionism and literary elites, and led future 
generations of medical thinkers to directly participate in formulating quarantines 
and other related public health policy reforms. They also point to Fracastoro’s 
use of new inventions, such as the printing press, to disseminate his contagion-
ist ideas. These developments, in turn, helped early modern states to extend 
their social control over the population, and in the process, helped to generate 
 commercial development.13
These arguments beg careful reconsideration. First of all, it is not clear what 
connections Fracastoro had with his quarantinist contemporaries. Fracastoro’s 
works did appear at a time when Italian city-states such as Venice and Florence had 
quarantines. However, the expansion of the quarantines to urban bureaucracies 
specifi cally dedicated to epidemic control, permanent plague hospitals (lazarettos) 
and cadastral registers of the dead began only some fi fty years after his death, at a 
time when maritime states sought greater economic and social control over their 
populations. Fracastoro’s claims may have been popular among academic circles 
in northern Italy and southern Germany, but they did not spur debate between 
quarantine offi cials and the Italian commercial elites who, facing new expenses 
and restrictions on their Mediterranean overseas trade, may have opposed them.14
Despite these limitations, historians contrast the dynamic growth of con-
tagionist thought with Muslim writers, whom they contend simply ignored 
Al-Khatimah’s and Al-Khatib’s initial accounts. At best, Muslim writers restated 
Galenic maxims about the miasmatic and humoral origins of the plague, and, at 
worst, followed Al-Khatimah’s lead in repressing medical thought in the name 
of religious dogmatism.15 Yet to date there has been little serious consideration 
of what this ‘second generation’ of Muslim scholars, the bulk of whom were 
late fi fteenth- and sixteenth-century patrons of the Ottoman court, actually wrote 
about the plague.
There is a remarkable amount of contagionist and innovative thought among 
these writers, however. For instance, Bitlisi wrote prior to Fracastoro in around 
1500 that plague and other diseases were contagious:
Plague is spread by smelling, touching and seeing. This contagion is similar 
to what happens with rabies among dogs and other animals. With rabies, dogs 
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spread the disease by biting others. As I have seen by experience, rabies also 
spread just by touching and breathing.16
This passage is especially signifi cant as Bitlisi grounded his assertion in his own 
experience, not just what he read. This cuts against the argument that Muslim 
authors either repeated Galenic maxims or rejected scientifi c innovation.
Other authors supported their own observations with attributions to earlier 
Muslim writers. Bitlisi, an anonymous seventeenth-century Ottoman writer and 
Osman, a late eighteenth-century anti-contagionist critic, claimed that Muslim 
doctors long considered plague to be one of the great contagious diseases, a 
status shared with leprosy, mange, fetid breath, measles and smallpox. Similarly, 
Al-Yahudi, a late fi fteenth-century Jewish convert to Islam who fl ed to the 
Ottoman court, asserted that Avicenna personally witnessed the contagious 
nature of plague. He also said that ‘Ibn Rüshd [Avveroes] of Cordoba mentions 
that a person who isolates himself can avoid plague’. This raises the curious 
argument that even key twelfth-century Islamic thinkers could presage the 
idea of a quarantine some two hundred years before the Black Death. Perhaps 
Al-Yahudi sought to cover his own personal arguments – like his warning 
‘not go in crowded districts’ – with earlier renowned authorities so that his 
 recommendations would be accepted within literary Islamic traditions.17
Most early modern Ottoman treatise writers advocated fl eeing as a measure 
to avoid plague. As seen in Chapter 2, Bitlisi’s own work is an extended Islamic 
legal justifi cation of his own fl ight from a plague outbreak in Damascus and parts 
of Anatolia when he was returning from a pilgrimage from Mecca.18 Al-Yahudi 
scrupulously avoided such legal arguments, and accepted the ‘most experienced 
Christian physicians’ suggestion to fl ee from a plague infested area’ since ‘even 
the birds and animals cannot endure’.
Al-Yahudi and the other early modern Ottoman writers made some pro-
vocative prescriptions as cures for the plague. Al-Yahudi stated a number of 
times that wine was a good remedy, without mentioning that Islamic jurists 
almost universally condemned consuming alcohol, and wine in particular. The 
seventeenth-century anonymous author made a similar suggestion. Al-Yahudi 
also mentioned that Avicenna prescribed plague victims to drink a Venetian 
treacle, a complex concoction that also included alcohol and snake blood, both 
prohibited by Islamic law. Al-Yahudi disagreed, but only because he did not see 
it as  effective in practice.19
Other authors also made surprising prescriptions. An anonymous 
 seventeenth-century prescription collection included opium and sulphuric acid 
among its ingredients, alongside the more traditional garlic, onion, vinegar 
and rose water.20 Such chemicals were hardly the rule for ‘traditional’ Galenic 
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medicine. Moreover, Bitlisi went so far as to suggest the use of quicksilver, a 
chemical that came into vogue in Europe at roughly the same time that he wrote 
his work. Bitlisi mentioned that he not only used the drug for plague during an 
outbreak in Diyarbekir, but also even earlier when the fi rst syphilis pandemic 
broke out in Europe in 1494:
It [syphilis] was not heard of by our ancestors or from earlier philosophers. The 
above-mentioned disease appeared in European lands (efrenc). Since Anatolia is 
close to Europe, it spread from the latter to the Arab, Persian, Indian and Chinese 
lands. It was called ‘ceb-i efrenc’ due to its origin. It is now called ‘frangi’. Many 
people died among the Muslims. The medication which was prescribed during 
this outbreak was unknown previously to physicians and philosophers and was 
not cited in medical books. The medication included melted quicksilver (erbak-i 
mahlul). A number of another chemicals and elements are mixed with melted 
quicksilver to produce the medication. I even used this drug for four months and 
was cured because of it.21
Bitlisi’s advocacy of chemical prescriptions was freely borrowed from his 
European contemporaries and not from previous authorities.22
The fi rst modern Muslim reformists were often dismissive of Bitlisi and 
the early Ottoman plague writers, claiming that the audience and impact of this 
literature was minimal. Such views were very important, as they justifi ed the 
claims of later historians that the Ottomans did nothing substantial about plague 
and other epidemic diseases until the reforms of the 1830s. Sultan Mahmud II’s 
eloquently expressed this argument when he gave his inaugural address for the 
empire’s fi rst European-style medical school in 1835:
It is true that many books were written among us [Muslims] on medical sciences 
and that the Europeans even learned many things by translating these books into 
their own languages. The books were written in Arabic, however, and, as they 
ceased to be objects of interest and care in the Muslim schools for many years 
and as the number of men who knew them decreased, they became obsolete. To 
go back to these works now and plunge into their study in order to translate the 
science of medicine into our own language, Turkish, would be a painstaking job 
actually requiring many years.23
Here Mahmud II makes the assertion that earlier Ottoman medical thinkers, 
plague treatise writers included, in general had outdated ideas and wrote in clas-
sical Arabic, supposedly a language which was foreign to Ottoman Turks and 
others of the empire’s ethnicities. This statement also implies that the Ottomans 
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suffered from a lack of print culture and other technological developments that 
widened the public and scientifi c reception to new medical ideas.
But one should weigh his statements carefully. Although Bitlisi, 
Taşköprüzade and Al-Yahudi’s works were still in circulation in the early 
nineteenth century, as is evident from a rise in manuscripts on the topic during 
Mahmud II’s reign, it is ironic that a number of these new manuscripts were 
in fact translations of texts from Arabic to Ottoman Turkish. These transla-
tors included Ahmed Kürkzade, a prominent early nineteenth-century Ottoman 
notable from Istanbul, and Muhammad Salih, a major fi gure within the 
Nakşibandi tarikat from eastern Turkey and an important player in the imperial 
political scene after Mahmud II had deposed the Janissaries and the rival Bektaşi 
tarikat. Both translators believed that their efforts were important to ongoing 
discussions about plague and other epidemic diseases, such as cholera, which 
had broken out at roughly the same time period.24 If Mahmud II saw these works 
as a waste of time and effort, a number of other participants in Ottoman literary 
culture fundamentally disagreed.
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the impact Bitlisi, Tas ̧köprüzade, 
Al-Yahudi and the other early modern Ottoman authors had on audiences from 
the late fi fteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries. They were indeed aimed at 
a variety of circles, including religious and urban elites, Ottoman statesman 
and court circles. Many in this audience were fl uent in classical Arabic: a legal 
and ecclesiastical language used in many ways like Latin in much of central and 
western Europe. Moreover, a considerable number of readers who saw the works 
in collections in Istanbul and other regional cities (for example, Damascus, Cairo 
and Salonika), doubtless passed on what they read to third parties. They could 
have conceivably read them to others or summarised them orally. They could 
have conveyed these ideas in an institutional setting, such as an Islamic school 
(medrese or mekteb), a local judge’s court, at a local mosque or pious foundation, 
at market or even on the street. Some ideas may even have penetrated emerg-
ing coffee houses, where minstrels could talk of some materials, like Bitlisi’s 
adventures, as a traveller’s tale. Certainly, the works did not have the benefi t of a 
printing press, but such a medium did not begin to have a full impact on medical 
and scientifi c developments until the overseas commercial developments of the 
mid-seventeenth century.25
One should also note that a number of the key plague treatises – such as 
Taşköprüzade’s and two anonymous seventeenth-century works – were trans-
lated at that time into Ottoman Turkish by highly respected members of the liter-
ary elite, such as Ebussuud Efendi, the single most infl uential Ottoman Islamic 
jurist of the sixteenth century, and Abdulgani Efendi, a well-known seventeenth-
century religious fi gure. Although much of the early modern literature on plague 
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remained in Arabic, their translations helped to sow the seeds of Ottoman literary 
culture.26 This mixture of vernacular with ecclesiastic languages is a familiar 
one, considering that a similar discourse was witnessed in Europe at that time.27
In retrospect, one may fi rst conclude that Muslim treatise writers, and the 
Ottomans in particular, exchanged new ideas on all aspects of the plague from 
the Black Death of 1347–8 until the late sixteenth century. In this regard there 
was no major difference between European and Muslim authors. The question 
of whether Muslims and Europeans had differing popular reactions is still open, 
but the frequent suggestions of contagion, fl eeing and even Al-Yahudi’s hint that 
isolation was justifi ed may be evidence of similarity on many fronts. One can 
say with relative certainty only that historians have generally overstated the case 
that Europeans alone reacted to plague with measures based on experience and 
scientifi c observation.
It is also diffi cult to make geographic or comparative notions about the dis-
semination of knowledge and the origins of disease. One frequent thread in the 
history of knowledge maintains that any innovation in Muslim civilisations was 
due to the ‘importation’ of that idea from Europe. Edward Gibbon, for example, 
goes so far as to claim that the Abbassid translators of ancient Greek texts into 
Arabic were Christian Greeks and that the Arabs themselves distained learning 
a heathen tongue.28 Yet such arguments cannot adequately explain how other 
writers, like Bitlisi, could succeed in introducing new medical ideas, since he 
was not of European origin and did not even travel to non-Muslim lands. How 
could a Muslim so freely exchange thoughts on combating plague that were 
in vogue in Europe at the same time, if there was not an intricate and ongoing 
 cultural, social and intellectual exchange between the two cultures?
Instead, the focus should be on the multicultural experience of many of the 
plague treatise writers. Al-Yahudi, the Sephardic Jewish refugee, found his 
counterpart in Bitlisi, who likewise fl ed as a Sunni Muslim from religious perse-
cution by the Twelver Shiite, Ismail Shah. As seen in Chapter 5, it is no mistake 
that these two scholars would be joined in the nineteenth century by Hamdan, 
an Algerian who fl ed French colonisation in the 1830s.29 Each of these authors’ 
exposure to foreign cultures may well have led to greater openness to novel 
conceptions of plague, preventative measures and prescriptions. Among the 
early Ottoman treatise writers, one can see this tendency when Al-Yahudi cited 
Christian doctors who prescribed untraditional, seemingly prohibited cures like 
alcohol, and when Bitlisi made a pitch for quicksilver, a non-Galenic chemical 
treatment.30
Strikingly, the comparative notion of judging an ‘other’ civilisation as 
the origin of an epidemic disease was also not limited to European authors. 
Admittedly, even the ancient Greek Thucydides, the fabled ‘father of history’, 
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contended that the plague that struck Athens in 430 BCE originated in East Africa 
and travelled to Greece via Egypt and Persia.31 Fourteenth-century European 
writers likewise believed that the Black Death came from central Asia.32
In contrast, Bitlisi claimed that syphilis came from Europe. Such a claim 
may well have stemmed from a shared dialectical tradition of ‘otherness’ that 
went back to the ancient Greeks, but the growing exposure between various 
global cultures must also have played a role. Syphilis indeed broke out during 
a time of transatlantic travel and the beginnings of European expansion. Just 
as the Ottomans would blame syphilis on the Europeans, so too the Europeans 
asserted that syphilis originated in America. This multi-layered discourse reveals 
that such writers conveyed their own biases, comparing one ‘civilisation’ with 
another. This comparative approach developed even further in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, when reformers and/or colonist-minded European 
thinkers often contrasted their own ‘progressive’ ‘modern’ agenda with that of 
the ‘backward’ past. Thus, ‘facts’, ‘witness accounts’ and ‘observations’ about 
the origins of disease, or how one should react to it, have a long history of 
being socially constructed. Seemingly, ancient Greeks, Western orientalists and 
Muslim innovators have all been more than happy to construct such myths.33
Quarantines and Mercantilist Discourse
The development of quarantines among the maritime powers of Europe in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was pivotal to changes in medical 
treatise discourses on plague. These states adopted contagionist measures as 
part of a general mercantilist policy of state-led commercial and economic 
reforms aimed at controlling overseas trade routes by monopolising markets 
in which they would import raw material goods, export manufactured products 
and maintain a favourable balance of trade.34 Such states, particularly Britain, 
Holland and France, began by developing their navies of ‘ships of the line’, 
seaworthy, ocean-going vessels with the most up-to-date cannonry, as well as 
their merchant marines of new, fl at-bottomed sailing vessels that allowed for 
a far greater volume of bulk goods. These states thereafter initiated a series of 
reforms – establishing monopolistic trading companies, levying tariffs against 
foreign goods,  subsidising overseas commercial commerce, promoting new 
credit  institutions – in order to achieve their agenda.35
Establishing quarantines helped to justify these policies of state intervention, 
particularly in the Ottoman Empire, which many Europeans imagined being as 
plague-ridden since the 1347–8 outbreak passed through Constantinople and 
Cairo. It was no accident that the quarantine offi cial who met the trading vessels 
on the docks, was also frequently charged with taking customs and enforcing 
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trade monopolies. Mercantilist states often exercised sovereignty by controlling 
the economy in the name of public health.36
The plague treatise writers who debated quarantine and other preventive 
measures in a mercantilist context played a fundamentally different role to that 
which they had previously. Beforehand, plague treatise writers were tied to 
relatively limited court and academic circles. Some, like Fracastoro, may have 
entertained the idea of contagion, but they did not translate those ideas into insti-
tutions. For example, Italian city-states like Venice, Genoa and Leghorn may 
have regularly quarantined vessels for up to forty days from the late fourteenth to 
the sixteenth century, and in about 1600 may have even developed public health 
offi ces, permanent lazarettos and cadastral records of the plague dead. But there 
was no broad debate in print involving said state offi cials, plague thinkers and 
the merchant community. In sum, literary elites remained aloof from popular and 
state efforts at quarantines, even in the decades after Fracastoro’s death.
Once the quarantines were established in the Atlantic mercantilist com-
munities of north-western Europe, new commercial interests began to question 
the effi ciency of such measures – especially if they perceived quarantine to be 
eating into their profi ts. Medical treatise writers often themselves participated in 
merchant ventures or were partisans of state reforms. In either case, the writers 
and their works aimed at this newly emerging public sphere. It was at this time 
that the writers fi rst really made use of printed books, pamphlets and commercial 
gazettes to sell their ideas to their rapidly expanding readership.37
One really witnesses the beginning of such debates in London during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when plague treatise writers began to par-
ticipate themselves in formulating new state policies on plague, trade and over-
seas commercial ventures. One can see this, for instance, when members of the 
College of Physicians, such as Dr Richard Mead, called for quarantine measures 
and met responses from state offi cials, like Sir James Porter, long-time British 
Ambassador to the Porte, members of the merchant community, such as the 
British Levant Company’s Dr Patrick Russell, and even reformist-minded critics, 
like John Howard.38 London’s commercial elites and booming urban economy 
were dependent on a powerful navy and merchant marine opening the way for 
overseas trade, such as with the Ottoman Empire. Their overseas trade with such 
places certainly played a great role in generating new wealth, particularly by 
providing an emerging British textile industry with bulk goods, such as cotton, 
wool, fl ax and silk. However, they also brought new public health problems to 
the fore. Extensive contacts with distant foreign lands were a conduit for danger-
ous new epidemics. Advocates of quarantines did not forget that most European 
accounts of the Black Death claimed that the disease came through the eastern 
Mediterranean and Constantinople, after it fi rst broke out in central Asia. More 
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recent literature on syphilis pointed to the European exploration of America as a 
cause for epidemics. The numerous Native American deaths the Europeans saw 
from smallpox were just one reminder of this trend. They also were aware that 
the drawbacks of London’s rapid urban growth – congestion, fi lthy conditions, 
immigration and social change – often could also foster disease and death. Many 
saw these developments as the causes behind the plague of 1665, and the great 
fi re that followed it in 1666.39
In response, English statesmen and politicians began to take new protection-
ist measures in order to address these concerns, thereby promoting the country’s 
commercial and demographic development. Some of these measures, like the 
Bills of Mortality, which calculated London’s death rate, satisfi ed both the 
statesmen and the merchants. On the one hand, the Bills were seen important for 
determining to what extent plague endangered the population, and led to possible 
preventative measures (for example, travel restrictions, quarantine and sanitary 
improvements). In fact, John Graunt attempted to write the fi rst statistical survey 
of London based on these fi gures in 1661. This work and others like it would 
lay the groundwork for later demographic studies, better known at the time as 
‘political arithmetic’. On the other hand, the Bills led to greater commercial 
development, since they allowed people to draw up life insurance based on the 
death rate. This provided investors with greater fi nancial security, and holders 
even began to use their policies as a form of paper currency. This helped to alle-
viate England’s dependency on precious metal coinage, a major problem in all 
early modern economies. It also paved the way for even greater developments, 
such as stocks and bonds which fuelled London’s rise as the world’s pre-eminent 
fi nancial capital, and the headquarters of commercial and industrial revolution.40
Quarantine restrictions relating to trade would prove to be far more contro-
versial. The Royal College of Physicians recommended as early as 1636, that:
care be taken that neither man nor goods may come from any suspected places 
beyond the seas, or in the land, without a certifi cate of health, or else either to be 
sent suddenly away, or to be put to the pest-house, or suchlike place, for forty 
days (according to the custom of Italy).41
In times of emergency, such as London’s Great Plague of 1665, royal authority 
enforced such quarantines. Merchants might have protested the measure, but 
were reassured that it would be dropped after the plague subsided.42
After the plague broke out in Marseilles in 1720, the Royal College of 
Physicians, having now gained greater standing as a state institution, pushed 
for a permanently enforced quarantine. The main culprit, they maintained, were 
imported goods from the Ottoman Empire, including cotton and fl ax (from Cairo 
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and Syria), wool (from central Anatolia) and silk (from Bursa). Not accidentally, 
these items made up the bulk of England’s Levant trade, and were key to her 
textile industry.43 Dr Mead, the chief author of the measure, saw:
that of all the goods which harbour infection, cotton in particular is the most 
dangerous, and Turkey is almost a perpetual seminary of the plague; I cannot but 
think it highly reasonable, that whatever cotton is imported from that part of the 
world, should at all times be kept in quarantine; because it may have imbibed 
infection at the time of its packing up, not withstanding no mischief has been felt 
from it by the ship’s company.44
England’s commercial elites, particularly Levant Company partisans, bitterly 
protested this restriction, arguing that the merchants and sailors involved in the 
trade would surely have been the plague’s fi rst victims if cotton, and other like 
porous items, were indeed infectious:
The merchants who have lived in Turkey can inform us, that after the plague has 
ceased, they, or their servants, do handle and smell the cotton etc. without receiv-
ing any injury. Every one who has been in Turkey well knows that stevedores and 
sailors often work naked, in stowing the cotton. This is a laborious employment, 
and the hold of the ship is excessive hot. Further, the cotton packs or bales are con-
tinually handled and tumbled about; the labourers too are often bare footed, there-
fore they cannot help treading continually on the merchandise brought aboard.45
Others asserted that the plague was never transmitted in England from the 
Ottoman Empire, as it was endemic to that country alone:
Has not merchandise been brought from many parts of Turkey, all which have 
very deservedly an ill name for the pestilence, that very commonly rages among 
them? And how comes it to pass that during this constant, and uninterrupted 
commerce, when soft and porous goods, the proper somes, have been brought 
from Smyrna, Iskenderun, Aleppo, Constantinople, and other parts, the pesti-
lence has never taken a journey hither, in all appearance, those fi fty-fi ve years 
[since the Great Plague of 1665]?46
There were even some who claimed that the quarantine of goods could spell the 
end of England as a mercantile power:
The Venetians (says a certain author) were long possessed of the profi table 
Turkey trade, and were almost the only merchants that traded into Turkey, 
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and furnished the western parts of Europe with this merchandise; in all that 
time they had no notions of the frequent plagues being conveyed in goods they 
brought home, and were transported into other nations. And it is very remark-
able, that about the time they instituted offi cers of health, and begun the practice 
of  quarantines . . . their trade fell sensibly into decay. Our merchants about the 
same time made experiments of the Turkey trade, and became proselytes to this 
Turkish opinion, that a plague is not conveyed in goods.47
This passage illustrates the fear that quarantines established in England would be 
a devastating public expense and bureaucratisation that would kill trade and play 
into the hands of the country’s commercial rivals.
Parliament ignored most of these protests when it passed Mead’s Quarantine 
Act in 1721. Although they did not establish lazarettos in England proper, British 
government offi cials, acting through their Ottoman consulate, would judge 
whether a quarantine of varying lengths needed to be carried out at a number of 
Mediterranean ports (for example, Malta, Ancona, Messina, Venice, Leghorn 
and Marseilles). If there were no rumoured or confi rmed cases of plague, the 
British offi cials could issue a ‘clean bill of health’ meaning that the ship would 
either be exempt from quarantine or only required to wait up to two weeks in 
one of the lazarettos. However, if there were concerns about plague, the British 
Consul would issue a ‘foul bill of health’, requiring a full quarantine of forty 
days.48
New protests soon circulated against these measures. Some, like James 
Porter, a former British Ambassador resident in Istanbul, stated categorically that 
he had never heard of plague affecting any of his countrymen:
There is not, indeed, upon record, nor has a single living witness ever related 
an instance of an English factor, or servant’s dying of the plague at any of the 
seaport towns, or in any other part of Syria, or Asia Minor, but only one at 
Constantinople, in almost a century; though the disease frequently rages in that 
metropolis.49
Such statements may have led to arguments about the innate superior health of 
the British, or perhaps the benefi ts of the British diet or hygiene. The main point, 
however, was that the British should waste no time bothering about contagionist 
measures, as it would only hurt the Levant Company’s profi ts.
Others claimed that the methods used for quarantining merchandise, such 
as the airing of cotton, actually damaged the product. John Howard, the late 
eighteenth-century reformist who generally advocated for stricter quarantine 
measures, admitted this himself:
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The cottons are taken out of the bags containing them, and placed in rows of 
piles, upon boards lay down on stone pillars about 18 inches from the fl oors; and 
in repacking they are fl ung over a man who gets into the bags, in order to tread 
down the cotton; the consequence of which must be exposing him to greater 
danger should any infection remain. This, though the surest way of expelling 
infection from cotton, is not the most agreeable to merchants, not only because 
more expensive, but also [because it damages the merchandise].50
Yet another popular argument among the merchants was that the Levant 
Company and the local consul needed no further governmental supervision after 
loading in port. Porter argued, for instance, that the merchants took extremely 
vigilant measures to protect themselves from the epidemic disease:
All communication of the infection must arise either from men or merchandise; 
with regard to the former, when there is the least suspicion of plague in any 
seaport town of Turkey or any neighbouring village, the master of ships, the 
merchants, and the consul are particularly careful and vigilant to keep the vessel 
at a proper distance in the port, and not to suffer any of the ship’s company to go 
on shore; at the same time they will not permit a living soul to come aboard, or 
any good susceptible to infection to approach the vessel. All seamen are strictly 
forbidden to go near it; and, to do them justice, they punctually obey the order: 
for when the fear of that disease is once infused into their minds, they dread it 
more than a wreck, or a cannon ball.51
Porter’s logic here was that a merchant ship’s crew were well aware that the 
journey from the Ottoman Empire to England would take at least two months. 
Plague would rapidly spread in the stagnant air of the ship’s cabin, typically 
killing from a half to two-thirds of the crew before arrival.52
Also popular, of course, were appeals to British patriotism. Porter lauded his 
own countrymen’s survival instincts as a supreme virtue:
The desire of self-preservation is as strongly implanted in the breast of an 
Englishman; it actuates him as powerfully abroad as at home; he would not 
surely venture the loss of his life by infection, if there were the least grounds for 
such apprehension.53
Such statements would seem powerful, especially given the sentiments of many 
Members of Parliament who would decide on the matter, since they too were 
sympathetic to commercial interests, often holding stocks or participating in the 
trade directly.54
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John Russell, himself a factor of the Levant Company, and, interestingly, 
a doctor of medicine who supported Mead’s Quarantine Act, stopped short of 
accusing his fellow merchants of reckless greed:
He must entertain an ill opinion of mankind who can believe any merchant, in the 
Levant, from lucrative motives, would risk the health of his country, by exporting 
merchandise when the plague was raging in the place; or under the conviction of 
his own mind, that his commerce, highly advantageous as it might be to himself, 
might in the event involve thousands of his fellow creatures in misery.55
Patriotic appeals reached their height when it came to trade rivalries, however. 
The English merchants almost invariably compared their own trade with that of 
the Dutch, whose merchant marine and commercial economy competed with the 
English throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Dutch 
were the undoubted pioneers of free trade and were even more reluctant than the 
British to adopt quarantines. James Porter jealously argued that:
The Dutch never receive the contagion directly from thence [the Ottoman 
Empire]; they have admitted ships into their ports, either with clean or foul bills 
of health, and found themselves, as we may, always safe.56
Howard took an entirely different tack when he blamed the great plague of 
1665 on these free-wheeling Dutch traders:
I do not hesitate to affi rm, from the fullest authority of undeniable testimony, that 
it fi rst entered this island by means of contagion, and was brought from Holland 
in merchandise imported from that country, where it had made great ravages the 
preceding year; and if anyone is desirous of inquiring further into its origin, I 
inform him, that if any credit is to be given to report, its seeds were brought into 
Holland from the Turkish empire, along with cotton, which is a most faithful 
preserver of contagion.57
Howard’s argument was highly provocative, given the growing importance 
of Levant cotton in the late eighteenth century. When Mead fi rst pushed for 
his Quarantine Act in 1720, cotton was not nearly as important to the Levant 
Company, as their import trade favoured silk, followed by other raw material 
commodities like cotton. The British cotton textile industry was only just devel-
oping at that time, and its demand was largely met by American and Caribbean 
cotton producers. When Howard wrote in 1787, the situation had dramatically 
changed. The newly independent United States, along with their French and 
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Spanish supporters, did not guarantee the British unfettered access to their colo-
nial supplies of cotton at a time when demand was soaring. Rapid technologi-
cal improvements in the 1770s and 1780s transformed England’s cotton textile 
 production into one of the main engines of the Industrial Revolution.58
Howard furthermore claimed that the Dutch refused to build their own 
 lazaretto to protect the public:
When representations were made in Holland on the necessity of establishing a 
lazaretto to obviate this risk, and the fatal consequences which the introduction 
of the plague might be to all of Europe; but perhaps the Hollanders, ever prefer-
ring the interests of their trade to those of humanity, would not allow so forcible 
an argument to have any weight with them; but gave for answer, that it would be 
time enough to think of a lazaretto when English had built one.59
This picture took on an even more sinister tone when one considers the Dutch 
outsourced up to three-quarters of their cotton trade to the Ottoman Greek minor-
ity, who were granted the right to fl y the Dutch fl ag on their trading vessels.60 
The Greeks, who made up a substantial community in almost all the major 
Ottoman ports, would often give:
False reports concerning the plague . . . Their deputies inform consuls of acci-
dents having happened in their nation, when in reality there is no plague in this 
city or its environs.61
Such criminal activity would depress their British rivals since they would have 
to:
Perform a long and expensive quarantine in the ports of the Mediterranean, by 
which means the cottons which form their principal loading, as well as the chief 
article of both trades, are no less than seven months on their way to London.62
In contrast, the Greeks could quickly move their ships to Holland, where they 
would perform a minimal quarantine, if at all. All told, the Greek ships could 
deliver their cargo at least two to three months before their British rivals. This 
allowed the Dutch to supply more than half of the Ottoman cotton to London. 
Thus, the British quarantine would be compromised by lax Dutch measures and 
potentially contaminated cotton.63 At least some of the supporters of the 1721 
legislation, such as Daniel Defoe, had this loophole in mind, as it supported the 
Channel and Atlantic cotton trades at the expense of the Levant Company.64 By 
the 1780s, this favouritism was no longer in the national interest, since the War 
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of American Independence had cut England off from French, American and 
Caribbean supplies.65
John Howard’s answer to this conundrum was to establish a permanent laza-
retto in England, which all arriving ships would have to undergo. He also called 
for a ban on third-party cotton trade, which in effect meant a shipping monopoly 
for the Levant Company, since the Navigation Acts strictly prohibited foreign 
vessels from trading in English ports. Howard sought the measures in order 
to secure the country’s public health by limiting the risk to plague; but he also 
argued that they would have a profoundly positive effect in promoting British 
trade:
In what a different situation would the establishment of a lazaretto put it? By 
depriving the Dutch of the advantages they now enjoy, we should be able to 
supply the whole quantity of cottons demanded at our market; instead of only 
sending 5,000 bales, we should send more than double that quantity annually; 
and as by a fi xed regulation of the Levant Company, we can only purchase the 
products of this country with the produce of goods sent from England, the impor-
tation of our manufactures would increase in the same proportion. The quantity 
of shipping employed in the trade would likewise be doubled, and by earning 
the freight which is now paid to the Dutch, on the cottons they sent to England, 
it would be so much clearer gain to the nation, added to the advantages which 
would attend the extension of its navigation, an increase of the consumption of 
its manufacturers; advantages which are now enjoyed by our rivals the Dutch, the 
prosperity of whose trade is founded on the ruin of ours.66
The argument that a mandatory national lazaretto would double British cotton 
shipments and increase exports assumed British textile factories would continue 
to fl ood the market even after implementing the quarantine. Regardless of the 
uniformity the measures might create in terms of regulating the trade, the lag 
time of up to seven months per shipment would not change.67 Nevertheless, the 
British did not have to worry about foreign competition, since their navy ruled 
the Mediterranean after Admiral Horatio Nelson’s defeat of Napoleon’s fl eet at 
the Battle of the Nile in 1798. Likewise, the national interest would not be harmed 
if British textile factory owners abandoned the Ottoman cotton market for India, 
where the British East India Company largely dominated cotton production.68
In general, mercantilist plague treatise writers – both quarantine advocates 
and opponents – were much more connected to the public sphere, particularly 
with regard to commercial and trading interests. In 1665, Dr Hodges speculated 
that Dutch imported cotton caused London’s Great Plague, an easy enough argu-
ment when the English were in the midst of a war with the Netherlands.69 In 
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1720, Daniel Defoe would condemn the Levant Company and Dr Mead would 
claim that the Ottoman Empire was the seminary of the plague; both played 
key roles in shaping quarantine legislation that favoured non-Levant trading 
interests. Similarly, mandatory lazarettos were established by 1788 in part to 
secure new sources of cotton and further nationalise trade.70 Yet, from the 1670s 
onwards, there was not a single plague death recorded in London’s Bills of 
Mortality.71 It would seem that profi t rates, not death rates, were the bottom line 
to quarantine reform discussions.
An Ottoman Response?
The issue to consider, then, is why the Ottomans did not adopt a quarantine until 
the 1830s. One might expect the Ottomans to have developed initial measures 
as early as the sixteenth century, given the concentration of plague writers, 
undoubted social and administrative innovations, and their proximity and interac-
tion with Venice, Ragusa and other Italian city-states that had started quarantines 
of their own. At least one European observer, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, the 
Holy Roman Empire’s ambassador to Istanbul between 1554 and 1562 believed 
that the Ottomans dogmatic resistance to innovation explained this discrepancy:
The populace at large rejected the idea of contagion on the grounds ‘that the 
time and manner of each man’s death is inscribed by God upon his forehead; if, 
therefore, he is destined to die, it is useless for him to try to avert fate; if he is not 
so destined, he is foolish to be afraid’.72
There is also no evidence of quarantine reform among the vast numbers of cadas-
tral records governing land, revenue and administrative control during the mid-
sixteenth century, even though key Ottoman Muslim authorities like Ebussuud 
were amenable to fl ight and other medical precautions to avoid plague.73
Yet geopolitical factors, such as the Ottoman loss of sea power, also need to 
be considered. Quarantine reform in Europe was developed in order to protect 
and promote overseas commercial trade, but had no relevance to the Ottomans 
after they had largely ceded control over much of the Mediterranean, Red Sea 
and Indian Ocean and made no efforts to match the European expansion into 
the Atlantic and Pacifi c. The Ottomans, in contrast to European powers like the 
English, could not use a substantial merchant marine to modernise its economy 
and create new commercial links which increased wealth and, incidentally, 
 biological links with the outside world.74
Overseas European merchant communities in the major Ottoman ports of 
Istanbul, Izmir, Beirut and Cairo began to impose their own quarantine. For 
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example, Alexander Russell, a British trader to the Ottoman trading hub of 
Aleppo wrote in 1744 that:
Next to the protection of Divine Providence, the means that the Europeans 
depend upon for their preservation during the time of plague [in Aleppo], consist 
either in a retreat from the city, or in setting up in their town houses, in such a 
manner as effectively to prevent all intercourse or communication by which the 
infection might be received from without.75
In Russell’s opinion:
The advantages of shutting up, are in that country fully confi rmed by experience, 
so that all the Christians and Jews . . . followed the example of the Franks; and 
even . . . the Turks (who on account of an avowed principle of religion, cannot 
openly adopt the custom). Many of those particularly conversant with Europeans, 
devise various pretexts for keeping much at home; sometimes they retire to one 
of their garden houses, as if merely on a party of pleasure; at other times, when 
their affairs will permit, they make a commercial excursion to some distant city: 
A journey to Mecca, under the pretence of devotion, is no unusual expedient for 
avoiding the impending danger.76
Such statements led people to believe that it was only the Europeans or ‘Franks’ 
who could really regulate health and, by insinuation, good government.
In actuality, the Ottomans actually went further with plague control measures 
than most scholars give credit for. While they did not have Bills of Mortality 
or cadastral Books of the Dead as found in seventeenth-century England and 
Florence, one can see certain tendencies that led in this direction. For instance, 
Molla Mustafa Ševki Bašeski, a local Ottoman Muslim notable from Sarajevo, 
chronicles numerous instances of the plague which hit his city in 1746 and the 
following years. In his book he records the name, number and the profession of 
each of the victims. Although his work was not a formal record of the city’s dead, 
I would maintain that one might fi nd similar records in other Ottoman urban 
centres of that era.77
As we can see from Dr Richard Mead, the author of the 1721 British 
Quarantine Act, the Ottoman treatise writers were probably not the only ones to 
believe in contagion:
The late Mr. Williams, chaplain to Sir Robert Sutton, when Ambassador at 
Constantinople [from 1710 to 1714] used to relate a story of the same nature told 
him by a pasha: that in an expedition this pasha made to the frontiers of Poland, 
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one of the janissaries under his command died of the plague; whose jacket, a 
very rich one, had been bought by another janissary, it was no sooner put on, but 
he also was taken sick and died: and this same misfortune befell fi ve janissaries 
more who afterwards wore it. This the pasha related to Mr. Williams, chiefl y for 
the sake of this further circumstance, that the incidents now mentioned prevailed 
upon him to order the burning of the garment: designing by this instance to let 
Mr. Williams see there were Turks who allowed themselves in so much freedom 
of thought, as not to pay that strict regard to the Mohammedan doctrine of 
 fatalism, as the vulgar among them do.78
Ironically, Mead cites a Turk as an example to his British audience, especially 
given his belief that the Ottoman Empire was ‘the seminary of the plague’.79 
Moreover, the fact that the pasha supposedly related the tale to Mr Williams 
indicates the possibility that key Ottoman notables and statesman might have 
implemented quarantine reform if given the chance.
An anonymous British writer soon shot back a counter-argument:
Where should be the wonder, to see several people dying in the same coat, in 
times of pestilence. It is really no more than if several men became heirs to the 
same estate, one after another successively, as the Turks reason. The true state of 
this question is, whether the men had the plague before they put on the coat? Or 
that they died by putting it on? The last is impossible; because of the suddenness 
of the death, and supposing them otherwise in good health: and the former is the 
case common enough in times of pestilence, as we may learn by making a voyage 
to Turkey; where we may fi nd coats of all sorts, belonging to many masters, 
without describing the cause of their death to the habit.80
Here the author posited that most Turks realised the non-contagious nature of 
plague. Like Mead, he also cited the Turks in high regard, in contradistinction 
to many negative comparisons, particularly in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. He also indicated the increasing contagionist/anti-contagionist debate, 
and that Turkish anti-contagionists should not be simply seen as vulgar fatalists 
as Dr Mead asserted.
One instance where the anti-contagionist belief in the environmental, mias-
matic nature of plague led to new innovations was in sanitary reforms. For 
instance, Ahmed Efendi, an Ottoman astrologer, related the following story 
about the plague and Istanbul’s city planning in 1708:
One day after an earthquake the Sultan gathered philosophers together and asked 
them how they could stop it. The learned men said that they could solve the 
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problem but that the solution would cause plague. By building underground res-
ervoirs (sertablar) you could prevent earthquakes since the fumes would gather 
there. Wells are also vulnerable to this. The reservoirs, however, would generate 
fetid air, which would result in plague. The Sultan responded that it was better to 
have this solution since outbreaks of plague were better than earthquakes. You 
could cure plague with medicine but an earthquake would kill up to a hundred 
thousand and damage the buildings. Now days few of these underground 
 reservoirs are left.81
This story is evidence that earthquakes and fi res were seen by the Ottoman sultan 
and the authorities as a greater danger to the city than plague. Nevertheless, the 
later improvements that were made, such as fresh running water, were seen as 
preventing plague. This is not dissimilar to sanitary movements that you would 
see elsewhere, such as in London after the Great Fire of 1666.82
One outside admirer of Ottoman sanitation was James DeKay, a gifted 
American traveller who resided in Istanbul in 1831 and 1832 and who acquired 
an extensive knowledge of the language, culture and society of the people 
there. DeKay was greatly impressed by the Ottoman capital’s water works in 
 comparison with cities in the United States:
Every stranger is struck with numerous contrivances around Constantinople for 
supplying it with pure and wholesome water. Belonging to a city in the United 
States which has long been distinguished for its nauseous and detestable water, 
and for the culpable negligence of its rulers on a subject of so much importance, no 
opportunity was neglected to obtain all the information in our power in regard to 
the hydraulic establishments in this neighborhood. The result, however mortifying, 
must not be concealed, and we therefore state, that on a subject intimately con-
nected, not only with the comfort, but with the health of the people, the commercial 
emporium of the United States is some centuries behind the metropolis of Turkey.83
He later concluded that Istanbul’s waterworks must be at least 50 miles long and 
worth more than $50 million (in 1831). In contrast he also asserted that:
The City of New York, with a population of more than 200,000 inhabitants, has 
been deliberating for years over the question – whether it is expedient to spend 
two millions of dollars for the purpose of introducing a copious supply of pure 
and wholesome water.84
DeKay made several important observations about the commitment of the 
Ottoman government to public health. First he claimed that the Ottoman state 
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maintained a strong and continuous effort to maintain the water works. A separate 
governmental supervisor, and even the head of state often exercised direct control:
So important are these watercourses considered that the sultans have always been 
in the habit of making annually a formal visit of inspection, which is accompa-
nied with much ceremony, and ordering such improvements and alterations as 
are deemed necessary.85
DeKay extensively described a water reservoir. He indicated that there were 
many such constructions in the mid- to late eighteenth century, which again 
substantiates Ahmed Efendi’s earlier story. One should also note, however, that 
the water works were also substantially developed from 1550 to 1560, when the 
population of Istanbul grew from 150,000 to 600,000. There is extensive docu-
mentary evidence that a water inspectorate was founded to regulate the water 
works. Still, the Ottoman bureaucracy often had to maintain a careful balance 
between their desire for regularising control over the capital and the popular 
push for greater rights and privileges over this precious resource.86 This political 
tension was contrary to DeKay’s contention that the sultan exercised absolute 
control of the water.
Nevertheless, there is much to be said for DeKay’s observations on innovat-
ing the waterways. He, unlike many Western visitors, credited the Ottomans 
with improving the city. In contrast to the Roman and Byzantine aqueducts and 
reservoirs, which at the time he wrote had long ‘gone into disuse, as expen-
sive and inadequate for the purposes intended’,87 the Ottomans had invented a 
system of pipes and pillars that collected running water more effi ciently from the 
 hillsides around Istanbul:
They form a striking peculiarity in Turkish scenery, and it was some time before 
the principle upon which they were constructed was apparent. The water leaves 
the brow of a hill, and descending in earth and pipes rises in leaden or earthen 
ones, up one side of this pillar, to its former level, which must be, of course, the 
summit of the pillar, or sooteray, as it is called by the Turks. The water is here 
discharged into a stone basin as large as the top of the sooteray, and is discharged 
by another pipe, which descends along the opposite side of the pillar, enters the 
ground, advances to the next sooteray, which it ascends and descends in the same 
manner; in this way the level of the water may be preserved for many miles over 
a large plain, when an aqueduct would be, from its expansiveness, manifestly out 
of the question. In the city of Constantinople, the old aqueducts that no longer 
conduct water in the usual manner, are converted into a series of sooterays, and 
permits one to examine their structure in detail.88
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DeKay then proceeds to describe the unique features of the invention, with an 
eye on possibly adopting it back home in the United States:
This ingenious hydraulic arrangement seems to possess advantages which might 
recommend its adoption elsewhere. As the pressure is thus divided among this 
series of siphons, the necessity for having very strong and costly pipes is obvi-
ated. As they are from 300 to 500 yards apart, the cost is probably much less than 
by any plan which could be devised, where, in addition to the cost of a canal or a 
series of pipes, we should be compelled to raise it again by the expensive agency 
of steam or some other costly apparatus. The frequent exposure of the water to air 
and light at the summit of these sooterays is another important advantage which 
cannot be too strongly insisted upon; as it is now well known that nothing tends 
more to purify water than the presence of these two agents. The arrangement 
likewise of the basins on the top of the pillars is well adapted for getting rid of 
much of the matters deposited from turbid waters. Lastly to the descending pipe 
a small cock is attached near the ground, by which the fl ocks and herds of the 
adjoining villages and fi elds are furnished at all times with a copious supply of 
water.89
While many might look at the DeKay’s argument as a fanciful, one should not 
forget that traveller’s accounts often led to a new innovative designs, such as the 
British adoption of smallpox inoculations after Lady Montagu’s description in 
1718 of how Turkish village women injected infected tissue into their veins in 
order to prevent the disease.90 Whether DeKay’s sooteray was actually adopted 
in New York after his visit to Istanbul deserves further investigation.
DeKay did not end his account without highlighting the Ottoman state’s 
commitment to the welfare of its people. This was most evident when he saw that 
no one ruler ever claimed much credit for the water works:
They [the fountains] are frequently decorated with the inscription setting forth 
the greatness and goodness of Providence, and inviting the weary traveller to 
make due acknowledgements for the same. Unlike our civilized ostentation, the 
name of the benevolent constructor never appears on these sculptured stones. 
The quaint Turkish adage, which serves as a rule of conduct, is well exemplifi ed 
in this as well as in many other instances: ‘Do good and throw it into the sea; if 
the fi shes don’t know it, God will’.91
This goes to one of his main arguments: namely, that although the Ottomans’ 
belief in the general welfare of their people may have had its basis in the Islamic 
faith, it was also refl ective of enlightened Western values.
BULMUS PRINT.indd   62 06/03/2012   16:35
 Plague and Ottoman Medical Thought 63
As DeKay’s account shows, the Ottomans of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were not focused on undertaking quarantine reform. Works by Ottoman 
plague treatise writers during this time – like those written by Bas̆eski or Ahmed 
Efendi – were few and far between. Ottoman statesmen and administrators may 
have supported public health works, such as Istanbul’s water supplies, but this 
was a sanitary, anti-contagionist measure unconnected with the treatise writers 
or commercial elites. This trend would change only when the mercantilist 
European powers who did adopt quarantines began to challenge the Empire’s 
sovereignty in the name of public health.
Conclusion
Indeed, before the development of the mercantile colonialist states European and 
Middle Eastern Muslim plague treatise writers strongly resembled each other. 
Muslim writers, from the fourteenth-century Andalusians Al-Khatimah and 
Al-Khatib to fi fteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman writers like Al-Yahudi, 
Bitlisi and Taşköprüzade, were just as receptive to innovation and contagionist 
thought as their European counterparts, Fracastoro included. That Fracastoro had 
his work printed rather than relying solely on penned copies does not belie the 
fact that these Ottoman and European authors still appealed to relatively limited 
audiences.92
Mercantile development, particularly in England, fundamentally changed 
the equation by commercialising the plague treatise writer and his product. 
The English plague treatise writer, for example, produced his work with the 
emerging market of economic ideas in mind. The confl ict of contagionist and 
anti- contagionist thought continued to bear a superfi cial resemblance to earlier 
debates, but the process of social construction was far more subtle. The writer’s 
work was ever more aimed at overseas commercial interests. Remembering 
Adam Smith, one might postulate that these writers, like the everyday British 
labourer or business professional, was going through a process of specialisation 
that would lead to a career as a public health offi cial, state reformer or com-
mercial lobbyist.93 Their arguments would either suit the utilitarianism interests 
of these concerns or risk being discarded. Whether Parliament or the Crown 
accepted or patronised quarantine proposals, such as Dr Mead’s Quarantine Act 
of 1721 or John Howard’s late eighteenth-century proposed mandatory lazaretto, 
depended upon the market realities of that time. Ideas could change because of 
many economic factors, such as company monopolies, war, and a growing need 
for cotton and other ‘dangerous’ raw material goods.
The Ottoman plague treatise writers between 1600 and 1800 pale in com-
parison. Not only were there very few new works composed during this time, 
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but there also was no comparable drive for mercantilist reform. Ottoman states-
men, like the pasha mentioned in Dr Mead’s account or Bas̆eski, might have 
entertained ideas of contagionist reform, but they lacked commercial interest 
and the support of the Ottoman state.94 The government undoubtedly made 
great strides towards improved public health and kept an open mind with regard 
to innovation, as can seen in the sooterays and the other water-works reforms. 
Still, the only quarantines in the Ottoman Empire were run by European expa-
triates and the Greek minority, which apparently also saw the economic utility 
of the institution. Quarantine also served a useful ideological function for 
these groups as well: namely, as a marker to distinguish themselves from the 
fatalistic, barbarian, Ottoman ‘other’. Such orientalist discourse would prove to 
be formidable at the time of European expansion during the early nineteenth 
century.95 It was only when this threat was imminent – as seen in the French 
invasion of Egypt and Algeria, the British support for an independent Greek 
state, and the unequal commercial treaty of Balta Liman – that the Ottomans 
would respond.
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Magic and Plague in the 
Ottoman Empire
Introduction
Another key aspect to understanding Ottoman notions of plague is that treatise 
writers until Hamdan’s 1838 reform frequently referred to magic or esoteric 
knowledge in a variety of forms to call on or channel the supernatural, or forces 
unintelligible to human logic, to alleviate human suffering or avoid death. 
Certainly, writers during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, such 
as Bitlisi and Taşköprüzade, cited the time-worn formulas of Ahmad al-Buni 
(d. 1225) and other believers in the ritual use of Quranic verses, words, prayers 
and talismans in an attempt to secure divine intervention to save one from the 
disease.1 Ahmed Efendi similarly advocated astral magic to ward off plague in 
the Ottoman court during the late seventeenth century.2
Recent historians of science and medicine, beginning with Frances Yates, 
have successfully demonstrated that magic was also an elastic, but continuing 
element in European history during the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries.3 In 
the English case, for example, treatise writers on magic, including such sub-areas 
as cabala, a form of mystical understanding of the world based on Hebrew and 
Biblical texts, names and prayers, as well as astrology, divinations, conjuring, 
necromancy and alchemy, were profoundly affected by human tragedies (for 
example, London’s great plague of 1665, the 1666 London fi re, the English Civil 
War) and the social and ideological consequences of Protestant confessionalism. 
Similarly, the formation of an early modern English body politic, based in part on 
an emerging sea-borne merchant economy and a print culture refl ective of those 
interests, also brought about signifi cant change in the way magic was formulated 
and marketed by scholastics to their home audiences. Magical ideas prominent 
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during this time included the cabala and talismanic astral understanding of ele-
ments and symbols to affect celestial and earthly elements. Cabala and talismanic 
enthusiasts often promoted a humanistic reassessment of religious texts. These 
enthusiasts often deconstructed classical conceptions of the world as an earth-
centred Ptolemaic universe and as a global Galenic balance of the humors and the 
elements. One can also see a profound thread of both cabalistic and talismanic 
understandings of the plague in sixteenth- to eighteenth-century English plague 
literature, a still largely unexamined area in the historical literature.4
This chapter will suggest that, by referencing the English case, one can 
fi nd comparable Ottoman cabalistic and astrological understandings of plague 
throughout the early modern era. Arguably, Ottoman writers, such as Ahmed 
Efendi or the above-mentioned sixteenth-century Ottoman writers, had a 
world view that related in many ways to their English and European contem-
poraries. The question, however, is the extent to which these Ottoman writers’ 
socioeconomic, cultural and geopolitical contexts, as refl ected in their chang-
ing professions, audiences and markets, differentiated the function and content 
of their work from their English counterparts. A detailed analysis of Ottoman 
and English treatise literature as they relate to cabalistic and the talismanic/ 
astrological understandings of plague is necessary to answer this question.
Cabalistic Understandings
The Ottomans
The sixteenth-century Ottoman treatises, such as those of Tas ̧köprüzade and 
Bitlisi, use the ‘knowledge of letters’ (ilmi-i huruf) – a mystical understanding 
of the Quran, the names of God and prayers, through numbers, signs, symbols, 
elemental and astrological values attributed to the combination of the twenty-
eight letters of the Arabic alphabet – to offer the reader a cure for plague. These 
formulas are, in all likelihood, traceable as far back as the eleventh-century work 
of the Islamic philosopher Ghazali.5 Remarkably, Ghazali’s, Taşköprüzade’s 
and Bitlisi’s work parallels the Jewish cabala, which developed alongside its 
Islamic contemporary not only in late medieval Andalusia, but in the succeed-
ing centuries throughout the Mediterranean. Tas ̧köprüzade, for instance, noted 
that he acquired a number of his formulas from Sephardic Jewish refugees to the 
Ottoman Empire after the Reconquista in 1492, who, allegedly after converting 
to Islam, passed on their knowledge to him.6
As in cabala, Ottoman practitioners of the knowledge of letters believed that 
they drew their energy from the intermediate plane of existence (berza) between 
the earthly and heavenly worlds. Humans, as a microcosm of the universe, were 
BULMUS PRINT.indd   69 06/03/2012   16:35
70 Plague, Quarantines and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire
able to access all three of these worlds: the earthly in life; the heavenly in death; 
and the intermediate in one’s dreams or imagination. Humans were especially 
vulnerable to the creatures of the intermediate plane: namely, angels, Satan 
and, most frequently, spirits, or jinn. Jinn were the most directly responsible 
for infl icting a human victim with the plague by stinging him with a spear or 
arrow. (Plague treatise writers most often used the term taun for ‘plague’, as 
another form of its three-letter Arabic root (ta’n), which is translated as ‘spear’ 
or ‘arrow’.) Indirectly, Satan himself would lead the jinn to plague the people, as 
Bitlisi argues was the case during Muhammad’s day when the plague left Medina 
and devastated the nearby town of Cahka. Azrail, the angel of death, took the soul 
of each victim from his or her body when and if the plague victim died.
The treatises offer an arsenal of names (esma), letters (huruf) and numbers 
(ebced) that one can use to get rid of the jinn when it appears. Often the prayers 
would cite one of the ninety-nine names of God, such as the Believer (Mumin), 
the Nearest (Karib), the Purest (Safi ), the Venerator (Receb), the Strongest 
(Kavi), the Mighty (Muktedi), the Everlasting (Baki), the Destroyer (Helak) and 
the Universal Guardian (Rakib). Very frequently, the author would ask the user 
to repeat the name, or a similar religious word, a distinct number of times.7 For 
instance, Taşköprüzade directed that:
Reading the name ‘the Everlasting’136 times every day during a plague will save 
you from the attack of the jinn of a taun. Reading other names such as Islam 371 
times will save oneself from taun. This prayer is so powerful that the person who 
says it will not be harmed even if they step on a scorpion.8
The number of times a name should be repeated could often refer to a three- or 
four-digit alphabetical number code, which only the initiate would have access 
to, the letters most often forming the three- or four-letter root of yet another name 
of God.
Many of the prayers would refer to these names in order to call on a celestial 
power. For example, Taşköprüzade stated that:
Putting the name ‘the Mighty’ at the end of a Quran will save you from plague. This 
will effect the harvest moon in the East, which is connected to the planet Jupiter.9
Sa’deddin Süleyman bin Muhammed Emin Müstakimzade, a late eighteenth-
century chronicler, gave similar prescriptions:
In the fi rst night of a lunar month (gure), one should mention a name ‘the 
Everlasting’ 341 times and touch his body with his hand to get rid of the hidden 
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disease [plague] . . . One can write also inscribe the name ‘the Purest’ on a 
pumpkin leaf, and put it into violet oil. Hang it on a tube (sişe) exposed to the 
Sun. The person should memorize the name 391 times per day. The oil should be 
diffused and used like a lotion to protect oneself against plague.10
Some of the texts even cross into the sphere of magic which combined 
cabalistic and talismanic elements. Taşköprüzade called for the writing of God’s 
name on to a person’s forehead, the place according to astral magicians where a 
person’s celestial fate would be inscribed.11 Müstakimzade stated that:
The name of God ‘Universal Guardian’ (Rakib) should be written on to a blank 
sheet and place under a rock seal or should be written on a miskal of silver in 
order to ward off plague during one’s life time. One can write the following on 
to a piece of paper (Arabic letters: Elif, Lam, Re, Mim, Kaf, Kaf, Ye, Te, Be, Ded, 
Re).12
The rock seal and sheet of silver were important as they connected the name to 
a terrestrial element.
There are also a number of other passages pointing out the intermediary 
world of dreams and fears. Taşköprüzade mentions that one cure was revealed to 
a fi fteenth-century Arabic practitioner while asleep:
A disciple of Seyyid Ali-Hamdani saw Hamza in his dreams. Hamza gave him 
a prayer to expel plague and added that if a person’s son is struck by plague, a 
certain prayer should be written on his fi ngernails depending on the location of 
the plague boil. If the boil is on the right side of the body, the prayer should be 
written on the left hand fi nger nails and vice versa.13
This prayer writing apparently hoped to restore the individual’s mystical 
humoral balance. Another of Taşköprüzade’s stories directly relates to the fear of 
plague and how it could open the gate to the plague-carrying genies (jinns) from 
the intermediary world:
During a plague in Kasgar, students saw shadows on the wall [of plague-carrying 
jinns]. They got scared because the creatures had arrows (ta’n) in their hands. The 
students were ordered to show paper with certain words to counter them. Those 
who had the paper were saved but those who did not perished.14
Despite the formulaic use of names, numbers and rituals to magically cure 
plague, the Ottoman plague treatise writers also emphasised that ultimately it 
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was God who was responsible for turning the disease. Tas ̧köprüzade refl ected 
this tendency in the following prayer:
We ask You to protect us from Your deep sorrow . . . O You who have complete 
power and total control, O You who have hidden kindness, save us from what we 
are afraid of. The name of God is the best name. He is the God of the earth and 
the sky. With the name of God nothing will hurt us, neither on earth nor in the 
sky. And He listens to us and knows everything . . . In the names of God, the All-
Compassionate and All-Merciful, I am asking You. O God, O Believer (Mumin), 
O Protector (Muheymen), O Dear (Aziz), O All-Compelling (Cebbar), please 
rid us of plague . . . O God, You are All-Capable (Muktedir) and I am the result 
of that. You are the owner and I belong to You. You are strong and I am weak. 
You are rich and I am poor. There is no God but You. Everything will disappear 
except your kind face . . . By Your names, Your hidden kindness . . . [and] the 
number of Your words, please [give] us . . . a remedy.15
Here, one gains the sense that reading God’s names, and comprehending their 
mystical, numerical, spiritual meanings would ultimately lead to union with the 
divine: ‘Everything will disappear except Your kind face’. This would imply 
ascent into heaven, the celestial world. At the same time, however, Taşköprüzade 
was pleading to God for mercy from people’s pain and suffering on earth: ‘You 
are the source of recovery . . . please [give] us . . . a remedy’.16
The treatise made similar commentaries with regard to the Quranic verses 
they use in their ritual prayers. The most frequent set of verses to be cited in 
plague prayers, ‘The Opening’ (Al-Fatihah), the opening lines of the Quran, 
touches directly upon this theme of God as the remedy for human suffering:
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, Most Merciful: Praise be to God, the 
Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds. The Most Gracious, Most Merciful. 
Master of the Day of Judgement. Thee do we worship, and Thine aid we seek.17
Another frequently cited verse is from ‘The Throne Verse’ (Ayat al-Kursi), 
which states in part: ‘His are all things in the heavens and on earth; who is there 
that can intercede in His presence except as He permitteth?’ One also fi nds the 
Quran’s promise that: ‘If God touches thee with affl iction, none can remove it 
but He; and if He touches you with happiness, He hath power over all things.’18
The Ottoman plague treatises best illustrate such statements of dependence 
on God’s grace coupled with the possibility of individual action through the use 
of the magical knowledge of letters in two specifi c prayers. The fi rst, attributed 
to the great Sufi  mystic Ghazali (d. 1111), but actually penned in the sixteenth 
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century, is in fact part of a circular talisman of letters and alphabetical numbers 
that was intended for the benefi ciary to wear around his or her neck. The prayer 
that was necessary to activate the talisman reads:
To You, my God, I extended my palms in every hardship and I received Your 
grace from every direction. I do not hope from You anything that You are not 
part of. If I have gravely sinned, it is not hidden from You. You were kind 
in the past. You are capable of protection in every situation and from every 
consequence.19
The above statement is similar to the earlier prayers in that it calls for divine 
intervention to cure the disease. One does not fi nd, however, any specifi c refer-
ence to the jinn, a genie or evil spirit that caused the calamity. Instead, the author 
raises the possibility that the prayer is invalid if being cured is not part of God’s 
ultimate plan, such as when the victim is struck by plague as a punishment for 
his or her sins. Thus, the prayer refl ects a sense of humility in that the victim does 
not know God’s ultimate purpose even if armed with a reinvigorated mystical 
understanding of the divine.
One can see this humility even in the directions the author gives to reproduce 
the talisman. Those who reproduce it should be ritually clean, and aware of his 
or her duty of charity to the poor and those affl icted with disease or pain. ‘God 
created every trouble’, but it was the writer’s duty to attempt to alleviate suffer-
ing.20 An illustration of the actual circle, with the prayer above it (see Figure 4.1), 
is useful for considering the talisman’s more magical functions.
The nineteen Arabic letters and numbers (including a remarkable number of 
ones and nines) correspond to a Quranic verse, which only the plague-bearing 
jinn that came upon the bearer of the talisman would be aware of. The letters also 
mystically combine into a variety of God’s names: potentially far stronger than 
simply a single name. If the owner did not happen to don the talisman before 
being struck with the plague, he or she also had the option of drinking an elixir 
consisting of water poured on the circle. (At least one reader of the text may well 
have done so given the smudges and watermarks on the original).21
The second example is an oft-cited prayer from Taşköprüzade:
The Name of God is the very kind and very great proof. God is the ruler and 
does whatever He wants to. There is no power or force but by God, the exalted 
and great. I take refuge in God from Satan the cursed with the name of God the 
All-Compassionate and All-Merciful. O God I take refuge in You from the spear 
(ta’n), the plague (taun), calamities, sudden death, from being lost in worldly 
affairs and from bad actions (kaza).22
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Here Taşköprüzade appears to limit his appeal and use of names directly to God, 
and connect the plague and the jinn who infl icted it to demonical forces. As in 
earlier passages, naming God was not mere human-initiated manipulation of 
celestial powers, but in fact mystical union with God. As formulated, this prayer 
asks God to either expel plague, or forgive the supplicant for a ‘sudden death’, 
‘being lost in worldly affairs’ and from sins by welcoming him or her to the 
afterlife.
This passage is repeated three times in the text, surrounded by the formulas, 
names and numbers one is supposed to use in conjunction with the prayer, but 
there are also two signifi cant variations. In one citation – inserted before the last 
sentence in the above version – it states:
O God, the protector of kinship, drive plague away from us by the right of our 
Muhammad, the beloved elected one. God commend and salute Muhammad, his 
family, and friends.23
This statement implies that Muhammad, his family and companions may be able 
to intercede on behalf of the plague victims in a saint-like fashion.
A second variation reveals that Taşköprüzade was willing to speak to issues 
of fate and human interaction:
O He who has all the glory and kindness (ikram). In name of God who is known 
as the great Lord. Every day He is in a different situation. What God wants to 
happen will happen, and what he does not want to happen will not happen. There 
is no power except the great exalted God.24
Here Taşköprüzade’s statement parallels Ghazali’s prayer in that he too seems 
to imply that the individual’s fate is up to God’s ultimate plans, and perhaps was 
a form of punishment or trial, rather than a wanton attack by a demon-inspired 
jinn. Regardless, one must conclude that both Taşköprüzade and the Ghazali 
texts refl ect a great degree of fl exibility in terms of spiritual and mystical func-
tion to combat the great human suffering and insecurity plague had infl icted 
upon their societies.
The English
Remarkably, English spiritual treatises about plague from the fi fteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries strike a number of common themes with their Ottoman 
contemporaries. This similarity can be seen in prayers against the plague, on 
saintly intercession and on the use of divine names. Perhaps the most striking 
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example of such similarities can be seen in Psalm 91, the single most frequently 
referenced biblical material in early modern English plague literature:
[1] You who live in the shelter of the Most High who abide in the shadow of 
the Almighty [2] will say to the LORD, ‘my refuge and my fortress; my God, in 
whom I trust’. [3] For he will deliver you from the snare of the fowler and from 
the deadly pestilence; [4] He will cover you with his pinions, and under his wings 
you will fi nd refuge; his faithfulness is a shield and buckler. [5] You will not fear 
the terror of night, or the arrow that fl ies by day, [6] or the pestilence that stalks 
in darkness, or the destruction that wastes at noonday. [7] A thousand may fall at 
your side, ten thousand at your right hand, but it will not come near you. [8] You 
will only look with your eyes and see the punishment of the wicked. [9] Because 
you have made the LORD your refuge, the Most High your dwelling place 
[10] no evil shall befall you, no scourge come near your tent. [11] For He will 
command His angels concerning you to guard you in all your ways. [12] On their 
hands they will bear you up, so that you will not dash your foot against a stone. 
[13] You will tread on the lion and the adder; the young lion and the serpent you 
will trample underfoot. [14] Those who love me, I will deliver; I will protect 
those who know my name. [15] When they call to me, I will answer them; I will 
be with them in trouble, I will rescue them and honour them. [16] With long life 
will I satisfy them and show them my salvation.25
One sees the invocation of at least four of God’s names (that is, the Most High, 
the Almighty, the Lord and my God). All four of these names had distinct refer-
ences in their Hebrew original, paralleling the later Muslim use of the ninety-nine 
names of God. Moreover, the use of these names is highlighted in two formulas: 
‘He is my refuge and my fortress, my God, in whom I trust’ (verse 2) and ‘you 
have made the LORD your refuge’ (verse 9). At least two prominent Biblical 
and Talmudic scholars have claimed that these are in fact formulaic phrases that 
guaranteed its user divine intervention.26 As was seen in the Ottoman prayers, 
this intervention, ‘gaining refuge in God’, could mean either union with or 
 deliverance from the plague.
Seemingly, however, the prayer guarantees deliverance from the disease 
itself. Interestingly, the Psalm, like the Ottoman prayers, makes a direct con-
nection between plague and demonic forces. A number of scholars have traced 
phrases, such as ‘the terror of night’, ‘the arrow that fl ies by day’, ‘the pestilence 
that stalks in the darkness’ and ‘the plague that destroys at midday’ to specifi c 
names of demons from Babylonian and other ancient Middle Eastern mytholo-
gies, such as ‘Lilth’, the witch of the darkness, ‘Namroth’ and the Babylonian 
demon of pestilence. The prayer, originally written in the post-Babylonian exile 
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period, also apparently has the common Middle Eastern imagery of a winged 
god.27 Nevertheless, the text may also have reduced former gods like Lilth and 
Namroth to merely evil spirits, something very much akin, perhaps, to the jinn in 
Islamic sources. Over time, such imagery could also have had a great syncretic 
value for worshipers. One sees, for instance, that the Psalm mentions the role of 
angels as guardians in protecting the believer from plague. Thus, the supplicant 
appealed to one God for intervention, but allowed the possibility for another 
being, ‘a servant of God’ to intercede on His behalf.
At least some of the prayer’s message (for example, the plague as arrows 
tied to evil spirits that required the name of God to get rid of it, a special prayer 
directed at God who alone understood the secret demonical cause of the plague) 
had a resonance among the spiritualist writers on plague. These included Henry 
Holland, a Calvinist preacher who wrote a commentary on Psalm 91 in 1593; 
William Kemp, who wrote a broader account on the causes (spiritual and other-
wise) of the Great Plague that struck London in 1665; as well as E. Davies, whose 
sermon on plague was published shortly after the Marseilles outbreak in 1720.28
Other documents promised saintly intercession, such as a 1520 receipt that 
granted the bearer deliverance from plague in return for the donation of time or 
monies to the hospital of St Roche in Exeter:
The graces following be granted to all brethren, sisters, benefactors and good-
doers unto the hospital of the blessed confessor St. Roche founded and estab-
lished within Lyte Exeter. If they do a Pater Noster, Ave Maria and the Crede it is 
granted them that they shall never be affected nor grieved with the stroke of pesti-
lence. It more plainly appears in his legend how and when Almighty God granted 
to this petition to the said confessor St. Roche sent by his angel Raphael.29
Apparently, the belief that an intermediary of God, such as St Roche, and 
perhaps the angel Raphael, could save one from plague was common enough 
in England that it could be used as part of a pious foundation’s market strategy.
The prayers to which the document alludes, namely, the Our Father, Hail 
Mary and the Nicene Creed, bear similar features to the above-cited plague 
prayers. While the Hail Mary prominently included a request for ‘Mary, full of 
grace’ to intercede on the believer’s behalf and the Nicene Creed recognised 
God as the creator of the invisible (for example, spirits), the Our Father praised 
the name of God (that is, ‘hallowed be Thy Name’) in order to save the suppli-
cant (that is, ‘deliver us from evil’). The Our Father, in conformity with many 
such prayers, both Christian and Muslim, also implied that human suffering 
 undoubtedly also resulted from sin (that is, ‘lead us not into temptation’).
One should fi nally note that such beliefs in the possibilities of divine 
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intervention very well may have had a long-lasting symbolic legacy: the red 
cross, which was used by the English authorities in the mid-seventeenth century 
as the sign of a household or place struck by plague. The red cross, by no strange 
coincidence, was also tied to the myth of St Roche.30 This patron saint of plague 
sufferers was born with the symbol of the red cross on his breast, and after a life-
time of service to the sick and needy, was popularly commemorated in England 
and Scotland in particular. The oft-used phrase ‘Lord have mercy’ also recalls 
the common themes of plague prayers, despite the fact that no outward published 
reference to the saint survived the Protestant-dominated London of 1665.31
Yet there were cries throughout the seventeenth century for a reformed 
understanding of the plague which was highly critical of ritualistic spiritual 
healing. James Balmford, writing after the plague outbreak in 1625, told his 
audience that material remedies were much more in order: ‘[Do] not . . . depend 
on extraordinary means (miracles and such like) when we may enjoy ordinary 
[ones].’ At best, invoking plague prayers like Psalm 91 would be a vain attempt 
to understand God’s secrets: ‘For it is written . . . that secret things belong to 
God and revealed things belong to us.’ At worst, using prayers to secure divine 
intervention would be ‘tempting God’ in a way similar to that of Satan in tempt-
ing Jesus to throw himself down from the top of the Jerusalem Temple knowing 
that God the Father would be obligated to save him.32
Unsurprisingly, there were cries by people like Thomas Hastler, who used 
similar arguments in 1615 to denounce earlier plague practices as heretical ‘papism’:
But if it were possible for them to hear such unlawful prayers of men, they would 
with both hands (as we say) put them from them, and laboured to purge them-
selves from such fl at idolatry, with their song of obedience. Not onto us Lord, not 
onto us, but to thy name be such honour ascribed.
 But our Romish doctors, to maintain their invocations of celestial spirits, do 
cozen simple people nowadays (as their predecessors did the Christians in the 
apostles’ time) under the pretence of humility, saying that the God of all things 
was invisible, inaccessible and incomprehensible: and therefore (as Theodoret 
testifi es) they counselled their followers to procure God’s favour by the means 
of angels: like as the heathen idolaters to cover the shame of their neglecting of 
God . . . The very same rag our Romanists had borrowed from them to cover their 
superstition with that wickedness thereof might not appear.33
Here Hastler brands any type of prayer for intercession as akin to demonical 
witchcraft. Just as using God’s name in such a prayer was sacrilege, as the 
name’s honour belonged to God alone, so too calling on any intermediary, angel 
or saint alike, was heretical nonsense:
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Rome would have us believe that during the time of pestilence we must pray 
onto none but Saint Sebastian, and his successor, Saint Roche, saints invented 
to intercede against such a deadly disease: wilfully and directly opposing and 
contradicting the command and counsel of the Lord of Hosts.34
Stories of magic causing plague, rather than curing it, began to gain much more 
currency:
In the year of Our Lord 1572 when a certain woman of Rezna in Poland was 
buried near the Church of the Exultation of the Holy Cross, the plague began to 
rage and spread extremely.35
The author of this passage, William Kemp, related another story from Simon 
Kelwaye in 1593 of ill-fated ‘natural magic’ as responsible for the troubles of 
his own times:
When we see young children fl ock themselves together in companies, and then 
all will feign some of their company to be dead amongst them, and solemnise the 
burial in a mournful sort, this is a token which has been well observed in our age 
to foreshadow great mortality at hand . . . And I have heard that one did foretell 
our late unhappy civil wars, by seeing boys and children make offi cers, muster 
and imitate the train bands; saying, when he was in Germany, before the wars did 
there begin, the children there did the like.36
The question here, however, is what Kemp saw as the ultimate cause of the 
plague outbreak in 1665, and, by inference, the recent English Civil War. Did 
child play cause the plague or make their countrymen engage in open warfare or 
was the ultimate explanation to be found in imagination. The issue then would 
be, if the plague or wars started as a stray thought, would it be tied to the demon-
ridden intermediary world or would it be instead the product of human imagi-
nation, a new-fangled microcosmic idea which would make man, not God, the 
focal point of disease and the universe at large.
Undoubtedly, writers like Henry Holland in 1593 still clung to the idea that 
demonic spirits caused plague, regardless of whether a ritualistic name-based 
spell could infl ict or cure the disease:
They [the plague-bearing evil spirits] persuade by a marvellous and invisible means, 
piercing by reason of their airy, thin bodies, the bodies of man when they perceive it 
not, and so confounding and mingling themselves by means of some imaginations 
conceived, with the motions of their minds both waking and sleeping.37
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One does not perceive similar sentiments among the plague treatise writers by 
the time the plague struck London in 1665:
The plague . . . is spread by fear and imagination. From the heart proceed the 
vital spirits, which are its lifeguard, and if they by fear are dissipated, or retire 
inwards, or leave the outward parts forsaken, which in infectious times are as 
it were environed and besieged with pestilential air, in comes the plague like a 
prevailing enemy, and easily enters the gates, scales the walls, and surprises the 
heart, which like a coward in extremity of danger, is not able to help itself, or 
make resistance.38
The above statement focuses on the concept of vital spirits, an idea originally 
coined by Aristotle, that a spirit or soul was the organising principle to the human 
body. What we see here, however, is a fundamental revision of that concept, 
in human-centred terms. Prior to the seventeenth century, God was ultimately 
responsible for determining a vital spirit’s fi nal cause. Now, we fi nd, similar to 
Descartes’ philosophy on mind and body, that the person could control their own 
health by controlling their emotions. Thus, if human rationality conquered fear, 
it could also conquer plague itself.39 John Gadbury, an astrologist contemporary 
of William Kemp, confi rmed this when he wrote of plague that:
We fi nd experimentally, that our reason and understanding, and all our noblest 
faculties, are led captive by our imagination ad libitum; and we are enslaved 
ignobly, and yet to remain such fools as to indulge our injurer.40
Others, like Thomas Brooks, a preacher who wrote a plague treatise shortly 
before he himself perished in the 1665 outbreak, took a far dimmer view of the 
human rational ability to overcome nature:
The plague is more immediately from God, than any other sickness or disease; 
it is the immediate stroke of God. The scribe is more properly said to write than 
the pen; and he that make and keep the clock is more properly said to make it go 
and strike than the wheels and poizes that hang upon it: and every workman to 
effect his work rather than the tools which he used as instruments. So the Lord 
of Hosts, who is the chief Agent and Mover in all things, and in all actions, may 
more fi tly and properly be said to effect and bring to pass all judgements, yea, 
all things which are done in the earth, than any inferior or subordinate causes; 
seeing they are but his tools and instruments, which He rules and guides accord-
ing to His own will, power, and providence . . . Certainly, those are physicians 
of no value, that cannot look above second causes to the First Cause, they cannot 
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look to the wheel within the wheel. The plague is a hidden thing, a secret thing; 
it is a sickness, a disease, but more immediately comes from God than any other 
sickness or disease does.41
Here Brooks posited that the plague’s divine logic simply surpassed the physi-
cian’s ability to overcome it. A key difference between Brook’s vision and that 
of a number of earlier attributions of plague to a divine cause was not his despair-
ing of divine salvation from death, but his mechanical vision of the God-driven 
order.42 He used this vision, however, not to justify material measures against the 
disease, but to prove that such measures were indeed hopeless. This begged the 
question why an all-powerful God would use plague to kill good people:
that some of the best of the Christians should fall by the pestilence, when many 
of the worst of sinners have their lives for a prey; these are some of those mys-
terious providences that many times make some of the best Christians to stagger 
in their judgement; and why so, but because they look upon God’s proceedings 
through a double medium of fl esh and spirit; hence it comes to pass all things 
seemed to run cross, and that God’s most just and righteous proceedings, are not 
so clearly and fully discerned as might otherwise be. The wheels in a watch or in 
a clock move contrary to one another, some one way, some another, yet all show 
the skill and intent of the workman, to show the time, or to make the clock to 
strike: so in this world divine providence is seen to run cross to divine promises; 
the wicked are spared, and the righteous are taken away; yet in the conclusion all 
issues in the will, purpose and glory of God.43
Again, in contrast to Kemp and Gadbury,44 Brooks offers no hope of either 
spiritual material or human initiative against the disease itself. God’s logic was 
simply beyond mankind’s comprehension, leaving the individual with the sole 
task of pursuing his or her understanding of God’s ultimate justice. Curiously 
enough, Brooks uses cabalistic imagery to illustrate this point:
I have read of a lodestone in Ethiopia, which has two corners, with the one that 
draws iron to it, with the other it puts the iron from it: so God has two arms, the 
one of mercy, and the other of judgement; two hands, the one of love, the other of 
wrath; with the one he draws, with the other he drives; the one strokes, the other 
strikes: and as he has a right hand of favour, wherewith leads to the saints, so he 
wants not a left hand of fury, wherewith to dash the wicked to pieces.45
This passage once again highlights Brooks’ argument that God’s power was 
embodied in material logic. A mere human being could not grasp the physical 
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principle behind the logic, but it could understand its spiritual existence. The 
goal was, thus, to seek mystical union with the divine, with its implicit recogni-
tion of the Hebrew cabalistic stages of ‘God’s two arms’: Din, ‘judgement’ or the 
arm of ‘wrath’; and Hesed, ‘mercy’ or the arm of ‘love’.46 In contrast to under-
standings of the cabala as a multi-stage spiritual bonding in the present world, 
Brooks saw this pathway to salvation as lying only in death.
Brooks used a second, more talismanic illustration to make the same 
argument:
Though death, through the pestilence, be to the wicked as the rod in Moses’ hand 
that was turned into a serpent; yet to the godly, death, the pestilence, is like the 
wand in Elijah’s hand, a means to waft them over into a better life.47
In his eyes, magic, like science, or even spiritual promises like Psalm 91, was 
limited to death and a promise of life after death. Nevertheless, it is striking how 
Brooks identifi ed spiritual equality as yet another theme in this process:
So ’tis here, the noisome pestilence, or the pestilence of grief (as the Hebrew runs 
in Psalm 91:3) has an equal aptness to cut down one man as well as another, the 
rich as well as the poor, the honourable as well as the base, the strong as well as 
the weak, the prince as well as the peasant, the emperor as well as the carter.48
This vision of death and the dispatch of the victim to eternal judgement as a 
great equaliser was matched by the positive vision of social utopia for those who 
reached heaven:
The promises of God are a Christian’s Magna Charta, his chief evidence that he 
has to show for his preservation, for his protection, for his salvation . . . O how 
highly do men prize their charters and privileges! And how carefully do they 
keep and lay up the conveyances and assurances of their lands! O how should 
then saints treasure up those precious promises, which are to them instead of all 
conveyances and assurances for their preservation, maintenance, deliverance, 
comfort, and everlasting happiness.49
This statement fi rst implies that the quest for greater political and social equal-
ity may have also been a hopeless material endeavour. To Brooks, there was no 
sense in grasping ‘charters and privileges’ when the saintly plague victim could 
keep God’s promise of eternal life. Oddly, Brooks also noted that such prom-
ises include Psalm 91’s guarantee of divine deliverance from plague, when his 
passage infers that this may well simply be an earthly ‘charter and privilege’. 
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Could it be that Brooks in despair is asking his readers to discard this ‘promise’ 
in the hope of ultimate redemption? If so, this would imply a problem with Psalm 
91: was it the accurately recorded word of God? Could Brooks possibly have 
implied that the meaning of the scripture itself also defi es human comprehen-
sion or that it was mistakenly recorded in the fi rst place? Either interpretation 
would lead to questions about biblical authority that many Protestants of Brooks’ 
day would certainly have taken issue with as it questioned the then cherished 
 principle of sola scriptura.50
It is remarkable to note the pervasive sense of despair and fear in the English 
spiritual plague literature given the general argument that ‘progressive’ and 
‘effective’ measures like quarantine and other state-initiated reform had allevi-
ated human tragedy to a much greater extent than when the plague fi rst broke out 
in 1347–8. One fi nds instead that both the writers and their audiences refl ected 
the frustrations of their times. The seventeenth century may have allowed for a 
new mechanical philosophy that increasingly saw the individual and the state 
as being able to master nature and its calamities, but the reality was that tens of 
thousands of died of plague despite the quarantines and the Bills of Mortality. A 
wealth of new medical activity did nothing to stop the continued demand for a 
spiritual solution.51
The effect of confessionalist propaganda and the desire to control and disci-
pline individual spiritual activity had only lessened the ability of the audience 
to resort to ritualistic prayer and saint worship. This can be seen most clearly 
not only in Hastler’s anti-Catholic polemics, but also in the changing attitudes 
towards cabalistic prayers like Psalm 91. One can speculate that even in the 
early sixteenth century the common worshiper still had ready access to church- 
supported ritualistic prayers in the hope of saving oneself from plague, perhaps 
even including chants of God’s names to secure divine intervention. But by 
1593, with the rise of the Puritan movement and the consolidation of Elizabeth 
I’s Protestant state, popular lay preachers like Henry Holland would avoid 
interpreting Psalm 91 as a cabalistic formula, even though he would maintain 
the belief that the prayer – as a refl ection of God’s will – could still save one 
from the plague. By 1665, even this deterministic faith in God’s grace would 
give way to others who either despaired of spiritual solutions or turned to the 
new-found belief that human emotions determined who lived and who died from 
plague.
Certainly, there are signifi cant comparisons to be made between Ottoman 
and English cabalistic perceptions. Admittedly, there are defi nite similarities 
in approach between the two bodies of narrative accounts. The letter magic, 
the names of God, ritualistic prayer, the stress on the divine and the possibil-
ity of saintly and even human initiated salvation from plague that one found 
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in Taşköprüzade, Bitlisi and the Ottoman version of Ghazali’s circle found a 
correspondence in similar patterns in Psalm 91 and the lasting popularity of St 
Roche.52 The differences were not to be found in religious content, but rather 
the social and economic context of the early modern era. The rapid rise of an 
overseas merchant-based economy in the booming city of London resulted in 
fundamental changes in the purpose and audience of the spiritual plague treatise 
writers. While earlier writers were tied to the relatively limited circles of courts, 
and literate and religious elites and had a relatively small circulation, the late 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century English writers expanded their message 
via print to new urban and commercial audiences.53 This exposed the writers to 
state-driven concerns of religious orthodoxy, suppressing religious dissent and, 
as seen in Brooks, calls for the meek acceptance of one’s fate.
The transformation of magical imagery is perhaps the best example of this 
trend. Whereas magic was practised by religious elites and commoners alike 
prior to the late sixteenth century, the use of cabalistic chants was increasingly 
restricted thereafter. Seemingly, the only ones who could use such concepts were 
those literary and religious elites who applied it ideologically to justify an array 
of reforms or social disciplinary ideas. Brooks’s symbolic use of the Jewish 
cabala, Moses’ and Aaron’s magic rod and wands, like that of the divine watch-
maker metaphor are clear examples of this trend. His symbols conveyed the 
message of accepting one’s fate and limiting social dissatisfaction in a time of 
grief and dismay. Such imagery, like the preceding propaganda of religious and 
social intolerance, was a dark aspect of early modern history that the Ottomans 
simply did not have to deal with.
Astrology and Talismanic Understandings of Plague
The Ottomans
Ahmed Efendi’s composition of an treatise on astrology and the plague in the 
mid- to late seventeenth century provides a great number of insights into changes 
within astrological practice in the Ottoman Empire during this time and the 
increasing role of talismanic magic. Earlier texts, such as Bitlisi and Al-Yahudi, 
acknowledged celestial causes as the reason behind plague, citing Quranic or 
ancient philosophical texts as their prime authorities. Bitlisi, for example, argued 
that the Quran states that ‘day came into existence with the rising of the sun’ and 
that God created plants and animals in alignment with celestial bodies: ‘Every 
piece of earth is tied to the heavens. The heavens have power over those subor-
dinate to it.’54 This was perhaps best demonstrated by the continual effect of the 
sun and moon on tides and the earthly environment:
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Celestial bodies like the sun, the moon and stars can cause putrefi cation as well 
as health. For example, if the moon does not cool, then seas and rivers will shrink 
as a result, and herbs and trees will die from thirst.55
Al-Yahudi argued that Plato and Hippocrates had shown that the conjunction 
of Mars and Saturn was responsible for triggering plague. Al-Yahudi further 
posited that such celestial movements caused earthquakes, storms and other 
elemental eruptions that would lead to the creation of plague-bearing miasmas. 
While Al-Yahudi and Bitlisi prescribed various material measures, and Bitlisi 
also advocated prayer and enumerating the cabalistic names of God, none of 
these authors saw any elemental, or talismanic magic that could be used to 
 alleviate this situation.56
In contrast, Ahmed Efendi made a fundamentally different argument. He 
emphasised the importance of mastering the strange magical connection between 
the elements, individual human beings and the stars beyond to understand, 
prevent and cure the plague. He claimed that gaining an accurate reading of 
one’s horoscope, including the ascendant sign that a person has at his or her 
birth, was critical to learning the nature of this connection. An astrologer like 
him would understand one’s ‘ascendancy by looking at a person’s eyebrows’. 
Consequently, after looking at the individual’s horoscope he could, with knowl-
edge of the secret ore for each ascendant star, cast a mould fi gure of the individ-
ual to ward off plague. The mould fi gure would be made of a certain metal (for 
example, copper if the person’s ascendant star was Venus or tin if Jupiter) and 
might bear the secret name of a spirit or shape. If that person had the misfortune 
to be born under an unlucky star, he could ‘turn a bad sign into a good one by 
using certain intoxicating elements like opium’. Such talismans were compounds 
of terrestrial and celestial bodies that solved a problem.
Similar talismans could be produced for affecting a city or region; For 
example, jade was known for causing rain. A brass talisman of a snake was 
forged and placed at the hippodrome in Istanbul to ward off snakes. Spells 
were also to be used, either in conjunction with the talismans or independently. 
Ahmed Efendi related the story of how Caliph Memun used a spell to get rid of 
all the beetles in Baghdad, and how another used a similar incantation to clear 
Damascus of its scorpions, mice, snakes and spiders.57
Three further aspects of Ahmed Efendi’s work needs to be highlighted in par-
ticular. First, his work on magic, in contrast to Bitlisi and the Ottoman advocates 
of the ‘knowledge of letters’, does not refer to magic’s tie to the divine, or even 
to earlier ancient Greek or medieval Arab scholars. This is notable given the tra-
ditional citation in these works to Quranic and/or scholastic sources. Curiously 
enough, Ahmed Efendi was trained as a Mevlevi shaykh as well as an astrologer, 
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and spent considerable time as a religious scholar in Mecca, Medina and Cairo 
after losing his post as the sultan’s chief astrologer.58
Secondly, Ahmed Efendi’s work reveals strategies that were typical of 
astrologers of that time. He clearly sought to use his book to regain the coveted 
post of court astrologer. While he gave a general introduction to his art in order 
to demonstrate his qualifi cations for that post – highlighting at least two earlier 
books he had written on the topic – he did not reveal any specifi c spells or details 
that others could use to secure the position instead.59
Finally, Ahmed Efendi seemed to be well aware of current trends within 
astrological practice. Not only did he spend time learning in the scholarly and 
religious centres of the Mediterranean Islamic world – he wrote his two books in 
Egypt and in Arabic – but he also hinted at an openness towards other more trans-
regional trends, such as his mention of magic as being related to ‘mathematics 
either unleashed from the power of geometry, or from the science of dynamics as 
seen in a pendulum’.60 This could be an allusion to new trends that were popular 
among seventeenth-century scientifi c circles in Europe, and perhaps beyond.
The intercultural exchange of ideas was a two-way street, however. Raffael 
Gaffarel, a Frenchman who wrote a defence of astral magic translated into 
English in 1653, clarifi ed that much of his inspiration on the use of talismans, 
spells and celestial powers was based on past and present Islamic practices. For 
example, Gaffarel claimed that the word ‘talisman’ was originally an Arabic 
word, and that some of the great Islamic scholars of medieval times, such as 
Almansor, Messahala, Zahel and Albohazen, were some of talismanic magic’s 
most infl uential advocates. In Gaffarel’s eyes, the Islamic symbol of the crescent 
and the Quranic story that the fallen angels Arot and Marot brought the knowl-
edge of talismans with them when they travelled to earth, were other examples of 
this legacy.61 Recent scholars of Islamic history, like T. Fahr, confi rm that such 
infl uences were essential the revitalisation of talismanic magic by late sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century intellectuals like Giordano Bruno and Gaffarel.62
Yet Gaffarel was undoubtedly aware of more recent talismanic practices in 
the Middle East. Interestingly, Gaffarel highlighted the use of talismans not only 
on ships to protect them from bad weather and in fi elds to insure good crops, but 
also in imperial cities like the former Byzantine capital of Constantinople. One 
such story, taken from the late Byzantine historian Doukakis, relates the use of a 
talisman to ward off insects:
It is also reported, that after that Mahomet the Second had possessed himself of 
Constantinople, the breaking of the lower jaw of a brazen serpent was the cause 
of the increasing of serpents in those parts. So true it is, that these talismans have 
the power to direct many of those calamities that affl ict mankind.63
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Gaffarel’s story tends to romanticise the Byzantines as somehow in tune with 
their talismanic, Greek past far more than their Ottoman successors, implying as 
many humanist scholars did that the transfer of ancient knowledge by Byzantine 
exiles was critical to the revitalisation of Europe’s arts and sciences. One should 
note that this is in contrast to Ahmed Efendi’s version of the story, which implies 
the Ottomans themselves cast the bronze talisman.64
Gaffarel pointed out a second, similar account that relates to the Byzantine 
talismanic practice against plague:
At Byzantium, which is now Constantinople, there were many of these talis-
manic fi gures to be seen: but the fury of war has demolished them all, to the 
great prejudice of the inhabitants. Sultan Mahumet also caused one of them 
to be broken to pieces, which was a brazen horse, with a horseman upon him; 
which is certainly reported to have preserved the city from pestilence, and all 
contagion of the air: but since that time, this disease has raged so fi ercely, as that 
in the space of four months, Leunclavius, who was present, affi rms that there 
died 150,000 persons: and every year, in the months of July, and August, the 
like effect.65
This version once again reaffi rms the idea that the Ottomans, particularly Sultan 
Mehmed II, failed to continue the valuable Byzantine practice of talismanic 
magic, to the detriment of Istanbul’s population. Unsurprisingly, the account 
propagates the Byzantine version of the conquest of the city as the fall of a great 
civilisation to barbarism. The claim that Mehmed II destroyed an equestrian 
statue is signifi cant given that Muslims detested images as symbols of ancient 
Greek and Roman greatness in the arts.
Nonetheless, one should also compare this account to that of Evliya Çelebi, 
the famous mid-seventeenth-century Ottoman traveller, who related yet another 
version. He claims that it was Mehmed II’s son Bayazid II, a pious Muslim, who, 
during the construction of a series of new mosques in the old Byzantine city 
centre, tore down an ancient pillar erected by the Byzantines to commemorate 
the conversion to Christianity of the founder of the city, Emperor Constantine. 
According to Evliya, Bayazid quickly rebuilt the column after plague suddenly 
struck the city and killed his son.66
While Evliya’s tale confi rms that Bayazid, like Mehmed II, was initially 
ignorant of the value of talismans to protect the city from plague, it is signifi -
cant that Bayazid actually rebuilt the column after learning a painful lesson.67 
Moreover, Evliya’s inference that such talismans were used by the Ottoman 
rulers in Istanbul is confi rmed by the survival of three such talismans in the 
middle of the hippodrome, the great parade ground of the city in both Ottoman 
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and Byzantine times. There one can still fi nd the bronze serpent, a smaller 
column and an Egyptian obelisk, all three talismanical objects that were duti-
fully maintained by the Ottomans, as is evident from the walls that they built 
around them. Constantine’s monument, some half a kilometre away, similarly 
still stands today.
Also striking is Evliya’s implication of a possible religious motivation for 
Bayazid, since Bayazid was known as a far more sincere Muslim than his father. 
Presumably, initially Bayazid could have torn down the column to symbolise 
his religion’s ultimate conquest of Byzantine Christian civilisation. This part of 
the story corresponds with the earlier efforts of Byzantine authors and European 
travellers to build up the myth of Mehmed II as an intolerant barbarian. Some 
Ottoman chroniclers and Western travellers bolstered this claim, alleging that 
both Mehmed II and Bayazid II sought to rename the city as ‘Islam-bol’ or the 
‘full of Islam’ rather than simply ‘Istanbul’, an Ottoman Turkish translation of 
‘Constantinople’ that remains related to its original place name.68 Evliya seem-
ingly revised the myth in favour of a sultan who learned that the talisman’s 
magical powers, and perhaps his own tolerance of his realm’s Christian minor-
ity, was critical to his empire’s survival and prosperity. Could it be that Evliya 
actually was using this story in a similar way to the alchemists of neighbouring 
European states who employed metaphors to justify ideas of tolerance in age of 
confessionalist war?69
The English
Evidence of such imagery is particularly clear in the dedications of the English 
treatise writers. For example, William Kemp started out with the following 
 commemoration to his patron:
To the King’s most excellent Majesty Charles the Second, by the grace of God, 
King of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland; Defender of the Faith, etc.
Most dread and gracious Sovereign: the glorious sun, who communicates his 
beams and light, not only to the stars and heavens where he doth reside, but also 
to the air and water, and the remotest part of the earth, where the lowest shrubs 
are cherished with his infl uence, is a fi t emblem of your Majesty whose pious 
care was expressed not only for the nobles and courtiers, that have the honour 
to be near your person; but also for the Commons and inferior people, that have 
the happiness to be in your mind, in appointing and accepting the directions 
of the learned College of London, for the cure of, and preservation from the 
pestilence.70
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This statement, very much reminiscent of Louis XIV (1638–1715), the ‘Sun 
King’ Charles II (1630–85) so very much admired, used the astrological symbol 
of the sun in the heavens to justify his rule in both earthly and celestial terms. 
Such symbols were an attempt to displace the earlier idea of divine right, which 
would imply the monarch’s dependence on ecclesiastical authority, in favour 
of the natural legal notion that the universe, like the earth, was subject to lay 
rules and rulers. Such ideas appealed to kings and the war-torn populace alike, 
and helped to set in motion support for ‘enlightened absolutist’ rule.71 There 
are no similar dedications in Ahmed Efendi’s or the later Ottoman plague trea-
tises, which leads me to believe that Evliya’s symbolism and Ahmed Efendi’s 
awareness of international trends in literature on astral magic were not due to 
 patronage of ideological images from the court per se.
Another issue that Ottoman practitioners of talismanic magic did not have 
to deal with was the charge of heresy. Gaffarel’s treatise was the only printed 
work in the English language that I found that attested to the use of talismans 
against plague, referring to the accomplishments of Paracelsus and Crollius, both 
 controversial authors in the mid-seventeenth century:
Now of late many learned men have rescued from oblivion these fi gures [talis-
mans]; and Paracelsus did take so much pains herein, as that he made diverse of 
them; and those of such virtue, as that they preserved those that wore them from 
the pestilence, as many in Germany have had experience of . . . Those also which 
Paracelsus calls Zenexton, by a Made Name (it being the custom of this author, 
to devise new words), are made with exceedingly great art. In one of them there 
is a scorpion and a serpent fi gured: and he says it must be made when the sun 
and the moon enter into the sign of Scorpio. In another you have a great number 
of little holes, with in an oval. You may see the fi gures of them, in the chemical 
works of Crollius.72
Gaffarel then went on to note that Crollius faced charges of witchcraft for 
promoting such work. This pressure against occultist and talismanic magic led 
Gaffarel into an extended discussion as to why talismans actually confi rmed 
acceptable Christian norms. For instance, he claimed that the art fi rst emerged in 
ancient Israel. He offered discoveries such as the original Hebrew names for the 
planets (Jacob’s son Gad being the name for the planet Jupiter), Moses’ practice 
of the art and the sight of Hebrew letters in the heavens as proof in this regard. 
Only later, Gaffarel maintained, did the Egyptians corrupt talismanic magic.73 
He and other apologists for a Christian hermeticism, or talismanic magic, like 
Cornelius Agrippa, sought to restore the profession to what it once was.74
The English astrologers were far more sceptical of such speculation. As a 
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whole they tended to defend their profession as a science as distinct from ‘super-
stition’, a category which implied talismanic magic. John Gadbury and William 
Lilly, two of the most prominent astrologists of the second half of the seventeenth 
century, wrote almanacs that used such astrological reasonings – minus talis-
mans, spells and other magical components – to predict events from plagues to 
wars, and the lives of individual monarchs. Recognising the twelve zodiacs and 
the principles of ascendancy, they always argued their works to be the result of 
long labour over charts, together with foresight and the most modern knowledge 
of celestial movements scholars could provide.75 Almanacs proved to be among 
the most popular books of their day, tending to have the highest  circulation of 
any printed book short of the Bible during the seventeenth century.76
In fact, Lilly and Gadbury went so far as to maintain that astrology could 
prove plague’s celestial causation of ineffectual miasmas rather than the con-
tagionist argument popular among many physicians, particularly magistrates, 
members of the Royal Medical Society, and opponents of the Levantine cotton 
trade. At fi rst, Lilly indirectly criticised such opinion in 1644, when he related 
how ineffectual the Habsburg College of Physicians were in accepting both a 
contagionist and an astrological cause for plague in 1599.77
Gadbury made the bold argument in the immediate aftermath of 1665 out-
break that the London Bills of Mortality proved that the plague waxed and waned 
according to the celestial movements of Saturn and Mars.78 Oldenburg, chief of 
the Royal Medical Society, strenuously objected to Gadbury’s support for the 
anti-contagionist camp in his correspondence with others like John Boyle.79 John 
Graunt, whose work was central to the newly developing fi eld of ‘political arith-
metic’, also discounted such ideas in press in favour of contagionism.80 Gadbury 
responded at length to a similar critique by a contemporary of Oldenburg and 
Graunt:
There is another gentleman also, a doctor of physick (which title (fairly obtained) 
and possession of also, I exceedingly honour) has been pulling at me in print, for 
my maintaining the negative in the question above propounded. This antagonist 
is angry in earnest and tells the world that I deserve to be answered by the magis-
trate, and that there is no way to suppress my opinion, or answer my arguments, 
but by putting in execution an order published in Queen Elizabeth’s days . . .
 And considering some other passages of his, I perceive that he is not more 
angry at that my opinion, than at the celestial movers, the stars; whom (he says) 
many have accused as the authors of plague. I have (I acknowledge) in the book 
before mentioned, proved the stars to be (Sub Deo) the causes of the pestilence.
 But this gentleman (not withstanding his aim, and fruitless pains, to render 
me ridiculous and the stars (I study) ineffacious;) is not (in the meantime) aware, 
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of his own running into an error of far greater magnitude; viz. in his asserting the 
original of the plague to have been ROTTEN MUTTON eaten in the year before.
 Now let any rational man consider whether he comes nearest the truth; I, in 
asserting the stars; or he, in maintaining a rotten mutton, to be the cause of the 
pestilence. An epicurean may, and frequently does, ascribe more to his belly 
than on to those glorious and ever-busied lamps of heaven. I cannot stand here 
to repeat the arguments I have urged to prove the plague contagious; I must refer 
the reader, for that, to the book itself.
 But if rotten mutton be attended with such fatal effects, why not a plague 
every year after a rot of sheep which is the consequence of every moist summer? 
Or, if the plague were truly the effect of rotten mutton; how else then does it hold 
true, what he asserts elsewhere, in the same discourse that the plague came from 
the Netherlands, and to them from Smyrna, in a parcel of infected goods? Was 
there a rotten mutton in Smyrna too?
 To conclude: let us suffi ce at present, that I deny any such a way of infection 
by goods; and reject romance of his rotten mutton: and (as before) do assert, the 
stars (Sub Deo) to be the true and essential causes of all plagues.81
The jocular yet convincing tone of Gadbury’s statement was central to con-
vincing his audience to support the idea that celestial movements, not rotten 
mutton or imported Ottoman cotton, caused plague. This was likely to coalesce 
with the other anti-contagionist arguments that emphasised that imported goods 
– like lamb from the countryside or cotton from abroad – were far more of an 
economic benefi t than a public health hazard. This undoubtedly appealed to 
Gadbury’s mainstay: London’s entrepreneurs. Gadbury went so far as to name 
his political opponents – a doctor pushing Elizabeth I’s laws – and use the Bills 
of Mortality against them!82 It should be noted that Elizabeth I and her mercantil-
ist advisers were the fi rst to ban an import (French wine) in order to prevent the 
plague, much to the chagrin of the very shopkeepers Gadbury to whom would 
later appeal.83
Gadbury’s combination of astrology and the Bills of Mortality also seem 
remarkably similar to the way in which practitioners of the cabalistic, occult-
ist and talismanic arts, such as Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Miranda, Cornelius 
Agrippa and Giordano Bruno, justifi ed the fi ndings of Galileo. This proved once 
again that combinations of magic and scientifi c innovation readily sold to a body 
politic that sought to justify socioeconomic and geopolitical change.84
Moreover, Gadbury’s work also illustrates a stark difference between 
Ottoman and English astrological literature. The English literature was aimed at 
a broad, politically and commercially active audience. Gadbury, Lilly and Kemp 
were much more in tune with the politics of state-building movements, which 
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would justify absolutist notions of sovereignty, governmental regulation of 
religious and social affairs, and an emerging commercial economy. Astrological 
charts and tables that graphically illustrated the rise and fall of monarchs, the 
capturing of new markets, the founding of colonies and the outbreaks of disease 
tapped into this dynamic medium. One can almost imagine that Gadbury’s pam-
phlets were as dog-eared as any recent publication in the coffee houses, libraries 
and homes of London at the time.85
Ottoman astrologers were certainly not totally isolated from such develop-
ments, as seen in Ahmed Efendi’s and Gaffarel’s shared talismanic magic, 
as well as Evliya’s symbol of Bayazid’s magical unifi cation of the empire. 
However, Ottoman astrologers like Ahmed Efendi still worked within a court 
culture where their writings had a much smaller circulation. One should not 
overlook the fact that I have located only one new astrological tract in Ottoman 
Turkish on plague during the entire seventeenth century; a trend which contrasts 
strongly with the wealth of printed English astrological literature on plague 
during the same era.
While Ahmed Efendi and other Ottoman astrologists undoubtedly had 
an impact on the sultan and his family, palace intrigues and patronage, they 
did not play the same public, commercial role as London’s treatise writers. 
Consequently, the Ottoman writers were not subject to the same type of 
 ideological scrutiny as their English counterparts.
Gadbury’s exclaimer at the beginning of his argument with the doctor that 
astrology was the superior cause of plague ‘sub deo’, or ‘outside an act of God’, 
was not there by mere accident.86 This exception, like his and his colleagues’ 
avoidance of talismanic elements in his astrological predictions, was a direct 
result of the confessionalist pressure to root out magical practices outside ideo-
logical images and justifi cations. Talismanic magic, like all cabalistic medicine 
and saint worship, allowed for a type of individual initiative and economy that 
the state and religious authorities would not allow in print.
Conclusion
The impact of print culture and the political, religious and commercial devel-
opments in London during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries help to 
explain why English and Ottoman plague treatises developed fundamentally dif-
ferent functions during this time. Even by the early sixteenth century, it appears 
that both the English and Ottomans had similar cabalistic perceptions and prac-
tices regarding plague in both courtly circles and on a more popular level. This is 
indeed a far cry from Dols’ still dominant interpretation of the Ottoman’s static 
mystical essentialist conceptions of plague.87 Moreover, the religious authorities 
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of the time also seemed to have sanctioned such practices. Although the English 
crown and new Protestant ecclesiastical authorities increasingly pressured such 
practices, particularly on a popular level, intellectual elites continued to cultivate 
the cabalistic and hermetic/talismanic arts for a much longer period. Ottoman 
intellectuals, represented by the likes of Ahmed Efendi and Evliya, likely 
remained in touch with these same schools of thought.
England’s state and commercial formation, religious strife, civil war and 
natural disasters like the plague and the fi re of London, put pressures on astrolog-
ical and spiritual treatise writers on plague to act as ideological agents. Brooks’ 
use of multilayered divine magical, cabalistic talismanic and even mechanical 
symbols of utopia in the world beyond; Gadbury’s combination of astrology 
and the bills of mortality; as well as Kemp’s dedication to Charles II as the 
‘Sun King’, undoubtedly provided valuable justifi cations for English authorities 
overwhelmed by the crisis of 1665: social resignation to death from plague; faith 
that sciences like astrology would master epidemic disaster; and the belief in the 
sovereign as the source of earthly and celestial authority.
These works were simply state-encouraged efforts at social and political 
damage control rather than signs of progress against the ravages of pestilence. 
Undoubtedly, London’s suffering masses were frustrated that the plague dev-
astated the city regardless of the promises that quarantines and other medical 
regulations could contain the damage. References to natural magic, fear and 
imagination, as well as a growing disbelief that any preventive measure could 
alleviate the danger, reveal a sense of despondency to which only those who 
had suffered the untold horrors of religious and civil war could relate. The 
Ottomans, who remained outside such state-building movements, mechanical 
and social disciplinary ideologies, never had to ‘spin’ their way out of such a 
public accounting. Similar pressure would come about only towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, when the Europeans began to threaten the Ottoman social 
order in the name of a disease they had only imagined themselves to conquer.
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13. Taşköprüzade, Risale fi ’t-Taun ve’l-Veba, fol. 191B.
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Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman and 
the Ottoman Quarantine Reform
Introduction
The 1838 Ottoman quarantine reform was truly a turning point in the Empire’s 
history of epidemic disease. One might gather that Sultan Mahmud II adopted 
the quarantine from western European advisers and physicians; as is evident 
from the recommendations presented to the Ottoman ruler with regard to imple-
mentation of the institution two years earlier by the Austrian doctor Anton 
Lago.1 Egyptian rival Muhammad Ali had launched his own quarantine under 
the guidance of foreign offi cials some seven years earlier. Mahmud II’s pred-
ecessor Sultan Selim III had tried to do so in 1806. Many observers – Ottoman 
and Western – claimed that by 1840 the innovation had succeeded in  eradicating 
plague permanently from the Empire.2
One seriously needs to address a number of issues in this account. Were the 
Ottomans and western Europeans, particularly the powerful British naval and 
commercial interests, unifi ed in their support of the quarantine? One notices a 
number of Ottoman medical treatises in favour of this measure and a number of 
Anglo-American writers who were not. What exactly accounts for this discrep-
ancy, and how did the geopolitical realities of the time, namely, the Ottoman 
push for reform and the concurrent British desire for commercial and colonial 
expansion, refl ect this tension? Could one compare the Anglo-American critics’ 
characterisation of the quarantine as a social disciplinary and ethnically divisive 
institution to Ottoman realities?
The following chapter will pursue these themes by discussing two inter-
related sets of guiding questions. First, were Westerners or the Ottoman and 
other Muslim reformers primarily responsible for authoring and/or implementing 
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quarantine and other contagionist public health policy reforms? How did such a 
question of control refl ect upon the broader debate about nineteenth-century 
Ottoman reform as modernisation or Westernisation? Secondly, did quarantine 
and contagionist reforms lead to medical policing, where the state increasingly 
encroached upon civil society and individual liberty, as supposedly seen in the 
western European experience, or did it instead help to promote more popular 
participation in governmental affairs? Did such reform also promote ethnic divi-
sions, as they were originally designed to build maritime nation-states, or could 
they be adopted to an alternative context, such as the multi-ethnic Ottoman 
Empire?
Westernisation versus Modernisation
One could easily be tempted to see the entire Muslim reform movement as 
an example of Westernisation, the wholesale adoption of modern European 
reforms, institutions and languages regardless of the socioeconomic and cultural 
context of the host country. Certainly, Westerners were often responsible for 
implementing quarantine and other contagionist institutions, such as the laza-
retto and the bill of health system. It was no accident that the French armies that 
conquered Egypt in 1798 and Algeria in 1830 were the fi rst to establish such 
measures in the Middle East. One might surmise that European diplomats and 
expatriate communities in the Ottoman Empire either directly introduced conta-
gionist institutions or sent their recommendations indirectly to imperial offi cials, 
who copied them outright. Such actions could conceivably have led to a quaran-
tine system throughout the Islamic world after 1830, which quickly eliminated 
plague as a result. Allegedly, Western know-how, which had conquered plague 
in London after 1665 and Marseilles in 1720, had fi nally extended beyond the 
continent.3
Yet a careful analysis of existing Ottoman sources supports the idea that 
Muslim reformers embraced quarantine and other modernising reforms in 
order to revitalise the state and to compete with their European neighbours. 
These modernisers adopted innovations, not simply by borrowing directly 
from Western ideas and institutions, but by the selective appropriation of new 
techniques within a local context. Ottoman, Egyptian and Tunisian reformers 
all pushed for quarantines and sought to have their own control. The long-term 
success of quarantine and other mercantilist measures was dependent on effec-
tive state formation. Quarantines were in fact mercantilist tools that protected 
and promoted internal economic development, and often fl ew in the face of free 
trade. Unfortunately, Ottoman dependence on Britain to ward off the Russian 
and Egyptian threat to imperial existence led in turn to sizable trade concessions 
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to the British in the Balta Liman Treaty of 1838. These concessions would force 
the Ottomans to grant the British and other European powers partial supervision 
over the quarantines through the establishment of the Constantinople Superior 
Health Council. The European declaration of ‘victory’ over plague in the 1840s, 
and their dominance of the international sanitary conferences that followed in the 
ensuing decades, were refl ective of this outside hegemony.4
Nevertheless, one needs to detail the arguments for Muslim quarantines as 
simply an altruistic, progressive Western idea. This is fi rst evident in an analysis 
of native accounts of quarantine as an aspect of French colonisation of Egypt and 
Algeria, descriptions of the Europeans who introduced quarantine and lazaret-
tos to the Ottoman Empire between 1807 and 1830, and the wholesale Ottoman 
adoption of the standard Western quarantine model by 1838.
Admittedly, at least two native accounts of French colonisation readily iden-
tifi ed quarantines with Western society. Al-Jabarti, a prominent Arab notable 
who was an eyewitness to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, recalled that:
They [the French] exercise the greatest severity in the application of sanitary 
measures [which] harass the people and frighten them. When someone fell ill, 
the doctor visited him, and if he was recognised as stricken with plague, he was 
immediately transferred to quarantine without any of his family being able to 
see him afterwards . . . If he recovered, he returned home; otherwise they had 
him buried, fully clothed . . . His house remained closed for four days, and all 
his clothes were burned, . . . If any passer-by was imprudent enough to touch the 
door of the house or to overstep the boundaries drawn around it, he was imme-
diately arrested by the guards and sent to quarantine. Those individuals who 
undertook to wash the dead, to carry them or bury them, left their quarantine only 
to perform their functions. These measures . . . induced many inhabitants to leave 
Cairo or to settle in the villages.5
Here Al-Jabarti describes the measures taken by the French in minute detail, 
but we do not get a real sense of whether he believed they were effective or not. 
What is most striking about this passage is instead Al-Jabarti’s disillusionment 
with the inhumane and selfi sh treatment of the victims:
As for the French it is their custom not to bury their dead but to toss them on 
garbage heaps like the corpses of dogs and beasts, or to throw them into the sea. 
Among the other things which they said is that when someone becomes sick, they 
must inform the French who then send an authorised representative to examine 
him and to fi nd out whether he has plague or not. They then decide what to do 
with him.6
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While some historians have interpreted Al-Jabarti as someone who identi-
fi ed quarantine as totally alien to Islamic religious sensibilities – the beliefs that 
the faithful should not abandon those stricken with a horrible disease and that 
one should not take preventive measures against plague as it was the will of 
God – one should also not forget Al-Jabarti’s own personal motives in writing 
his work. Al-Jabarti, who wrote his work in part to criticise Muhammad Ali’s 
government as a conservative critic of reform, also thoroughly discussed French 
bureaucratic political reform7 – a hint that he might have actively participated in 
the short-lived Napoleonic government of Egypt in the wake of the 1798 inva-
sion. Thus, it may well have been in his interest to distance himself from the most 
 controversial aspects of the French occupation.
Hamdan Bin Osman Hoca, an Algerian who actively resisted the French 
shortly after they had occupied his country in 1830, had a far more positive 
impression:
The measures the Europeans have implemented [in Algeria] against plague have 
helped them avoid plague [in Europe] for several hundred years. For example, 
they do not allow anyone from the countryside to enter a city unless they prove 
that they are not ill. The Europeans invented such quarantines in order to 
 determine which people had the disease.8
Like Al-Jabarti, Hamdan credited the Europeans with the innovation: ‘The quar-
antine fi rst emerged in Europe and does not correspond to Islamic countries.’9 
However, he strongly believed that Muslims should also adopt the measure. Here 
he cited his own personal experience:
I myself took measures to prevent plague at home in Algeria. I did not leave 
my household and bought items that were carried by ship [from France], and 
not by land. I purchased no cloth or fabrics and avoided hiring maids from the 
provinces . . . I would fumigate myself and not touch anyone, except when I had 
to go Friday prayers or funerals. Due to this, no one in my household was struck 
by plague.10
This passage shows Hamdan’s own belief that the French quarantine did in fact 
save lives. Nonetheless, it is curious to note that the protectionist measures also 
included purchasing French cloth and fabrics and avoiding employing native 
Algerian maids. Hamdan, who wrote these passages in his own proposal for the 
Ottomans to implement plague, may have been aware of the mercantilist nature 
of this innovation. He likely saw such Western measures as a formula for ensur-
ing a country’s public health and commercial success.
BULMUS PRINT.indd   100 06/03/2012   16:35
 Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman and the Ottoman Quarantine Reform 101
Early nineteenth-century critics of quarantines in the Ottoman Empire 
confi rmed that the quarantine and other contagionist institutions, such as the 
lazaretto or pest house, were indeed Western ideas. Charles Maclean, a prolifi c 
British doctor, who actively lobbied for expanding the Levant Company’s trade 
with the Ottoman Empire in 1817, wrote that the Ottoman sultan had toyed with 
the idea only after a European diplomat had proposed it to him:
Yet such was a measure seriously proposed, by the Austrian government to 
that of Turkey, in the reign of Selim [III (1789–1807)] with a view of extirpat-
ing epidemic diseases. That good, but in some respects weak, prince desirous 
of adopting every innovation, which he considered an improvement, however 
impractical, had himself no disinclination to entertain this proposition of the 
Austrian cabinet, which was formally presented to the Porte by the present 
worthy Internuncio Baron Stürmer.11
Furthermore, Maclean and James DeKay, an American who visited Istanbul 
in 1831–2 in the aftermath of the US trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire 
in May 1830 that guaranteed them most favoured nation trading status, also testi-
fi ed that western Europeans (also known as ‘Franks’) and local non-Muslims had 
established lazarettos of their own. Maclean complained extensively:
Concerning these infernal depositories . . . miscalled pest hospitals in the Levant, 
it is proper that I should here say a few words. Their purpose is to serve as 
receptacles for all the miserable human beings, who are thought fi t to objects of 
excommunication, by their families or employers, for having the misfortune to 
be attacked with the plague. They constitute the intermediate stage to the burying 
ground; to which these unfortunate victims of barbarity, are, after being almost 
always despoiled of their property, and often unfairly of their lives, generally in 
a few days duly transferred. These depots, constituting one of the most direful 
consequences of the doctrine of contagion, are of course only in use amongst the 
inhabitants of those persuasions, who entertain that pernicious belief: and their 
non-adoption by the Mohammedans is one of their circumstances, which contrib-
ute to except that branch of the Levant population, beyond their neighbors, from 
the ravages of pestilence . . . None who enter them, indeed, are ever expected to 
return.12
DeKay, like Maclean, viewed the lazaretto as a cynical plot to abandon the sick 
on the pretext that Western medical knowledge of the plague alone could save 
its victims:
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Leaving this scene, we passed under the walls of the plague hospital, built exclu-
sively for Franks who may be affected with this disease. Over its melancholy 
walls we noticed the golden-berried ivy, the true ivy of the ancients, and this 
is the only locality about Constantinople in which I have seen it fl ourishing. 
The melancholy fate which has attended every patient admitted into this hos-
pital gives some color to the reports which the Franks circulate of its character. 
According to their account, no patient has ever been known to leave this place 
alive, and the voi che entrate of Dante would seem to be the most appropriate 
inscription over its walls.13
One can confi rm that certain Ottomans circles opposed quarantines and 
lazarettos, claiming that they were Western innovations that contradicted 
Muslim values. Osman Bin Süleyman Penah, the chief of Selim III’s dockyards 
in Istanbul, the chief engineer and fi nancial offi cer in charge of the Imperial 
Arsenal, was a most outspoken critic. Osman was personally opposed to the 
establishment of the Empire’s fi rst offi cial lazaretto and medical school in 
the Arsenal in 1806, where Ottoman naval academy students were trained by 
European doctors in infectious diseases, surgery and anatomy. He in all likeli-
hood wrote his 1804 tract against understanding plague as a contagious disease 
in full knowledge that the lazaretto would be established. Some three years after 
Osman wrote he would join Ataullah Şanizade, a former translator of Austrian 
medical texts, in engineering a coup against Selim III in reaction to the foreign 
presence and in the name of Islamic orthodoxy.14
Mahmud II took great care to include key Ottoman Muslim offi cials when he 
restarted contagionist reforms in the 1830s. Hamdan, recognised for his support 
of the Ottoman cause in Hacı Ahmed’s armed struggle in western Algeria and 
for a condemnation of colonial rule published in French, wrote his work on 
plague, this time in Ottoman Turkish, to counter any opposition from conserva-
tive religious quarters. Behçed Efendi, Mahmud II’s chief physician, wrote a 
second published work in both Ottoman Turkish and French to explain that both 
cholera and plague were contagious diseases. At the same time, the Empire’s 
chief religious offi cial, the şeyhül-islam, issued a fetva proclaiming that there 
was no ‘harm to take refuge in God’s favour from His wrath and attempt to take 
preventive measure when plague strikes’.15 These actions overcame conserva-
tive Muslim opposition to the 1838 quarantine despite the fact that Lago, and 
apparently some Viennese physicians, were also involved. Lago’s work, a forty-
page treatise on how modern the institutions and rules of modern quarantine 
and lazarettos could be implemented in the Empire, was apparently not widely 
 distributed beyond the bureaucratic circles directly involved in the project.16
Finally, it is also evident that Hamdan, one of Mahmud II’s chief advocates 
BULMUS PRINT.indd   102 06/03/2012   16:35
 Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman and the Ottoman Quarantine Reform 103
of quarantine and other contagionist reforms, based his proposal on western 
European standards. The European maritime quarantine system, based in large 
part on Venetian customs, had three outstanding features. Hamdan detailed the 
fi rst, namely, bills of health ‘given to ships leaving port’, at the outset of his 
description of the European system:
Kings have their offi cials (balyos) all along the coast. They register every ship. 
Passengers have to provide sealed offi cial papers indicating who they were, 
where they came from and certifying that there was no plague in their country. 
The offi cer is also in charge of describing where plague is.17
Hamdan followed up with an explanation of the second main feature, the 
European quarantine procedures:
There are fi ve categories of quarantine. First, are those that came from nearby 
countries with a good quarantine. Sick passengers should be detained until they 
verify what type of disease/illness they have. Second, are those that came from 
remote countries with a good quarantine. They should be put in quarantine in 
case they interacted with other ships during the journey. Third, are those that 
came from non-plague-infested countries without a quarantine. They should be 
quarantined for twenty days. Fourth, are those that came from a plague-infested 
country but have no plague on board. Passengers should be kept in quarantine for 
two months. Fifth, and fi nally, are ships with plague. They should be expelled 
without hesitation.18
Hamdan also spoke to the European quarantine practice of isolating and 
 purifying goods and personal effects:
If suspected, the passengers will go to the quarantine area but their belongings 
may be sunk or burnt. Passengers will be compensated accordingly. Guardsmen 
will be assigned to control the people under quarantine.
 Processed raw materials like wool and cotton will be controlled carefully and 
put outside during the quarantine; materials that do not pass on the dangerous air, 
such as olive oil, will not be put under quarantine.19
Finally, Hamdan described the lazaretto, the third main feature:
Quarantine areas will be guarded on all sides; food will be provided for those 
who are under quarantine; private bathrooms will be provided . . . People under 
quarantine will have rooms. Additional space will be provided if requested. 
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People under quarantine can interact with each other irrespective of the time they 
spent under quarantine. If people become sick, their time under quarantine will 
increase.20
Undoubtedly, the implementation of the Ottoman quarantine by 1838 – as 
seen in Hamdan’s proposal – and Muhammad Ali’s earlier 1812 regulations, 
were critical junctures in the history of medicine.21 The Europeans acted quickly 
after the Egyptians and Ottomans established quarantines to put some under 
international supervision, and, in the Ottoman case, many observers declared 
that the epidemic threat was ‘eliminated’ by the mid-1840s. One could easily 
conclude from these developments that quarantine was a progressive Western 
idea that eventually trickled down to the Ottomans and other Middle Eastern 
Muslim states.22
A number of questions complicate this scenario, leading to a fundamental 
re-evaluation of the Ottoman and other Muslim quarantine reforms as a form of 
Westernisation to a view that takes native agency far more into account. First, 
one must question, for instance, whether the quarantine reforms were purely 
‘Western’ in origin.
Some Western travellers critical of the reform tended to portray the widely 
acclaimed Ottoman belief in anti-contagionism as a universal truth. DeKay 
disingenuously voiced this opinion in relation to cholera in 1833 on the eve of 
Mahmud II’s quarantine reform, which was aimed in part at this disease:
Whether cholera be contagious is a question about which (whatever may be the 
fancies or the fears of ignorance) there is but one opinion among the Oriental 
physicians. They are unanimous in their belief of cholera being non-contagious; 
although partly to accommodate themselves to the vulgar prejudices and partly to 
inspire confi dence, they direct fumigations and purifi cations by water.23
This statement is very odd given the fact that DeKay provided an accurate 
partial summary of a popular 1831 pamphlet on cholera by Behçed Efendi, 
published after the outbreak of cholera throughout the Empire that year. DeKay 
neglected to mention the section where Behçed directed the affl icted to take 
precautions:
The fi rst thing to do is to avoid the place where the disease occurred. Do not 
approach the sick people, and do not talk with them because this disease is 
contagious like the plague! This has been tried and proven. If the disease occurs 
somewhere and someone dies or is ill, it is indispensable to immediately wash the 
garments of the sick and even the house furniture.24
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There is similar, although indirect, evidence of a native inclination towards 
contagionist thought during the decades leading up to the 1838 reform. Maclean 
spoke at one point in 1817 about a case involving the Grand Vizier, the most 
powerful offi cial in the Empire besides the sultan:
The present Grand Seignor is said to be one of those who entertains some appre-
hensions of this malady: and I have heard that, whilst I was in the hospital near 
the Seven Towers [in Istanbul], being struck with the death of his Hunkiar Imani, 
or Chaplain, he ordered the following maxim, extracted from the Hattisscherif, 
or collections of the sayings of Mohammed, preserved by tradition, to be brought 
to the recollection of the Mussulmaun people, from the principle mosques: ‘The 
sick ought not to have communication from without, and he, who is well, ought 
to avoid meddling with the sick’.25
These sentiments for taking governmental action to prevent needless deaths were 
shared by Hamdan, one of the chief authors of the 1838 reform. He claimed that: 
‘Plague comes from putrid, fetid air which poisons light materials like cotton and 
wool [which people wear]. It then spreads to humans.’26
One then wonders what Hamdan, Behçed and the Grand Vizier based their 
beliefs in plague and cholera’s contagious nature upon? Arguably, all three were 
convinced, at least in part, by direct experience with the disease. One is tempted 
to further speculate that they were also informed by European notions of the 
disease, since Western medicine was also alleged to be determined by experi-
ence, an objectivity many prior historians of medicine believe to be absent from 
Muslim society. Yet even if European notions of contagionism affected any of 
the three cases, one should not forget that Muslim thinkers and statesmen often 
remained receptive to ‘foreign’ ideas as a general rule. Hamdan prominently 
mentioned the platitude: ‘Wisdom is the believer’s guide. He should take it from 
wherever he fi nds it.’ For him, this truth was just as applicable to earlier times as 
it was in his day. He pointed out that just as the Arabs took much of their learn-
ing from the ancient Greeks, so too did the Europeans base their experimental 
knowledge on prior scholars. He jokingly chastised that the Turks should follow 
in the Europeans footsteps, since ‘One should take knowledge, even if it comes 
from the Arabs.’27
Nevertheless, Hamdan readily admitted European superiority in medicine and 
science because, to him, it was based upon experimental knowledge. In his eyes, 
the Ottomans should adopt quarantine, a practical application of this knowledge, 
and fundamentally rethink their approach towards learning new technology. Most 
controversially, Hamdan proclaimed that the Europeans’ success was due to 
detaching natural philosophy (science and medicine) from religion.28
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Here Hamdan had to convince a sceptical Muslim audience that adopting 
a secular approach was not a betrayal of the faith. Mahmud II, who apparently 
had not forgotten the opposition Selim III had faced from his own statesman 
Osman Bin Süleyman Penah, prefaced the publication of Hamdan’s work with 
an  offi cial edict:
A tract, now in press, will clarify the nature and conditions of the disease [plague] 
and combat certain prejudices from religious zealots. To ignore the sovereign in 
this regard is to show ungratefulness . . . Those who ignore [the tract] . . . are 
subject to chastisement for their misdemeanour.29
Hamdan clarifi ed that the ‘religious zealots’ to which Mahmud II referred had a 
‘vain imagination’. He alleged that, according to them:
The Europeans are infi dels who have an irreligious, materialistic perspective. 
This fi xed thinking harms the Muslim community by ignoring the source of detri-
ment (plague) [and not adopting useful measures from Europe].30
Hamdan followed up this statement in an extended argument on how earlier 
famed Islamic thinkers reinforced his views. He pointed out, for instance, that 
Ghazali, the great fourteenth-century Abbassid mystic believed that: ‘One 
should not deny philosophy because it is distinct from religion. If we deny the 
philosophers, we only increase their evil attitude towards Islam.’31 Hamdan also 
cited Ali bin Ebu Talib, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad, as justifying 
the need for Muslims to keep an open mind towards acquiring new knowledge 
from others:
If you know the truth, you know the people who tell the truth. Ignorance defeats 
humanity. If you do not know something, ask those who do. You are part of 
society and have a responsibility to it.32
Hamdan made a number of concessions in his proposal to accommodate reli-
gious sensibilities. He remarked at one point that imams should to be among the 
quarantine offi cials, since they needed ‘to wash and prepare the dead’. He also 
mentioned that when he practised the quarantine in French-occupied Algeria, he 
did make sure to still attend Friday prayers and funerals. This was an acknowl-
edgement that certain religious duties took precedence, even if it meant breaking 
some of the quarantine principles of personal isolation. To him, Ali’s reminder 
of the Muslim duty to society, meaning the greater Islamic community, was a 
supreme virtue.33 This was a familiar argument to Ottoman Muslim elites, the 
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majority of whom were adherents of the liberal Hanafi  school of Sunni Islam. 
Ottoman reformers since Ebussuud Efendi, the sixteenth-century chief religious 
offi cial, appealed to the maxim that innovations were justifi ed if they saved their 
people.34
Hamdan’s tract was not the fi rst to attempt to sway the Ottoman ruling elite 
on the quarantine issue. Osman’s earlier work condemning the institution had 
aimed at the same audience that ultimately deposed Selim III. Hamdan and 
Mahmud II might have referred to Osman as a ‘religious zealot’, but the fact was 
that he was among the privileged ‘enlightened ulema’ Selim III had entrusted 
with the reform movement.35 Thus, there was very little to distinguish Osman 
from Hamdan and other members of the Ottoman bureaucratic class except for 
the political and religious rhetoric which both of them used. Hence, terms like 
‘enlightened’, ‘zealot’, ‘backward’ and ‘dogmatic’ were relative to the political 
struggles at the time at which they wrote.
What really counted towards both Osman’s and Hamdan’s success in per-
suading the Ottoman public was their shared sense of patriotism. Just as Osman 
was motivated by the large numbers of foreign doctors and other experts Selim 
III had employed to man his reform effort, so too Hamdan was convinced that 
the threat of European colonisation was very real. He illustrated this most clearly 
in his 1833 work, which protested to the French public how they had unfairly 
colonised Algeria:
One would think that an honourable nation [like the French] would not violate 
its own treaties so that we could enjoy liberty and be treated justly. It would not 
matter if Pierre or Paul governed, the principle of the French government was not 
to touch our religion. Religion is a moral thing that one should not dispute with 
us. The French people’s fraternity will unite us with them. Civilisation is based 
on people’s rights, and we are not scared of a civilised nation. Such were the 
refl ections [before we found out differently] . . . The Turks professed the same 
religion as us. We acknowledged their government, but our mores and religion 
were respected, our properties were not pillaged, our blood was not spilled, and 
our wives and children were not massacred.36
He also elaborated on the progressive nature of Ottoman rule: ‘The Turks, “the 
so-called barbarians” maintained tolerance and effective rule in Algeria and 
 elsewhere in the vicinity of Europe for three centuries.’37
Such statements published in French and distributed in Paris just in time for 
a parliamentary debate on reconsidering Algerian policy reveal that Hamdan 
understood, and fully participated within, a Western political context. He, 
indeed, was using his knowledge of French political and literary culture to 
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combat the French in the most effective way he knew. His daring protest, written 
in collaboration with Ottoman Foreign Minister Mustafa Res ̧id (1800–58), later 
the key architect of the Ottoman reform movement, resulted in Hamdan’s per-
manent expulsion from Algeria after his work hit the press. The act must have 
also won him substantial gratitude among the Ottoman public, a reputation that 
Mahmud II was no doubt cognisant of when he backed his quarantine tract. The 
fact that Hamdan and the other quarantine reformers met no substantial opposi-
tion from ‘religious zealots’ highlighted the success of this strategy.38
This leads one to question whether the Ottoman quarantine was really in 
the European interests. Great Britain, by far the strongest commercial power in 
the eastern Mediterranean, as in much of the Indian and Atlantic oceans, had 
a growing engagement with the Ottoman economy. By the early nineteenth 
century, British merchants were eager to increase their sales of cotton goods and 
woollens in return for a variety of raw material products, including raw cotton 
and mohair. The Treaty of Balta Liman of 1838 – which greatly reduced external 
and internal tariffs to British traders – was a logical precondition for fl ooding the 
Ottoman market with British textiles.
One can see the dramatic upturn in the sale of both cotton goods and woollen 
textiles imported into the Ottoman Empire.39 The effect that this growth of 
imported cotton goods, from approximately 850,000 tons in 1838 to 3.8 million 
tons in 1855, and woollen textiles, from 38,000 tons to 135,000 tons, had on the 
Ottoman Empire was to inhibit domestic manufacturers. Urquhart described in 
detail his vision of this commercialisation of agriculture only some fi ve years 
before the treaty:
The manufacture of cotton is the principal indoor occupation of the greater 
portion of the East – of the above sixty-millions of men, with whom our future 
commerce will probably be carried on through the scales of the Levant – of men 
who are applying their labour to manufacture the cotton, and wool, and silk, 
that clothe them, while their fi elds lie uncultivated under a climate producing 
all of those articles which at present give the highest remuneration for labour. 
Throughout these vast and varied regions, these resources have lain dormant, 
as in the Turkish village; because hitherto the fi rst object of necessity was not 
furnished to them cheap enough to induce them to forgo its manufacture, and 
turned their attention to cultivation. How important, then, is it to establish the 
fact, that our cottons are at a suffi ciently low price to induce them to forgo the 
home manufacturer! . . . The village which was insulated before, now seeks to 
connect itself with the lines of communication with the principal marts; cultiva-
tion extends, wealth accumulates, instruction follows, desire for new objects 
increases, produce is raised, England’s looms have called this prosperity into 
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existence . . . From the year 1827 to 1830, our exports have increased from 
531,704 to 1,139,613.40
All this trade would have been hindered by the new quarantine regula-
tions, which targeted cotton and wool in particular. Thus, it is no surprise that 
authors like Maclean and Urquhart, both lobbyists for increasing trade with 
the Ottoman Empire, would condemn quarantines as a hindrance to trade and 
public health. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, quarantines were largely mercantil-
ist measures aimed at promoting domestic industries at the expense of the free 
market. Hamdan, as we have noted previously, was well aware of quarantine’s 
effects when he stated that the French colonists in Algeria purchased only goods 
imported from France, and that French quarantine offi cials charged all ships a fee 
in order to cover costs.41
Hamdan and his Ottoman compatriots were also likely aware of what the 
British infl icted upon some of their key trading partners. Since the 1750s the 
British East India Company had been instrumental in destroying India’s cotton 
manufacturing and forcing its cotton growers to export the goods to London to 
help fuel textile industrial production. This led to increased British profi ts, an 
eventual motive for establishing outright colonial rule.42 In 1839, just one year 
after the Balta Liman Treaty and the Ottoman quarantine reform, Great Britain 
went to war with China, provoked again by the British East India Company, 
which forced the ruling Qing dynasty to accept their illicit trade of opium despite 
its devastating social effects. This contradicted the ongoing colonialist myth that 
the British, like the other imperialist European powers, were civilising their new 
subjects.
Hamdan and others like him stressed the need for reform in view of such 
commercial imperialism. Hamdan, in fact, argued that Mahmud II pushed for an 
Ottoman quarantine to strengthen the state:
The Europeans overcame plague with their precautions and taught them to their 
progeny. As a result, their politics and trade developed. In contrast, Muslims 
wasted their people . . . When he [Sultan Mahmud II] saw that another country 
was doing better than his, he hurried to amend the circumstances within the realm 
[by adopting the quarantine].43
Likewise, Hamdan drew a parallel between quarantine and other key reforms, 
such as rearming the military:
Previously the Muslims waged war with spears, arrows and swords, while the 
Europeans invented gunpowder, rifl es and cannons. When the Muslims acquired 
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these materials from the Europeans, nobody protested but said it was necessary 
to acquire them.44
Of course, it would be a mistake to accept uncritically Hamdan’s inference here 
that the Ottomans lagged far behind their European rivals from the seventeenth 
century onwards. Recent studies have shown that Ottoman gunpowder technol-
ogy kept roughly apace.45 Hamdan’s statement is also misleading if it referred 
to Mahmud II’s reformed military. The sultan’s abolition of the Janissary corps 
in 1826 was in fact a bloody slaughter of the capital’s conservative opposi-
tion. His success in this endeavour paralleled the quarantine reform. Mahmud 
II, learning from the mistake Selim III made in allowing the janissaries to 
rally against his reform, this time cunningly plotted a coup to undermine his 
opposition.46
Nevertheless, Hamdan seemingly did imply that his reform, like earlier 
military reforms, would rely on foreign expertise, oddly enough from his old 
nemesis, the French: ‘There is no harm in this, since [they] have training in the 
matter.’47
This reliance on European methods and the French language can also be seen 
in 1838, when Mahmud II reorganised his military’s medical school. Mahmud II 
clarifi ed his long-term goal to assimilate European/French medical and scientifi c 
knowledge into an Ottoman Turkish cultural context in this excerpt from his 
inaugural address at the school:
I have given precedence to this school because it will be dedicated to a sacred 
duty – the preservation of human health . . . The instruction in medicine will be 
in French. You may ask why this should be in a foreign language . . . What we 
need is well-trained doctors for our troops and for our people, on the one hand, 
and to have the medical sciences incorporated into our own language and our 
own medical literature codifi ed, on the other. Therefore, my purpose in having 
you study the French language is not to teach you French as such but that you 
may learn medicine – and in order to incorporate that science step-by-step into 
our own language. Medicine will be taught in Turkish in our land only when this 
has been done.48
It should be added that the medical school was under the direction of Abdülhak 
Molla, even though the majority of the staff were foreigners, largely French, 
Viennese and Italian.49
Hamdan also made it clear in his proposal that the quarantine was to remain 
under direct Ottoman supervision. In his opinion, it was necessary for the 
Sultan:
BULMUS PRINT.indd   110 06/03/2012   16:35
 Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman and the Ottoman Quarantine Reform 111
To appoint a pious Muslim as the supervisor to implement a quarantine. That 
person should be mature, cognizant of the needs of the Islamic lands, and not 
prone to nepotism. He is charged with a duty to protect the Empire from plague. 
The supervisor will also convene a council regularly to implement and maintain 
the quarantine. They should meet every day to examine the newcomer’s papers 
and decide how long subjects should stay in quarantine. The supervisor should 
have all necessary authority to carry out his mission to guard the Islamic land.50
Similarly, quarantine was only to be implemented in Istanbul, on both sides of 
the Straits, in order to better regulate international travel. As one would expect 
for border or customs offi cials, quarantine offi cers were expected to make an 
oath of loyalty to swear that they would not betray their cause.51
The fact that the British opposed Hamdan’s proposal for direct Ottoman 
control over the quarantine should come as no surprise. Lord Ponsonby, the 
British Ambassador to the Porte at the time the proposal was formally discussed 
in March 1838, refl ected the concerns of the British Board of Trade in a letter to 
Prime Minister Palmerston:
I must not omit to speak of the expenses to which the commercial Franks and 
others will be subjected by the quarantine; and that will not conceal my fear 
that, whatever measures may be adapted, the execution of them will be so bad 
as to subject us with all the many-fold inconveniences of sanitary regulations, 
without giving us the benefi ts that are generally supposed be derived from them 
. . . I am fully impressed with the importance of this matter, and I shall be most 
happy to be assured of the probability of possibly extricating the plague from 
Constantinople. I am not assured of it – I doubt it extremely, and therefore I am 
adverse to these measures.52
The Board of Trade, acting upon such concerns of lost profi t and enhanced 
Ottoman governmental control over international commerce, renewed its efforts 
for free trade. When the British drew up the Balta Liman Treaty in August 
1838, they insisted that quarantine be supervised by the Constantinople Superior 
Health Council – a body that included representatives of all the major European 
powers. Mahmud II, under extreme pressure from the Russian Navy at that time, 
conceded to the British request.53
This frustrated tale of quarantine reform certainly belies the view that the 
western Europeans were responsible for implementing the institution in the 
Middle East, thereby eliminating plague by 1840. Admittedly, Hamdan and other 
Ottoman innovators, like Muhammad Ali in Egypt and Husayn Bey in Tunisia 
before him, did adopt the institution from western Europe.54 But they, like their 
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mercantilist predecessors, sought to use quarantine as a tool to reinforce national 
sovereignty rather than tear it down. As Hamdan’s case illustrates, he and other 
reformers were willing to use Western-inspired reforms, and their knowledge of 
the current European political and commercial context, to resist Western infl u-
ence. This is a paradox that one can see throughout world history, such as when 
later Russian Marxists based their own modernisation and independence from 
the West on an ideology born in the West.
The fi nal British protest of the quarantine was quite hypocritical, given the 
fact that they had used their own quarantine as an instrument of their own protec-
tionist commercial policy but prevented the Ottomans from using the institution 
to stem a fl ood of British cotton and woollen textiles. Their declaration that two 
years of a weakly enforced quarantine in Istanbul had ended the nearly 500-year 
reign of the Ottoman Empire as ‘the seminary of plague’ seems simply too con-
venient a fi t for British trading interests.55 One might reluctantly conclude that 
the disease was largely a socially constructed phenomena.
However, one must note that there was no mention in Hamdan’s proposal of 
any domestic institution, in particular the quarantine of homes which Al-Jabarti 
was so horrifi ed by when he witnessed the practice in occupied Egypt. Only 
Lago, the foreign doctor, recommended discriminatory practices against the 
poor as a risk group, but the reformists did not include his ideas.56 The Ottomans 
might have allowed such practices among the European expatriates and the non-
Muslim Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities, but there was little evidence 
of a systematic practice among the Muslims themselves.
Quarantines and Illiberalism
Edwin Ackerknecht’s seminal 1948 essay ‘Anti-Contagionism Between 1821 
and 1867’ argues that quarantines and contagionist thought often led to illiberal-
ism and the police state – a thesis that infers that the 1838 Ottoman quarantine 
legislation may have refl ected a similar tendency within the empire.57 One of 
Ackerknecht’s main sources was the early nineteenth-century British writer 
Charles Maclean, who, besides writing extensively on his own investigations in 
Istanbul, adhered to a classical liberal argument that free trade and laissez-faire 
policies were essential to good governance. Maclean and others like him were 
opposed to quarantines and other welfare measures in general, claiming that 
their restrictions hurt human liberties, led to more arbitrary government and cost 
 precious manpower and resources.
More recent literature on nineteenth-century medicine and government has 
largely seconded these arguments. Postmodernists like Michel Foucault and 
Bruno Latour saw nineteenth-century European medical reforms as encroaching 
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upon individual autonomy and popular participation in governmental and social 
affairs.58 The doctors – and quarantine offi cials – were also potential liberals, 
members of the emerging commercial class who the state co-opted by includ-
ing them in the reforms. If one sees this explanation of state-initiated reform in a 
non-continental European context, such as Mahmud II’s efforts in the Ottoman 
Empire, it implies that the adoption of quarantine in 1838 would inhibit a ‘progres-
sive’, ‘liberal’ path of state formation. Some might even view Mahmud II’s and 
Hamdan’s efforts at quarantine reform as setting the stage for autocracy, social dis-
cipline and, given the Empire’s rich ethnic and religious diversity, even genocide. 
Ackerknecht’s, Foucault’s and Latour’s focus on issues of policing and a crippled 
civil society in part refl ected the impact of the Second World War and its legacy of 
illiberalism. Disillusionment with continental European civilisation would help to 
foster the neoliberal James C. Scott’s claim that all state-initiated modernisation 
projects, regardless of geographic considerations, were doomed to failure.59
Yet, as Peter Baldwin has recently pointed out, such dichotomies and broad gen-
eralisations deserve extensive reconsideration.60 One might begin by remember-
ing that Ackerknecht’s nineteenth-century British liberals often wilfully obscured 
the mercantilist roots of their own society. As Chapter 3 has demonstrated, 
England’s rise as an overseas commercial power rested upon seventeenth-century 
mercantilist reform, such as the Navigation Acts and quarantine legislation. These 
reforms – and the mercantilist discourse of both contagionist and anti-contagionist 
thought – helped to spawn the very dichotomised, ideologically charged argu-
ments that Maclean and other nineteenth-century liberals made about their own 
society and how it compared with the Ottoman Empire. These writers’ categorisa-
tion of the Ottomans as an anti-contagionist ‘other’ led them to dismiss out of hand 
the Ottoman attempts at modernisation – and quarantine reform.
Admittedly, Maclean and his fellow British liberals effectively illustrated 
that the English Quarantine Acts had had a policing aspect since the fi rst years of 
their existence. By 1603, only seven years after London had initiated the Bills of 
Mortality, a law was passed which forbade members of infected households from 
leaving their habitations for six weeks.61 The houses were to have:
A large red cross, and Lord have mercy upon us on the door; and watchmen 
attending day and night to prevent anyone’s going in and out, except physicians, 
surgeons, apothecaries, nurses, searchers, etc. allowed by authority: and this was 
to continue at least a month after all the family was dead or recovered.62
When Richard Mead authored the Quarantine Act of 1721, which regulated 
Levantine cotton and wool imports, he pushed for an extension of these 
 disciplinary powers to quarantine entire city districts:
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But the greatest care must be taken that none pass without conforming them-
selves to this order, both by keeping diligent watch, and by punishing with the 
utmost severity, any that either have done so, or attempted it. And the better 
to discover such. It will be requisite to oblige all who travel in any part of the 
country, under the same penalties, to carry with them certifi cates, either of their 
coming from places not infected, or of their passing the line by permission.63
This call for ‘internal passports’ and emergency policing powers targeted the 
poor in particular, since, in his opinion, they were the most vulnerable and 
 disorderly risk group:
All possible care ought still to be taken to remove whatever causes are found to 
breed and promote contagion. In order to do this, the overseers of the poor (who 
might be assisted herein, by other offi cers) should visit the dwellings of all the 
meaner sorts of inhabitants, and where they fi nd them stifl ed up too close, and 
nasty, should lessen their number, by sending some into better lodgings, and 
should take care by all manner of provision and encouragement, to make them 
more cleanly and sweet . . . When the sick families are gone, all the goods of the 
houses, in which they were, should be burned; nay the houses themselves, if that 
can conveniently be done.64
One may speculate that Mead refl ected the common concern that London was 
growing too quickly for its own good even in 1720 – some sixty years before 
the dramatic increase in working-class immigration to the city was in full force 
during the Industrial Revolution. Imposing new regulations might keep this 
growth to a more reasonable level and assure the state and the more well-to-do 
that order would be maintained.
Later eighteenth-century advocates of quarantine reform, such as John 
Howard and Dr Patrick Russell, concurred that the poor were of special concern. 
Howard, for instance, mentioned that ‘the air about poor patients is more 
 infectious than about the rich’.65 He later described his reasons:
The rich are less liable to the plague than the poor because they are more careful 
to avoid infection, and have larger and more airy apartments, and because they 
are more cleanly and live better on food, with plenty of vegetables.66
Russell largely agreed with Mead on the need to re-house the poor on grounds of 
the common good and public health:
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They perhaps might be lodged in barracks, or otherwise, in a way fully as com-
fortable as in their wretched dwellings in town, and, in case of a return of the 
plague, their being already in the country would save the police an infi nite deal 
of trouble afterwards, as well as greatly facilitate attempts to extinguish the dis-
temper, at its resuscitation in particular parishes. At any rate, it would be some 
check on the progress of contagion, the propagation of which is known to be 
much promoted by the intercourse of the lower class of the poor.67
Russell’s commentary on barracks is especially important given the popular-
ity of new British welfare legislation when he wrote his work in the 1760s. 
State ‘drafts’ of the poor into such housing, like the practice of indenturing, 
colonisation or impressment, were common practices in England during that 
time.68
Nevertheless, quarantine advocates like Mead and Russell understood that 
there were limits to policing powers during epidemics. Mead recognised, for 
instance, that an overly harsh policy towards the poor could alienate them:
The methods taken by the public, on such occasions, have always had the appear-
ance of a severe discipline, and even punishment, rather than of compassionate 
care . . . [They] must naturally make the infected conceal the disease as long as 
was possible.69
Mead’s opponents in the House of Lords came to a similar conclusion, 
arguing that they should quarantine only the sick, and opposed neighbourhood 
 quarantines or resettling the poor away from affected areas:
Because such powers as these are utterly unknown to our constitution, and repug-
nant, we conceive, to the lenity of our mild and free government; a tender regard 
to which was shown by the act Jac. I, which took care only to confi ne infected 
persons within their own houses, and to support them under that confi nement, 
and lodged the execution of such power solely in the civil magistrate.70
Despite these hesitations, quarantine opponents only took a categorical stand 
against policing and social discipline at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
For instance, Maclean posited that even the earliest acts of isolating London’s 
sick were inhumane and ineffective:
In 1665, the plague, in London, spread most rapidly, and proved most fatal, the 
very period that the shutting up of houses, supposed to be infected, and other 
restrictions upon intercourse, were most rigorously enforced: and it was after the 
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houses were again laid open, and the people abandoned all other precautions, in 
despair, that the spreading of the disease, and its mortality, suddenly diminished, 
and ceased.71
Maclean also elaborated on how the eighteenth-century focus on the poor 
actually worsened England’s social situation:
But the effects of this dread of contagion fall with ten-fold destruction upon the 
poor. They are not enabled to hold out, by present, or hopes of future reward, 
lures to meretricious attendance; and, as dread is generally more powerful than 
natural affection, they are not only almost certain of being left without attend-
ance, but even without subsistence. If only suspected, they are deprived of 
employment: and if they have the good fortune to recover, they are still shunned 
as dangerous: so that the lot of those, whom an epidemic may have spared, is 
often beggary or starvation.72
The bottom line was that government-guided attempts to deal with the ‘danger-
ous rabble’ – stigmatised as an unwanted ‘risk group’ – created greater depend-
ency on welfare measures and possibly planted the seeds of revolution. One 
might also infer, although Maclean does not mention it per se, the Malthusian 
argument that government spending on the poor was a waste, since they would 
perish anyway due to inadequate food supplies.73
Critics and advocates of quarantine were quick to tar their opponents with the 
brush of patriotism: contrasting societies in the debate was a constant thread. For 
example, many stressed the ‘foreign’ bureaucratic or illiberal aspects of quar-
antine. One can see anti-Catholic rhetoric when Mead’s anonymous opponent 
claimed that quarantine advocates and offi cials worked ‘under the power of the 
Pope and the ecclesiastical state’, and that their beliefs were ‘newly broached in 
arbitrary states and governments’.74 Maclean similarly concluded that the chief 
opponent of his liberal arguments against quarantine was the Pope.75 Both these 
critics hoped to tap into the British antipathy towards Catholicism present since 
the Reformation. Others made the same connection to French mercantilists, 
who, of course, rivalled the British in the Levant trade throughout the eighteenth 
century. The House of Lords exposed this bias in 1721 when they criticised 
Mead’s Quarantine Act:
These methods were copied from France, a kingdom whose pattern, in such 
cases, Great Britain should not follow; the government there being conducted by 
arbitrary power, and supported by standing armies.76
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DeKay slightly tailored this line of argument when he went after govern-
ments who supported quarantines throughout the Mediterranean in 1831–2:
The rulers of Europe, who in all past times made quarantines the pretext for 
shutting out the contagion of liberal ideas, eagerly seized upon this disease as a 
reason for doubling their quarantines, and, if possible, increasing their rigor. This 
has been carried, during the present year, to such an extent, that all commercial 
intercourse was at a stand, and the short-sighted despots discovered at last that 
there were bounds and limits even to their arbitrary decrees.77
Here DeKay took aim at the rigorous controls many post-Napoleonic era 
European states put in place to prevent liberal opposition movements. He 
went on to castigate quarantine as a parasitical institution that hindered both 
 commerce and the free fl ow of ideas:
It may safely be asserted that quarantines are jobs designedly intended to give 
salaries to physicians, superintendents, and guards, at the expense of the unfor-
tunate sufferers. In the Levant, in addition to these powerful pecuniary reasons, 
others of a political nature tend to keep up the monstrous farce. During the thirty- 
or forty-days quarantine, ample time is allowed to procure all the information 
necessary respecting the opinions and views of the prisoner. He is surrounded 
by spies; and the men who supply him with food at twice its value pander to the 
guilty fears of his government, by furnishing them with the minutest chit-chat of 
the stranger, which may throw any light upon his political opinions. It is, in fact, 
not so much the contagion of disease as of liberal opinions that is dreaded, and in 
this view quarantines are to be despised as the instruments of despotism.78
The nineteenth-century liberals saw the Ottomans in a much more positive 
light.
Their idealisation of the ‘Turks’ as laudable anti-contagionists stretched from 
the sultan down to the man on the street. DeKay, indeed, viewed Sultan Mahmud 
II as the ‘one crowned head who refused to establish quarantines, and contented 
himself with laughing at the beards of his royal brethren’. He praised him in 
1831–2 for not going ‘the whole length of what is considered in Europe as the 
index of civilization, to wit, custom houses and quarantines’.79 He argued that it 
was no surprise therefore, that:
The Turks content themselves with sending those attacked with plague to breathe 
the pure air of the country, and purifi ed their dwellings. In the meantime they 
permit vessels to arrive from all parts of the world, and to depart, undisturbed 
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and unimpeded by the delay, the expense, the imprisonment, and the offi cial 
impertinence and extortion of a quarantine establishment.80
Even Maclean, who generally viewed the Ottoman rulers more negatively, 
favourably compared their government’s abstention from policing ‘domestic’ 
quarantines to the history of such measures in his own country:
Under the Turkish dominion, however, each individual is left to act, according 
to his discretion, with respect to the government of himself, and of his family, 
in times of pestilence. He is not shut up in his house, surrounded by watch-
men, shunned by his neighbours, or deserted by his children, if supposed to be 
infected. He may seek a more salubrious air, without the danger of perishing for 
want of food, or been driven back into a pestilential atmosphere by neighbouring 
peasants, both of which happened in the plague of London, in 1665.81
Such positive commentaries on the anti-contagionist Sultanate were matched 
by generalisations about the so-called popular Ottoman belief in anti-contagion. 
In DeKay’s eyes, for example, the average Turk on the street did not heed 
 constant rumours of plague:
I see the Turk marching along with an air of the greatest nonchalance, elbowing 
his way through the crowd as if unacquainted with the existence of such a disease 
as plague, or rather to show his constitutional fortitude and his utter contempt 
for the puerile precautions adopted by his timid neighbors; but then, on the other 
hand, everyone knows that Osman is an infi del, and of course not a civilized 
being, consequently he has not intellect enough to comprehend when he is in 
danger, and when he is safe. With this sapient conclusion, the Franks of Pera, 
who are far from being the representatives of the collective wisdom of Europe, 
persist in their childish terrors, and continue their absurd precautions.82
DeKay’s satirical defence of the so-called ‘fatalist Turk’ as a ‘noble savage’ is 
matched by assertions that the ‘Turk’, in contrast to the contagionist European, 
helped those in need, regardless of the danger plague posed to his or her own 
well-being. The ‘humane Turk’ did not desert his or her friends or family when 
they had the misfortune to be struck by the plague.83
One cannot take such statements at face value. DeKay, writing in 1831–2, 
and Maclean, writing in 1817, were very likely both aware of the Ottoman Turks 
impending quarantine reforms, and a number of Turks, particularly bureaucratic 
elites if not the average Ottoman, suspected that plague was indeed a contagious 
disease.84
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This critique especially holds true for DeKay’s idealisation of the Ottoman 
Empire as a liberal republic. Ingratiating himself to Sultan Mahmud II he 
claimed that:
Like all his subjects, the Sultan is extremely temperate in eating, and his estab-
lishment is far from being on that expensive and magnifi cent scale which we are 
accustomed to attribute to Oriental courts. I have been assured by an offi cer of his 
household, that the expenses of his table rarely exceed ten piastres, or about fi fty 
cents, a day; and from various anecdotes which I have elsewhere heard, I should 
not be disposed to believe that his annual expenses exceed those of the President 
of the United States. 85
The modesty he mentioned of the sultan stems from Islam, a religion he believed 
empowered its adherents to constructively participate in political life:
Of the infl uence of Islamism on the actions and lives of its professors we have 
already treated, and it only remains to add that its direct tendency to counteract 
and mitigate the severity of the despotic governments, which in East have always 
found a congenial soil. It produces an equalizing effect, and is in fact a sort of 
religious republicanism, only extending much further than in our country [the 
United States] where a difference of complexion is fatal. It ennobles all who 
profess it, and furnishes an absolute title to any offi ce short of the throne itself.86
Thus, he concluded that Muslim values were key to realising social and politi-
cal inequalities. His comment here that Americans, who allegedly also tapped 
into the ‘Protestant’ mantra of ‘an equality of all believers’, could not overcome 
questions of racism (that is, a ‘difference of complexion’). He also highlighted 
the Ottoman’s ‘perfect toleration’ of other religious faiths in this regard.87
Perhaps even more important is DeKay’s argument that Ottoman Muslim 
personal practice of giving to the poor obviated the need for state intervention:
The Turkish proverb, ‘all that you give you will carry with you’ beautifully 
expresses their belief in the importance and effi cacy of alms. The giving of alms 
is frequently impressed as one of the highest duties of the believer; and we are 
told that at one time the practice was carried to such an extent as to produce a 
decree from the ulemah that not more than a fi fth should be given to the poor. At 
present we are informed that is upon an average about two and a half percent. In 
no country in the world are beggars treated with more kindness and consideration 
than in Turkey, or their wants more speedily relieved. Poverty, in fact, appears to 
be a passport under which a beggar will not only thrust himself into the highest 
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public offi ces, but even into the council chamber of the divan, with the certainty 
of having his wants relieved.88
This general sense of philanthropy thus explained why the Ottomans would not 
need or want a quarantine. They understood from the outset that the state had a 
sacred duty to protect the sick and poor.
The liberals, and Western commentators in general, did not spare differ-
entiating the non-Muslim Ottoman minorities and European expatriates from 
the Turks. In particular, DeKay condemned the groups for their inhumane and 
 irrational fear of plague:
When any . . . [non-Muslim or European] is seized with it [plague], he is imme-
diately abandoned to his fate. No medical man will dare approach him, on pain 
of being himself ruined; all rational mode of cure is neglected as useless, and 
the aid of medicine is given up in despair. That sympathy which our common 
nature yields to the sick is here denied. The [one] sick of the plague is put out 
of the pale of pity, and only looked upon as some noxious being, whom it ought 
be not only allowable, but meritorious, to destroy; and so the disease proceeds, 
rendering asunder the ties of families, extinguishing the common charities of life, 
eradicating the best feelings of our nature, till at length it has become one of the 
most dreadful moral as well as physical evils – at once the scourge and the scorn 
of humanity.89
This echoed Boccaccio’s age-old criticism that the popular belief in contagion-
ism led to the immoral abandonment of the stricken.90 DeKay then alluded to 
a personal case of plague involving his own next-door neighbour, Dr Visconti, 
who had dutifully attended many patients in the European dominated city quar-
ters of Istanbul. When the ‘fatal bubo’ appeared near his bowels, no one would 
dare approach until they were offered the sizeable sum of 1,000 piastres.91
To DeKay, the non-Muslim mania about plague was a fact of life:
It is truly surprising that people who have been from their childhood accus-
tomed to the presence of this disease should yet live in such continual terror. 
The fi rst question asked is: ‘Are there any new accidents today?’ For by this 
polite periphrasis do the ignorant and timid European residents here designate 
one of the greatest scourges of humanity. I have noticed, for several days past, 
that people of all classes walk about the streets with smelling bottles in their 
hands, and with rags or bits of cotton thrust in their nostrils. To a newcomer it 
is laughable to witness the caution with which the Franks pick their way along 
the streets, carefully avoiding to tread on the least particle of woolen, cotton, or 
BULMUS PRINT.indd   120 06/03/2012   16:35
 Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman and the Ottoman Quarantine Reform 121
paper, and jumping from side to side to avoid touching even the clothes of the 
passers-by.92
One should remember that there is no evidence in this or any other statement 
by Western travellers that the Levantine community ever was able to impose 
domestic quarantines by force. There are occasional hints by DeKay and 
Maclean that the ‘municipal authorities’, namely, the Greek Patriarch and the 
European consuls, called for quarantines, but the police were Ottoman Muslims 
who remained aloof.93
The writers also compare plague death rates among the communities. For 
instance, John Howard claimed that ‘the Jews in Constantinople and Smyrna 
lose only one third . . . the Turks lose two-thirds; other nations a little more or 
less’.94 DeKay and Maclean came to similar conclusions about the higher rate for 
Turks and for Ottoman non-Muslims and Europeans.
The authors had a number of reasons for this difference. Howard pointed out 
that diet largely explained the discrepancy. The Turks had very meagre eating 
habits followed by the Ottoman Greeks and Jews:
The poorer sort of Greeks and Jews use much oil with their food; and this I 
reckon [is] a disadvantage to them. I have heard of instances of servants in 
European families, who through imprudence and carelessness, had been attacked 
with the plague, while the rest of the family have escaped it.95
DeKay also agreed that the plague rarely struck the ‘well-fed part of the 
population’.96
However, DeKay also saw alcohol use as a major factor:
I was cautioned against dieting myself to ward off this disease, and indeed the 
use of spirits was warmly recommended. It is supposed that the rigid temperance 
of the Turks renders them more obnoxious to its attacks; but whether that be the 
case or not, it is certain that the Franks, who lived upon the fat of the land, and 
wash it down with copious draughts of wine, are rarely affected by this disease.97
DeKay characterised the Greeks as the most prolifi c drinkers. He noted that 
during his neighbour’s funeral that the casket bearers, ‘three Greeks, [took] the 
precautionary measure of getting most conspicuously drunk’.98
This was not the only instance where the writers connected drug use to a dif-
ferent religious, ethnic or ‘racial’ group. The most popular drug use to disparage 
was opium, of course. Howard and Maclean alleged opium use to attack Turkish 
statesmen and physicians who disagreed with their arguments. On the one hand, 
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Howard, who pushed the Ottomans to hire Western European doctors, claimed 
that their Turkish counterparts were dangerously incompetent:
The Turks have few hospitals at Constantinople. Those for the sick are a fort 
of caravansaries, in one of which, I saw many sick and dying objects lying on 
dirty mats on the fl oors. The surgeon seemed to be either extremely stupid, or 
 intoxicated with opium.99
On the other hand, Maclean cursed the Ottoman government offi cials after they 
refused to hire him to conduct a study on plague:
It not only appears not to have been in the policy of the Ottoman Porte, to enter 
into my views of increasing the population of their territory; but, sensible of the 
opium, which could [also] not fail to attend the rejection of my propositions.100
DeKay, who was still hopeful of gaining Ottoman support for his own cause, 
tried to address this derision with his own anti-Semitic diatribe against the 
Ottoman Jewish minority:
It was here too that we saw for the fi rst time an opium-eater. He was a miserable-
looking Jew, pale and emaciated, and, although his eyes were rolling about every 
part of the room, he appeared to be unconscious of the presence of anyone around 
him. The idea of a Turk and an opium-eater is so naturally associated in our 
minds, that for a long period after our arrival here we were in daily expectation 
of meeting some Turk in the streets, maddened with opium, and ready to plunge 
with his yataghan into the body of the fi rst Christian that crossed his path. It was 
not until after a residence of several months that we were enabled to put a just 
value upon the representation of those who deal in exaggeration, in order to make 
an impressive picture. As none fell in our way, we determined to ferret them out 
in their secret haunts, and even to experiment ourselves with this pleasing poison.
 Opium is known to be one of the staple products of Turkey; and hence, it has 
been logically inferred, that everybody in the country must use it habitually. The 
Turks, by the same ingenious process of reasoning, conclude that the Americans 
are the most intolerable opium-eaters in the world, because they are the greatest 
purchasers of that commodity.101
DeKay expounded his anti-Semitism in another passage about the Ottoman Jews 
as a ‘degraded race . . . distinguished by its dirt and fi lth’. Oddly enough, DeKay 
also did not hesitate to use his fellow Americans as a foil for his idealisation of 
the Ottoman Turks. One may speculate that he was referring in part to his ‘own’ 
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minority, the African-Americans. At one point in his text, he referred to two 
‘Blacks’ who were the only ones to die from cholera during an outbreak in an 
American sloop-of-war sitting off Istanbul’s Golden Horn. He explained they 
died because they refused to take modern medicine.102
The most striking aspect of the above liberal discourse on quarantines and 
social discipline is its superfi cial comparisons of the Anglo-American world 
to the foreign ‘other’. While the writers described the ‘domestic quarantine’ in 
England, they did not refer at all to what policing measures were taken in ‘des-
potic’, ‘contagionist’ France and other continental European countries whose 
quarantines hurt their commerce. Similarly, the writers uniformly labelled 
the Ottomans as strictly ‘anti-contagionist’ during the reigns of Selim III and 
Mahmud II when quarantine reform was in the air. This mistake parallels mis-
leading generalisations that Western observers made elsewhere, such as the 
claim that plague was endemic to the Middle East alone.
This illustrates the weakness of Ackerknecht’s sources for the Ottoman 
Empire. Writers like Maclean and DeKay were committed fi rst and foremost 
to an agenda of liberal free trade, and were more than willing to play with the 
facts accordingly. One could see this, for instance, in Maclean’s vignette of the 
opium-smoking Turkish offi cials, and DeKay’s glorifi cation of Mahmud II and 
the chief court physician Behçed Efendi as strict anti-contagionists even when 
they knew the contrary was true. The truth according to these sources was rela-
tive – as the limited Ottoman sources we have on the subject point in an entirely 
different direction.
The question as to whether there were social consequences to the quarantine 
reforms is open to debate. Ottoman offi cials very occasionally mentioned poor 
migrants from the countryside as a potential cause of the plague. As early as 
1792, an Ottoman imperial decree ordered that beggars in Istanbul who were 
sick with contagious diseases should be put into hospitals, while the able-bodied 
‘should be deported to their place of birth’.103 Such notions lingered even after 
Selim III was deposed by his so-called conservative opponents. An 1812 edict 
complained about recent poor migrants to Istanbul who spread plague by solicit-
ing prostitutes: ‘God’s wrath has punished this behaviour by striking down the 
population with plague for the past three to fi ve months. Get rid of the villainous 
households and the disease will stop . . .’104 Hamdan chided the religious and 
sexual overtones, but accepted urban immigration as a cause when plague struck 
colonised Algeria:
The French hired [Algerian] maids to do shopping but would spread disease to 
their masters and sons after mixing with the local population in coffee houses, 
bath houses etc.105
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Anton Lago also took up this issue in his treatise when he argued that the 
Ottomans should regard the poor as a risk group: quarantine offi cials should pay 
attention to the poor and the fi lthy environment in which they lived. He even 
recommended that the poor be isolated from those of better social standing when 
they were in the quarantines or lazarettos.106
The Ottomans were reluctant to embrace such principles within their reform 
efforts, however. Neither Hamdan nor any of the prominent Muslim quarantine 
offi cials seem to have promulgated discriminatory practices against the poor 
from 1838 until 1894, when the Europeans pushed the issue with regard to alleg-
edly impoverished Muslim pilgrims from their colonial possessions who were 
seeking to visit Ottoman Mecca and Medina in order to perform their religious 
duties. Hamdan might have had his prejudices, but he and the other reformers 
were very aware that the Ottoman religious authorities – the traditional overseers 
of the urban poor – might be very leery of sanitary policing practices that would 
undermine their authority.
In contrast, it was the Europeans who stressed the so-called social and ethnic 
aspects of the Ottoman quarantine. Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to 
Istanbul who derailed the 1838 quarantine, protested Sultan Mahmud II’s alleged 
consideration of a domestic quarantine:
The other proposal is to empower the health offi cials to enter any house in which 
they may believe the plague to have broken out and to take such measures as they 
may judge expedient, being authorised to act by some member of the Board of 
Health. This power will occasion a serious inroad upon one great and precious 
principle and right created by our capitulations, that is the inviolability of the 
domicile of the Frank; and it will probably occasion robbery, perhaps murders, 
and certainly infi nite distress and misery to the sick.107
This statement strikes a familiar chord: the Ottomans, like other quarantinists, 
were arbitrary, despotic and could not be trusted with control. The ‘Franks’, 
namely, European expatriates and Istanbul’s and Smyrna’s Greek minority, were 
able to run hospitals of their own. There were occasional contests between the 
hospital authorities, who wished to extend their own infl uence to nearby Muslim 
residents, and the central authorities, who occasionally sent guardsmen to extract 
fees for new construction and collecting taxes.108 Thus, it was the Europeans, 
and not the Ottomans, who insisted that a domestic quarantine would defi ne the 
superiority of one religious community over another.
In a similar vein, I have not been able to locate any case of anti-Semitism 
in the source material except for Hamdan’s protest to the French for occu-
pying Algeria. His derogatory comments about Algeria’s Jews as ‘money 
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grubbing’ and ‘exploitative’ can be traced to the French use of ethnic poli-
tics to consolidate its rule.109 One sees here a foretaste of twentieth-century 
Palestinian anti-Semitism, which was based on a similar resentment of outside 
intervention.
Liberal writers, like Maclean and DeKay, themselves contributed to the 
cause of Western imperialist expansion in the Middle East by highlighting 
ethnic, religious and class differences within the Empire. Their success in con-
vincing their English-speaking readers to support overseas commercial efforts 
helped to bring greater instability. The breakdown of the Ottoman protectionist 
measures, and Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s declaration of the equal-
ity of all Ottomans, regardless of religious creed, encouraged both Christian 
minority separatist movements (that is, Greeks, Armenians, Marionites) and 
their European sponsors to take advantage of imperial weakness.110 This sense 
of vulnerability, very similar to what Hamdan felt about the French occupation 
of Algeria, would be the true harbinger of ethnic nationalism in the century to 
come. In sum, it was the imperialist powers, and not the Ottoman drive towards 
modernisation and quarantine reform, that promoted illiberal notions of identity 
and governance.
Conclusion
The 1838 Ottoman quarantine lends important new insights into the Empire’s 
reform movement. Native reformers like Sultan Mahmud II and Hamdan initi-
ated the measure to strengthen the Ottoman state and to resist British commer-
cial expansion rather than pave the way for it. Here paradoxically the Ottoman 
reformists followed the same path trodden by the English some two centuries 
earlier. The quarantine and contagionist reforms, like modernisation as a whole, 
may have strived to order society and increase the fi nancial reach of the state. 
However, they were not bound to stress ethnic and religious differences through 
policing measures with the teleological aim of separatist nationalism. It was, 
ironically, the early nineteenth-century Anglo-American treatise writers who 
spoke of human and economic liberty who were the ones to encourage ethnic, 
religious and even racial division instead of a reinvigorated, sovereign and 
self-suffi cient Ottoman government. Equally ironically, the Ottoman reformers 
who succeeded in convincing their domestic critics of the need to resist outside 
powers caved in to British pressure to establish the Constantinople Superior 
Health Council. If one could have asked Hamdan after 1840 if he agreed that 
the plague was gone, he might have quipped that the only ‘sick’ patient was the 
Ottoman state itself.
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Plague and Quarantines in the 
Colonial Era
Introduction
Hamdan’s belief that the internationalisation of the Ottoman quarantine in 1838 
signalled capitulation to the British was ill-founded. From its inception, various 
interests clashed at the Constantinople Superior Health Council. Austrian physi-
cians may have run the Constantinople Superior Health Council for a short time, 
but it was soon headed once again by an Ottoman president, whose administra-
tive staff were often in confl ict with the foreign members of the Council.1
Muhammad Ali (1769–1849), who started a process of modernising reform 
in Egypt in a bid to take over the empire itself, established a separate quarantine 
in Alexandria and other public health institutions in order to combat plague, 
cholera and other epidemic diseases. Like the Ottomans, Muhammad Ali gave 
in to European pressure and allowed international representatives to help run the 
Alexandria quarantine. The Europeans frequently lauded Muhammad Ali for 
his efforts; often claiming that Muhammad Ali’s French appointees to supervise 
the quarantine, such as Antoine Clot (1793–1868) and Louis Aubert-Roche 
(1818–74), were much more successful than the Ottomans in preventing the 
outbreak of disease.
European criticism that the newly established Ottoman public health authori-
ties needlessly inhibited trade and the free fl ow of overseas traffi c by imposing a 
ten- to fi fteen-day quarantine on all traffi c passing through the Straits motivated 
Clot (also known as Clot-Bey) and Aubert-Roche to complete a new study of the 
plague in Egypt in 1846. They found that Egypt’s most recent plague outbreaks 
could be explained by environmental factors rather than contagious ones. In their 
opinion, the muddy banks of the Nile and the unsanitary living conditions of its 
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inhabitants caused periodic outbreaks of the disease. Improving water supply, 
hygiene and building codes could prevent disease, not isolating patients and their 
families, or quarantining suspected boats. Soon, this new infectionist perspective 
would dominate public health discourse, particularly the International Sanitary 
Conferences, held fi rst in Paris in 1851.
The Ottomans were reluctant to give up contagionist notions of epidemic 
disease, and wished to maintain their quarantine of foreign ships and even cities. 
They sought to tax naval traffi c and even merchandise. This led to international 
protests – mainly from the British. British intervention was decisive during 
the Crimean War in protecting the Ottomans from Russian encroachment. 
But Ottoman protectionist measures arguably soured relations with London’s 
 commercial interests, particularly those involved with cotton exports – still 
central to the British textile industry. This led in part to British plans to develop 
cotton as a cash crop along the Nile, and, eventually to support the Suez Canal, 
as it was outside of Ottoman control. Such developments led in turn to the colo-
nisation of Egypt. The Ottomans may have relaxed trade restrictions later, but 
they were also forced to acknowledge the loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal. In 
addition, the Europeans accused the Ottomans of neglecting the annual pilgrim-
age after cholera spread from Mecca to Europe in 1865. These issues culmi-
nated in the 1894 and 1897 International Sanitary Conferences, which fi nalised 
quarantines in the Suez and on the Red Sea coasts; developments that forced the 
Ottomans to revise their understanding of plague and the institutions necessary 
to prevent it.
The following chapter will explore the contours of this debate between 
Ottoman contagionists and British and French infectionists from 1838 to 
the 1890s about the defi nition and nature of plague, where the disease was 
endemic, who would control the Council, and how preventative measures like 
the quarantine could be implemented along the major sea lanes and the pilgrim-
age routes.
Contagionism versus Infectionism
Offi cial British and French support for Clot-Bey’s and Aubert-Roche’s revised 
understanding of plague as infectious dated back to protests of the Ottoman quar-
antine in 1838. Lord Posonsby, the British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, 
complained to the Prime Minister:
With reference to the proposed [Ottoman quarantine] regulations, I have to 
instruct your Excellency to endeavour strongly to impress upon the Turkish gov-
ernment that they would more effectually prevent the breaking out and spreading 
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of the plague by introducing cleanliness and ventilation in the city and suburbs 
of Constantinople, than by any such violent interference as is proposed with the 
domestic arrangements of families. It is quite certain that the plague is much 
aggravated, if not actually generated, by the wants of cleanliness in the streets, 
by the want of suffi cient ventilation in houses, and by the want of proper drain-
age in places contiguous to habitation; and, if the Turkish government would, 
in the fi rst instance, apply vigorous measures to correct these evils, they would 
strike at once at the causes of the disease; whereas the measures, which they have 
now in contemplation, will only be productive of inconvenience and suffering to 
 numerous individuals.2
The French suggested that the best way to counter the Ottomans was to help 
to promote ‘the formation of a general congress of delegates [from] the various 
European states having ports in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of agreeing 
on some uniform system of quarantine regulations to be adopted by all’.3 Soon 
there were statements by British offi cials based in Malta, Syria, Erzurum and 
Bursa lending support for a general congress that complained of the Ottoman 
contagionist understanding of the disease. Mr Robert, a supervisor of British 
hospitals in Syria, commented:
[In regards to this frightful disease], I beg to state that the results of all my experi-
ence leads me to believe that the disease originates in local causes, and that it is 
endemic in Syria and Egypt; that it is not of a highly contagious nature; and that, 
if ever so at all, some other concurrent circumstances are necessary to render 
itself. Extreme and exclusive [Ottoman] opinions on the doctrine of contagion 
are hardly warranted by this present state of our knowledge.4
Lord Aberdeen, the chief offi cial of the British quarantine, tried in 1843 to 
convene the fi rst International Sanitary Conference on the subject, and readily 
gained French support for his proposal. However, the Austrians viewed the con-
ference as premature until competent medical men determined both the standard 
duration of a quarantine for people and goods and the best way to disinfect 
objects ‘susceptible to contagion’.5 As a result of this concern, the French Royal 
Academy of Medicine appointed Clot-Bey and Aubert-Roche to answer ‘all the 
very questions connected with the plague and with quarantines’.6
Clot-Bey’s and Aubert-Roche’s fi ndings, based on personal observation and 
lengthy interviews with medical personnel and patients in Egypt from 1831 until 
1846, generally endorsed the infectionist position. In their opinion, the pestifer-
ous atmosphere of Lower Egypt was caused by the extreme ‘destitution, fi lth and 
misery’ of the poor ‘inhabitants of the Delta’:
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Their wretched hovels are so horribly disgusting as almost to defy description; 
they are not only surrounded by, but are actually receptacles of heaps of ordure 
and putrid matters. Not infrequently are the dead buried immediately under the 
mud fl oors of these dwellings of the living; and many of the graves in the cem-
eteries (which are always within the villages), being left open, are continually 
exhaling a stench that is utterly intolerable to any stranger. Then, again, the food 
of the Fellah is always of the worst description, and often too of the most scanty 
supply. Rotten cheese, decayed vegetables, semi-putrid fl esh or fi sh; such are 
the articles that he lives upon. The very water that he drinks is fi lthy and impure. 
And then think of his mental and moral condition; the brutish degradation of 
all his faculties and affections, his hopeless servitude, his blank unmitigated 
wretchedness.7
To them, the urban centres of Lower Egypt were also in peril:
Cairo, with its 200,000 inhabitants, is a very hot bed of the most disgusting and 
pestiferous impurities. From the canal, which traverses it, there is constantly 
streaming forth a cloud of intolerable offence; and yet this is the supply of water 
for the use of its people! There are no fewer than thirty-fi ve cemeteries, of which 
twenty-fi ve are within its walls. In the Coptic quarter of the town, the dead are 
buried under the fl oors of the houses; and nothing but a few boards separate the 
living from the putrid bodies of the deceased. From eighty to ninety corpses have 
been known to be huddled together in these horrible sub-domal receptacles. Can 
we therefore wonder that Cairo should be a generating focus of the pestilential 
disease?8
Geographical factors were also important to Clot-Bey and Aubert-Roche. 
They claimed that the plague never occurred above the fi rst cataract of the Nile, 
which was less densely inhabited, less humid and had more fl owing water and 
better soil. The answer, therefore, was to improve living conditions for those 
living in Lower Egypt by implementing modern building codes, sewage systems, 
and regulating food, water supply and burial of the dead. The French authorities 
posited that they had already done this in Algeria, where the ‘present adminis-
tration’ had abolished quarantine and instead rebuilt towns and villages on the 
slopes of the hills to make sure that they were spacious enough not to be ‘over-
peopled’. Gavin Milroy, a prominent British critic of the quarantine system, 
believed that Algeria ‘may become as seldom the theatre of the pestilence as 
almost any of the countries of Europe’.9
Thus, the French and British could use sanitation measures to justify a colo-
nial agenda for Egypt. Neither the French nor the British were willing to admit 
BULMUS PRINT.indd   133 06/03/2012   16:35
134 Plague, Quarantines and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire
that the ‘natives’ themselves were capable of the implementing hygienic reform 
necessary to free their societies of plague or other life-threatening epidemic 
diseases.
Moreover, Clot-Bey led an experiment by a team of European doctors to test 
whether or not the blood of plague patients could infect other human beings in 
1835. The subjects of the experiment were fi ve criminals who had earlier been 
condemned to death. Each of the fi ve was injected with the blood of a plague 
patient. Only one of the fi ve was affected. He came down with a mild case of 
plague three days after the injection. Clot-Bey argued that the single mild case 
of plague could be explained by the patient’s exposure not only to the ‘epidemic 
atmospheric infl uences then existing in Cairo’, but also the fact that he had lived 
in a plague hospital – ‘a focus of pestilential infection’ – three days before the 
experiment. Clot-Bey’s beliefs were confi rmed when he had injected himself six 
times with the blood of a plague patient without any ill effects. He followed this 
up with an injection of puss from a bubo and this resulted in ‘a slight indisposi-
tion, which he attributed to the absorption of the purulent matter, which bore no 
resemblance to the symptoms of plague’.10
Clot-Bey and the European doctors were obviously willing to dehumanise 
patients in order to biologically defi ne the disease. The doctors, armed with the 
knowledge of modern medicine, were allowed to experiment on marginalised 
others – in this case non-European criminals – in order to disprove the theory 
that plague was contagious through human blood. Their fi ndings were then dis-
seminated by medical doctors like Milroy who shared the same privileges and 
convictions. One could also extrapolate that other marginal populations – poor or 
non-European colonials – could be subjected to such measures in the future. The 
moral right to choose whether or not to be a subject was only limited to Clot-Bey 
himself, his colleagues and possibly other Europeans of good social standing.
Clot-Bey and Aubert-Roche also did not hesitate to use ethnic categories to 
measure the impact of the plague. They drew up a table of mortality rates during 
the plague outbreak in Alexandria in 1835. They concluded that 14 per cent of 
the city’s Greek population died in the outbreak, as well as 12 per cent of the 
Jews, Armenians and Copts, 11 per cent of the Turks, 7 per cent of the Italians 
and other southern Europeans, and 5 per cent of the French, British, Russians 
and Germans. They contrasted this sharply with those who died, including 84 per 
cent of the city’s blacks, 61 per cent of the Malays and 55 per cent of non-elite 
Arabs. The great difference in mortality rates, they claimed, was based on the 
assumption that ‘the attacks of the pestilence among all classes of the population, 
native or stranger, is almost uniformly observed to be inversely proportionate to 
their cleanliness, good living and general comfort’.11
This ethnic interpretation of disease often led to denials that Europe could 
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once again be infected with plague. Milroy exemplifi ed this trend in 1846 when 
he asked:
Is there reason to believe that the plague, when imported from the east into any 
European port, may be communicated to a suffi ciently large number of persons 
to give rise to a pestilential epidemic? The medical men of Egypt answer this 
query in the negative. Their opinion is based on the often observed fact that, 
when plague patients are transported to places not subject to the pestilential con-
stitution, they die or recover without transmitting their disease to anyone. If the 
infected, as we have seen, cannot communicate the disease to the inhabitants of 
certain places in Upper Egypt, how can we believe that, when transported from 
Egypt to France, it will possess a power of transmission so strong as to occasion 
an epidemic?12
Thus, Milroy inferred from Clot-Bey’s and Aubert-Roche’s report that ‘vessels 
arriving from infected ports’ carrying plague patients should be allowed to 
disembark ‘at any place not subject to the epidemic pestilential infl uence’. 
Milroy ridiculed those who argued that European ports should retain quarantine 
 procedures out of undue caution.13
Other British writers came to similar conclusions. Netten Radcliffe (1826–
84), a contemporary of Milroy, posited in 1843 that it would be ‘almost impos-
sible for plague to get a serious hold upon’ Britain, given its outstanding sanitary 
condition. Those extremely rare cases that were imported should be regarded 
as mere ‘pathological curiosities’. An anonymous British writer attributed this 
success to a 1848 public health law that enabled his government’s ‘sanitary 
authorities’ to limit overcrowding, ensure adequate ventilation, and remove 
‘putrescent animal and vegetable matters’ from homes, buildings and streets.14
The general consensus was that ‘the disease has disappeared before civilisa-
tion’. The fl ip side of this argument was that plague ‘has returned with a coun-
try’s decline and barbarism’. Milroy specifi cally targeted the Ottoman Empire: 
‘Wherever the Ottoman dominion has prevailed, civilisation and social improve-
ments have retrograded rather than advanced.’ He further claimed that ‘pestilen-
tial epidemics’ were bound to recur in ‘Syria, of Turkey in Europe and Asia, and 
of the Barbary states’, as their hygienic condition remained poor. This was par-
ticularly true for the ‘residents upon marshy alluvial soils near the Mediterranean 
or near certain rivers, as the Nile, Euphrates and Danube; the dwellings being 
low, crowded and badly ventilated; a warm moist atmosphere; the action of 
putrescent animal and vegetable matters, unwholesome and insuffi cient food; 
and great physical and moral wretchedness’. Others would point to the Libyan 
Merdj highlands around Benghazi and Derna, particularly among the local 
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Bedouins. To Milroy, ‘the recently instituted Board of Health at Constantinople’ 
should not believe the illusion that they saved Istanbul from ‘an invasion of the 
plague for some years past exclusively and entirely to the establishment of laza-
rettos and quarantine restrictions there’.15 Rather, they should take to heart the 
warning Lord Posonsby had given them at the beginning of their efforts.
The Ottomans remained committed to a contagionist programme of pre-
venting plague. After its establishment in 1838, the Ottoman Quarantine 
Administration stopped all boats going through the Straits to check if they came 
from a contagious port. If the boat in question did, they would have to spend 
the requisite time in quarantine. Questions of whether or not there was a case of 
plague on board or in the port of origin were thus more important than the boat’s 
hygienic or sanitary situation. The Ottoman authorities would also take other 
contagionist measures to protect Istanbul from outbreaks in the countryside. In 
February 1839, for example, ‘the Sublime Porte sent an imperial edict to the 
judges, notables, and dignitaries of Anatolia’, which stated that a land cordon 
would be set up around the six districts surrounding the Ottoman capital on its 
Anatolian side. The decree also instructed local judges, notables and dignitaries 
to respect the institution, and to obey its police, engineers and other offi cials.16 
This followed the example of the Habsburg Empire, which had established a 
permanent land cordon along its southern border with the Ottoman Empire to 
prevent plague and cholera in the late eighteenth century.
The Ottomans were also largely in control of both the Constantinople 
Superior Health Council and the Quarantine Administration. The Constantinople 
Superior Health Council, which agreed to take on foreign members, was almost 
always chaired by an Ottoman. The minutes of the Council itself were written 
in Ottoman Turkish, with only a small French summary at the end of each 
session.17 Ottoman subjects dominated the Quarantine Administration leader-
ship,  including the General Secretary, the Supervisor of Military Affairs and the 
Chief of the Domestic Sanitary Police. The Ottoman authorities selected and 
trained lower-ranking Quarantine Administration offi cials, who were sent out to 
smaller stations at Beirut, Smyrna, Crete, Erzurum and Trablusgarp (Libya) for 
further training. The Ottomans also recruited Europeans for the Administration, 
but they were subject to the same rules and regulations as their Ottoman 
counterparts.
The Ottomans did not hesitate to use these institutions in order to project 
their power internationally. In 1846, the Istanbul quarantine ‘successfully 
implemented precautionary measures’ to protect itself from a plague outbreak 
in ‘Egypt, Syria, Benghazi, Tripoli, Marseilles and southern Italy’. During the 
outbreak, Muhammad Ali, the great moderniser of Egypt, came to Istanbul to 
pay homage to the sultan. Ahmed Midhat Efendi (1844–1912), a renowned 
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Ottoman scholar and later head of the Ottoman Quarantine Administration 
(1894–1908), related in his history of the Ottoman quarantine that Muhammad 
Ali also came by boat ‘in order to see the importance the Sultan gave to public 
health’. Ironically, the Ottoman Quarantine Administration stopped his boat in 
Smyrna. Offi cials there considered the boat suspect, as it had come from ‘plague-
ridden Egypt’. Muhammad Ali waited in the city eight days before quarantine 
offi cials from Istanbul arrived to inspect and disinfect the boat.18 The fact that 
a widely acknowledged international dignitary who had threatened to take over 
the Ottoman state himself over the past twenty-odd years had to await ‘disinfec-
tion’ helped the Ottoman quarantine gain broader respect from a domestic audi-
ence used to a seemingly endless stream of defeats; from the French invasion of 
Egypt in 1798, to the Greek rebellion of 1821–9, and Muhammad Ali’s Syrian 
campaigns of 1833–8.
The Ottoman Quarantine Administration sought to bolster this support 
further when it declared that, contrary to Clot-Bey’s and Aubert-Roche’s fi nd-
ings, ‘the incidents of plague that did occur in Syria, Anatolia, and elsewhere in 
the Empire always came from the outside’. Thus, ‘plague was not endemic in . . . 
any of the Imperial Ottoman domains’.19 Ahmed Midhat further ridiculed Clot-
Bey’s and Aubert-Roche’s focus on ‘prophylactics – a peculiar science – which 
ignored the truth about effectively implementing quarantines’.20
The Ottomans would face their fi rst great challenge after the Clot-Bey and 
Aubert-Roche report in 1858–9, with the outbreak of plague among the nomads 
of Benghazi. Foreign observers, such as Radcliffe and the French scholar 
Joseph-Désiré Tholozan (1820–97), claimed that the outbreak infected 10,000 in 
fi fteen months, 4,000 of whom perished.21
Dr Bartoletti, an Ottoman member of the Constantinople Superior Health 
Council and long-time Imperial representative to the International Sanitary 
Conferences, was dispatched to the province on 3 June 1858 ‘to help local offi -
cials stop the spread of the disease’.22 He found that only 200 had contracted the 
disease, and thirty had died. He further stated that the outbreak was spontaneous 
and of a contagious nature, and should not be blamed on the Bedouin’s nomadic 
lifestyle, their dwellings, burial customs or even peculiarities of the soil. To 
him, the plague was connected to a famine that had weakened the resistance of 
the local population to the disease, and had nothing to do with the climate per 
se. Why, he asked, should one ‘ever pretend that the plague originated from the 
Sahara, the Libyan desert, or the Sudan, for to my knowledge the high tempera-
ture in that region appears to be an insurmountable natural obstacle to the disease 
[just like it is] . . . in Upper Egypt’.
The measures Bartoletti and other local quarantine offi cials implemented also 
contradicted Clot-Bey’s and Aubert-Roche’s infectionist views. The province of 
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Benghazi was declared from the beginning of the epidemic to be under a foul 
bill of health, and was placed under strict quarantine to prevent maritime contact 
with other ports: ‘The strictest surveillance was exercised on deliveries from 
suspected vessels [from the Libyan coast] to the Dardanelles in order to guaran-
tee the capital of the Empire.’23 Bartoletti complained that the foreign councils 
in Benghazi and Tripoli tried to interfere with these measures, and he brought 
up the matter at the Constantinople Superior Health Council upon his return: 
‘In that meeting they decided that the assembly would be the sole authority for 
public health affairs when it came to the provinces and that consuls did not have 
the right to intervene . . . The Sublime Porte has the sole power to confi rm and 
implement the assembly’s decisions.’24
Dr Laval, a French doctor, and Dr L. Arnaud, a Frenchman in the Ottoman 
Quarantine Administration, challenged Bartoletti when they investigated a later 
outbreak of plague in Benghazi in 1874. They found that the disease was in fact 
endemic among the nomadic population of the region. They attributed the out-
break to their poor hygiene, the burial of their dead and, above all, to the pestif-
erous nature of the soil when dampened after years of drought. Laval formed an 
ad hoc committee including the American Consul General in Tripoli as well as 
two Maltese doctors and several notables from Benghazi. After writing a letter to 
the Ottoman governor of Benghazi begging for greater hygienic measures, Laval 
fell ill and died from plague, prompting Arnaud to follow up his efforts. Arnauld 
established sanitation camps for the affl icted, fed and clothed the patients and 
had them go through a decontamination process. He praised the Ottomans for 
trying to alleviate the population from the famine, but drew attention to the 
inadequate measures they had taken. In effect, he called for a belated embrace 
of infection as the cause of plague and for an end of Ottoman denials that the 
disease was endemic in parts to the area.
Quarantines and Commerce
Such differences of opinion can also be seen in relation to the transport of goods 
through quarantines. Ahmed Midhat mentioned: ‘Quarantines were involved 
in commercial competition for a while. Some states would implement quaran-
tines needlessly and this hindered international trade. The merchant marines 
of each country complained about this.’25 He and other Ottoman Quarantine 
Administration offi cials claimed that the system could be implemented without 
inhibiting free trade. Bartoletti took a similar line at the fi rst International 
Sanitary Conference in 1851 that: ‘[Europe] should adopt as extensive a quar-
antine system as possible to protect public health, but not disrupt international 
commerce. The Turkish quarantine is an example of how this may be done.’26
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The British, the Ottoman Empire’s leading commercial partner until the 
1880s, disagreed profoundly with these views.27 Dr John Simon wrote in 1865 
that a quarantine was ‘a mere irrational derangement of commerce’. To him, a 
quarantine subordinated commercial to political interests, and ensured that ‘a 
community lives apart from the great highways and emporia of commerce’.28 Sir 
Arthur Helps, the Chief Administrator of the British Quarantine Administration 
in 1869 wrote despairingly:
It might be advisable to keep up regulations as regards quarantine which you 
could not at all justify medically, but which you could justify commercially 
and internationally, seeing that our commercial marine would be smitten by 
most severe regulations in other countries if we did not keep up quarantine 
here.29
Milroy focused on the role of cotton, the chief British export from Egypt 
during the nineteenth century. Unsurprisingly, he cited the Clot-Bey and Aubert-
Roche report. He posited that while a plague ‘epidemic raged at Alexandria [in 
1835] among the servants and employees living in the magazines of the Egyptian 
government’, roughly 100,000 bales of cotton were exported to Europe without 
any ill effects. Plague may have been on board eight of the sixteen British vessels 
laden with 31,709 bales of cotton, ‘yet their cargoes did not prove more danger-
ous than those of the non-infected vessels’. No person was ‘infected in conse-
quence’ even though there were no precautionary measures to disinfect ‘this 
immense quantity of an article that has always been deemed highly susceptible 
of retaining the infectious effl uvia’. This case proved Clot-Bey’s and Aubert-
Roche’s conclusion that ‘there is nothing to prove articles of merchandise can 
transport the disease beyond epidemic foci’.30
These anti-contagionist arguments resonated in the International Sanitary 
Conference of 1851. Dr P. Segur-Dupeyron, a member of the French Royal 
Academy of Medicine and French Consul in Damascus submitted a report on the 
subject of plague and merchandise after conducting exhaustive archival research 
and inspections of Mediterranean quarantine facilities. He found only ‘a single 
event where plague was transmitted through goods’: a case in Istanbul where ‘a 
porter named Mehmet Huseyin caught it from infected luggage in the lazaretto 
of Kuleli’. He concluded ‘that there was no positive evidence that plague was 
transmitted by infected merchandise . . . especially cotton’.31 The British and 
French delegates supported these fi ndings.
They were in the minority, however. Dr Rosenberger, a member of the St 
Petersburg Superior Health Council was the fi rst to weigh in on the side of the 
Ottomans:
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A third of my honourable colleagues agree with the British who are not afraid 
that the plague would be spread by vegetable or animal matter. But are not you 
who oppose contagion imposing another theory on us that is to the detriment of 
public health? The majority of physicians believes in contagion and denounces 
the new theory. There are a number of cases where vegetable and animal 
matter transmitted plague. I have seen this myself in Odessa in 1837 and in 
Sevastopol in 1829 and 1830. Dr Bartoletti who has the most personal experi-
ence of us all will tell you that vegetable as well as animal matter can pass the 
plague and that it is impossible to recognise whether or not it came from an 
infected place. These experiences prove that prudent measures are in order. I 
trust the older regulations – drawn up after centuries of experience and detailed 
registration – far more than the people today who make false arguments. As 
seen recently in Turkey, the adoption of stringent quarantine regulations was a 
brilliant success.32
Bartoletti then successfully proposed that a ship laden with cotton, fl ax and 
hemp with a poor bill of health begin quarantine ‘only after the cargo is com-
pletely unloaded’.33 As a result, the conference fi nal report categorised cotton, 
hemp and linen as liable to possible quarantine. The majority of participants also 
dismissed ‘the fi ndings of Segur-Dupeyron since he did not physically observe 
the lazarettos nor properly inspect the cotton bales’.34
The prospects for the British and French improved once the construction 
of the Suez Canal began in earnest in the 1860s. Although the issue was not 
resolved in the International Sanitary Conference of 1866, most observers 
quickly realised the enormous amount of traffi c that would go through the Canal 
and that the Zone – although internationally run – could possibly be subject to 
quarantine as well. The next International Sanitary Conference in Vienna in 
1874 specifi cally broached this topic. The majority of participants accepted that 
each country could choose between ‘quarantine’ and ‘medical inspection’ as a 
precautionary measure to prevent plague or cholera. Those that maintained con-
tagionist quarantine practices – like the Ottoman Empire – promised to ‘dimin-
ish its stringency as heretofore practiced’.35 Henceforth, the British adopted ‘the 
state of health of those on board . . . [as their] guiding principle . . . [and not] the 
arrival of a ship from an infected country’. To them, quarantines were outmoded 
as ‘the period of incubation of this sickness onboard became the standard or 
limit of the duration of detention’.36 This meant in effect that the British and 
the anti-contagionist majority on the Suez Canal International Sanitary Board 
could ensure the free fl ow of traffi c by adopting ‘medical inspection’ instead of 
‘ quarantine’ procedures.
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Challenges to the Constantinople Superior 
Health Council
Ottoman quarantine offi cials continued to face a number of challenges to their 
authority. One of the most profound was the controversy over how to fund 
the institution. When Mustafa Reşid Pasha, one of the chief architects of the 
Ottoman reform movement, met in 1840 with the foreign powers to discuss how 
the Ottoman quarantine could be internationalised, he reached an agreement 
about taxation: ‘Foreign states would have the right to send one delegate a piece 
to the quarantine assembly . . . [but] foreign boats [like Ottoman ones] would pay 
a special public health tax.’37 The rate was fi xed at 40 piastres per boat regardless 
of size or number of passengers. But as early as 1842, Ottoman offi cials worried 
that this tax alone could not pay for their quarantine system. Baki Efendi, the 
chief fi nancial offi cial for the Ottoman quarantine wrote a memorandum to the 
Sublime Porte that the 5,660 piastres raised between March 1840 and February 
1841 could not pay for even one-tenth of the total expenses. He feared that 
‘they would shut down public health stations inside the Ottoman dominions – 
 including coastal stations’. He proposed that passengers on ships – including 
foreign vessels – pay 1 piastre each as a public health tax.38
The Ottomans raised this issue again at the 1851 International Sanitary 
Conference in Paris. After arguing that the uniform tax of 40 piastres per boat 
was too low for commercial vessels Bartoletti persuaded the participants that:
The taxes the authorities took from commercial boats were not suffi cient to 
cover public health expenses. The conference decided that the authorities should 
receive a suitable amount of revenue and that the taxes should be levied accord-
ing to the tonnage size of each boat instead of small amounts based on offi cial 
receipts.39
The Conference agreed in theory that foreign boats above 50 tons would pay 3 
piastres per ton and Ottoman boats in the same category would pay 2 piastres per 
ton. Any boat weighing 50 tons or less would pay 1 piastre per ton, and smaller 
incidental taxes on passengers and their goods would also be allowed. The 
foreign participants asked for fi ve months’ delay to get their respective countries 
consent, but did not respond.40
By September 1862 the Ottomans proposed to reduce the tax:
They suggested that two liras be taken from boats up to fi fty tons; fi ve liras from 
boats between fi fty-one and 200 tons; and ten liras from boats larger than 200 
tons; twelve liras from steamers regardless of tonnage if they were penalised. 
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If the boats came from contagious locations without a bill of health they should 
undergo quarantine twice.41
The British – who had the largest tonnage of commercial vessels in the Ottoman 
waters – complained in 1866 that the Ottoman quarantine was overstaffed, over-
paid and could reduce the number of its offi ces. Nonetheless, the Ottomans did 
eventually implement a renegotiated rate in 1872: ‘Every boat 500 tons or below 
would pay 20 piastres as a base rate. Others would pay additional fees beyond 
the 20 piastre base rate; 12 piastres additionally for those above 500 tons; and 8 
piastres from those above 1,000 tons’. The Ottomans and the foreign powers also 
agreed to form a ‘mixed committee’ to discuss any changes to the rates.42
The Ottoman quarantine offi cials also had to struggle with the British and 
the French during two signifi cant outbreaks of cholera. The fi rst case occurred 
during the Crimean War, when the British, French and Sardinians sent their 
fl eets to Istanbul. The French Marshal Saint Arnauld refused to undergo quaran-
tine and British complained that public health regulations caused military delays. 
The Ottomans retorted that ‘even battleships should be subjected to quarantine’, 
but in April 1855 they allowed 15,000–20,000 French Imperial Guards to camp 
at the Davut Pasha Barracks.43 ‘Cholera soon broke out among them . . . [and] a 
severe epidemic followed’. Cholera spread from the camp to ‘Pera and to those 
villages on the Bosporus the nearest to the cholera focus’.44 The Constantinople 
Superior Health Council met multiple times during the next ten months, quar-
antining the soldiers to limit the outbreak. They also constructed separate 
foreign cemeteries for the French and British, and implemented new burial and 
butcher shop regulations. Some of the foreign offi cers continued to disrespect 
the Ottoman authorities, ‘arguing that they came from disease-free countries’.45
A new cholera outbreak in 1865 spread throughout the major ports of the 
Ottoman Empire. Bartoletti, the representative of the Ottoman quarantine 
authorities, spoke at the International Sanitary Conference convened in Istanbul 
in 1866 to discuss the outbreak. He found that the cause of the epidemic could 
be traced to Egypt in at least two cases. Infected passengers from the Egyptian 
frigate Moukbiri Sourur spread the disease in Istanbul after the captain falsely 
declared that there was no case on board. In Smyrna, a vessel arrived from 
Alexandria with a foul bill of health, and cholera spread to the city after a 
patient was brought to the lazaretto. Bartoletti also claimed that the Ottomans 
were proactive in handling the disease, as they quarantined over 25,000 people 
at various stations throughout the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. There 
were only 480 confi rmed cases of cholera, 238 of whom had died.46
Others were highly critical of Bartoletti’s account. An international inquiry 
about the case questioned the low number of cholera cases in the Ottoman 
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lazarettos, and claimed on the basis of foreign consular reports that there were 
many more unreported deaths in the towns and surrounding villages. They 
posited that 2,500 died from cholera in Smyrna, while only nine died in the city’s 
lazaretto. Similarly, nearly 350 died in the villages surrounding the Dardanelles 
and only fi fteen died in their lazaretto. They suspected that the lazarettos 
 themselves helped to spread the disease:
See how things happened at the Dardanelles. From the beginning of July, many 
cases of cholera had been admitted to or developed in the lazaretto, when on the 
twelfth, a soldier of the guards, at the gate of the establishment, was attacked by 
the disease. He was transported to the neighbouring hospital, where he rapidly 
sank. On the next day, eight cases of cholera occurred; namely, two among the 
soldiers of the guard at the gate of the lazaretto, three in the garrison of the fort 
adjoining the establishment, one in the town, distant an hour’s walk by land, 
but much nearer [to] the sea, in the person of a garde de sante, who had left the 
lazaretto two days before, one in another quarter of the town in an individual 
who went every day to the lazaretto to sell cakes, and fi nally one in the person of 
a boatman of the Health Offi ce. This was the point of departure of the epidemic 
which developed itself in the town, and did much mischief there.47
This case led to further questions about how the Ottomans might have been 
covering up the actual extent of the epidemic:
It would be a matter of the greatest interest to be able to say precisely in what 
matter things have happened at each [of the Ottoman ports]; but the want of 
precise information does not permit this. It is easy to understand, also, how many 
interests are opposed, in most of these cases, to the exact truth being known.48
This point leads to the conclusion that the Ottomans needed to open up their 
quarantine to greater foreign scrutiny. Despite this criticism, the Ottomans 
refused to surrender authority over ports on their own sovereign territory.
Criticisms of the Ottoman quarantine regarding plague also continued 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Dr Armedee Latour, a 
member of the French Consultative Committee on Public Hygiene complained 
in 1878 that the Ottoman quarantine offi cials lacked the training and resources 
to carry out the task:
The reports by the Central Administration of sanitary doctors along its coast and 
provinces are largely incomplete, and show a lack of competence and concern. 
One doubts that the sanitary doctors are qualifi ed for such a mission. It is diffi cult 
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to obtain qualifi ed people in such remote countries, as they have very little 
resources. [The Ottomans] were forced to assign individuals who are not trained 
or certifi ed. The quality of their medical personnel has gradually improved in 
recent years, but the majority of the Ottoman Administration is very narrow-
minded, believing that they are carrying out their task when they show that the 
disease does not exist.49
To Latour, fi ghting the plague effectively meant implementing sanitation 
measures throughout the Empire, and not limiting their efforts to maritime 
quarantines stations: ‘The Sanitation Administration in the Ottoman Empire . . . 
should be such that the plague cannot escape the vigilance of their agents in the 
smallest village’.50 Dr J. D. Tholozan, a member of the Epidemiological Society 
of London and the Medical Academy of Paris likewise judged:
Even if we accept the hypothesis that we can eliminate plague germs by estab-
lishing sanitary cordons and quarantines, it is feasible only in theory. In practice 
it is not so as seen in Cyranique [Benghazi]. Can one disinfect the nomads of 
Benghazi? The Ottoman Empire simply does not have the means to carry out such 
a task . . . It does not have the army, police, and fi nancial resources to do so.51
These critics were also bitter that the Germans had begun to support the Ottoman 
Quarantine Administration – just like the Austrians and Russians did. Dr Adrien 
Proust (1834–1903), a long-time French participant at the International Sanitary 
Councils, claimed a German colleague delegate to Constantinople Superior Health 
Council supported an Ottoman protest that increasing foreign pressure exposed 
‘the country to disease’.52 Tholozan was similarly disgruntled about Dr A. Hirsch, 
a German representative to the 1874 International Sanitary Conference who dis-
counted the Benghazi outbreak, and claimed that the last plague epidemic in the 
Ottoman Empire occurred in Constantinople in 1842.53 Dr A. Fauvel, long-time 
Inspector General of the French Sanitary Service feared that it was impossible for 
the European powers to develop a unifi ed policy towards the Orient, ‘as they are 
divided by antagonism, jealousy and struggles over infl uence’.54
Proust suggested in 1897 that the European governments should try to use 
their infl uence to reassert control over the Constantinople Superior Health 
Council: ‘The foreign consulates should dominate, and have a commensurate 
number of representatives. This is especially urgent in . . . Constantinople, as a 
lack of action would result in serious disadvantages.’55 Without foreign domi-
nation, ‘the Council is bound to remain, like the Ottoman government, ultra-
quarantine in doctrine’.56 To him, the Europeans should try to accomplish what 
they had already done in Alexandria:
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Alexandria’s Council underwent a fortunate change in 1892, since the number 
of Egyptian members outside of the President have been reduced to three. They 
are appointed by the government and do not have a right to vote in the event of 
a tie in the committee. Beforehand it was composed of nine Egyptian members. 
Now the Council has become an international body since the local element has 
been reduced. Additionally, a Permanent Committee has [been] substituted for 
the President when urgent decisions need to be made. No one attached to the 
Egyptian government or Maritime Company has been considered.57
In contrast, he accused the Ottomans of unfairly ‘possessing effective 
supremacy in a council that should be international’:
In short, Ottoman civil servants have successfully attacked the Sanitary Council 
of Constantinople every day and weakened its authority. The Council represents 
sanitary interests of the fi rst order and its ruin might affect the health of Europe’s 
trade and navigation. The Turkish government would determine all sanitary 
measures if that were the case.58
In his opinion, the Ottomans had an effective majority in Council, as eight 
of the twenty-one voting members represented the Sublime Porte, and four to 
six more were non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, who voted with their countrymen 
even though they were appointed to represent other foreign governments. He 
called a reorganisation of the Council:
By reducing the number of Ottoman members from eight to four and make the 
American, Persian, Dutch, Spanish, Belgian, Swedish and Norwegian govern-
ments send their own citizens. Without it, the Council is bound to remain, like 
the Ottoman government, ultra-quarantine in doctrine.59
The Ottoman government, however, successfully avoided Proust’s plot in 
1897 and continued to hold sway in the Council, much as it did from the 1840s 
onwards. Thus, the Ottomans were able to assert authority in the face of political 
threats, fi nancial crisis and the outbreak of epidemic disease. Seemingly nothing 
could force them to re-evaluate their contagionist emphasis on quarantines, 
 lazarettos and governmental control of their coastline.
The Suez and the Hajj
It is therefore quite striking that the British, French and other European powers 
should succeed in radically changing international rules concerning quarantines 
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and plague in the 1890s. They continued to see plague and other epidemic 
diseases as primarily infectious, but they now acknowledged the need to hold 
infected and infectious people and cargo in quarantine when need be – as some-
times was the case if they came from a non-European country. This development 
primarily involved establishing quarantines stations around the Suez Canal, 
which the British de facto controlled as part of the protectorate it had declared 
in 1882. The British, French and Dutch successfully petitioned during the 
International Sanitary Conferences to develop more stringent policies regarding 
the Hajj pilgrims – all in the name of preventing outbreaks of plague and cholera. 
These policies also coincided with imperialist interests as they were already 
attentive to anti-colonialist movements in Egypt, India and Java. The colonial 
powers were very concerned that the pan-Islamic Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid 
II (1876–1909) might use the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina 
to mobilise this opposition for his own political purposes.
Although there were serious concerns raised about the pilgrimage to the Hijaz 
during the cholera outbreak of 1865, quarantines along the Suez Canal Zone 
were not fi nalised until the 1892 International Sanitary Conference in Venice. 
Thereafter, large British-dominated quarantines were authorised at Moses Wells 
by the Mediterranean entrance to the Canal to deal with southbound vessels, and 
at Djebel Tor at the opposite end in the Red Sea for northbound boats, along 
with smaller satellites at Abou-Saad, Abou-Ali and Vasta. While the Ottomans 
had also established stations at Kamaran for boats headed to Jeddah, and Bab-
el-Mandeb for pilgrims from the Indian Ocean heading towards the Red Sea, the 
Suez quarantines were more important as all maritime traffi c passing between 
the Mediterranean and Red Sea were under its jurisdiction.
In the International Sanitary Conferences of 1894 and 1897 a series of 
new regulations about cholera and plague were implemented about the Suez. 
European vessels that had a clean bill of health were given immediate practique 
without any restrictions or requirements. Other European vessels were to be 
placed under a fi ve-day observation after passing through the Suez as long as 
none of their third-class passengers disembarked and the boat had a disinfection 
chamber and adequate medical staff. Non-European vessels – even those going 
to the pilgrimage – could be granted similar terms if the country that owned the 
boat adhered to the convention. The Suez Quarantine Authority, however, had 
the ability to detain any non-European vessel if there were cases of plague or 
cholera in the Hijaz that year and make them go through a special disinfection 
procedure:
The pilgrims shall be landed; they shall take a shower bath or bathe in the sea; 
their soiled linen and any portion of their personal effects or their baggage, open, 
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in the opinion of the sanitary authority, to suspicion, shall be disinfected. The 
duration of these operations, including disembarkation and embarkation, must 
not exceed seventy-two hours.60
The pilgrims would then be dealt with by the quarantine authorities, who often 
gave inoculations of anti-plague or anti-cholera serum. The Haffkine anti-plague 
vaccination produced high fever in the patient within hours of the shot; and, as 
Ottoman quarantine offi cial Besim Ömer related, sometimes up to 5–10 per cent 
of those vaccinated died in the process.61
Other regulations were targeted towards ‘risk groups’. Poorer pilgrims were 
heavily discouraged from making the journey, and were prohibited from board-
ing a pilgrimage vessel without a return ticket. First- and second-class passen-
gers were given more lenient treatment, especially if the boat carried few or no 
people in third-class. Third-class passengers would also face greater restrictions 
and surveillance when in quarantine. Those ship-owners who could not provide 
adequate steamboats, food, water, medical equipment and staff would not be 
allowed to make the journey. Those that did would be subject to additional 
 scrutiny from the port of embarkation.
Disinfection procedures were extended to medical inspection and fumiga-
tion for rats and rodents in 1897, but it did not lead to a fundamental reworking 
of the 1894 regulations, which were fi rst drawn up before Alexander Yersin’s 
 discovery of bubonic bacilli in Hong Kong.
Critics of Ottoman contagionist measures were delighted with the new 
 procedures. Proust lauded the new surveillance facilities and procedures:
The Suez Canal is of immense importance to maritime relations throughout the 
Mediterranean basin. The pilgrim must be subjected there to complete disinfec-
tion before arriving in Mecca . . . The disinfection methods they practice are nec-
essary given what happens on board the pilgrim ships. As Dr Ferrari, the director 
of the Suez Health Service, makes the authoritative judgement that ‘pilgrims are 
always transported in rundown ships’. Pilgrims excessively crowd the boats, and 
there is no free space left. They always number more than the bill of health indi-
cates for the sanitary authorities of the Hijaz. A number of times the ships have 
lacked tents to shelter the pilgrims on the bridge, meaning that they are exposed 
to sunshine all day long. Water and food are also insuffi cient and very expensive. 
The information the captains and doctors give about the ships are often very 
inaccurate. Ferrari adds: ‘I have often received certifi cates from the captain and 
the border offi cials saying that the pilgrims are in perfect health. But when I pay 
them a medical visit I notice the sick dying in the middle of fi lth without any 
medical assistance from the doctor or the border offi cials.’62
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The Ottomans had no easy answer to these developments. They initially 
stood by their own contagionist rules and regulations, but they, the Greeks, the 
Serbs and the Portuguese, were the only participants to the 1897 International 
Sanitary Conference not to agree to the new convention. They also would not 
be able to internationally licence their doctors or provide adequate disinfec-
tion chambers unless they adopted ‘medical inspection’ and other prophylactic 
methods. Continued Ottoman intransigence would marginalise their infl uence in 
international sanitary policies and threaten their maritime links with the distant 
province of Hijaz. The Constantinople Superior Health Council soon called 
on new hygienic measures to survey the pilgrimage in the light of these new 
realities.63
Muslim dissatisfaction with the Suez quarantines grew, however. İbrahim 
Rifat Paşa (1857–1936), an Egyptian general who to helped lead the annual 
sultan’s procession to Mecca and Medina in 1903 complained of his treatment 
at Djebel-Tur on his return journey. He and the entire procession were forced 
to undergo quarantine there for sixteen days because one of the pilgrims who 
accompanied him allegedly caught the plague. Their ‘medical inspection’ was 
brutal:
A group of Christian Greeks were responsible for the inspection. Some treated 
our possessions well, but others turned over all our pots and poured out the 
contents, and then threw them on the ground. The majority [of the items] were 
perfume bottles and delicate silver pots, most of which were damaged . . . A lot 
of things, especially the expensive and valuable ones were stolen . . . They [then] 
forced us to go into the bath houses, and made us wear dark, loose cotton clothes 
without buttons. We left the bath houses with bare heads and feet and waited in 
the heat of the sun and musty air . . . We caught diseases, and had head colds and 
chest pains during this time . . . They gave us tin pots to use both for drinking 
water and for cleaning the toilets . . . The toilets were not cleaned every day and 
the fl ies gathered horribly. How is this healthy?64
Rifat Paşa protested to the Egyptian Interior Minister, but he was told that he and 
the other members of the procession had no choice but to comply.65
Conclusion
Istanbul was also hard-pressed by such complaints. The Empire’s quarantine 
offi cials could not do very much about maritime passage through the Suez, as 
their sovereignty over Egypt and the Canal Zone was practically non-existent. 
Ottoman access to the Hijaz was also largely limited to sea traffi c, as pilgrims 
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much preferred steamers to the old caravan routes. Those who did take a caravan 
were vulnerable to robbery from local Bedouins. Muslim pilgrims, particularly 
Arabs from Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq voiced their opposition to British 
domination, but also sensed the pending colonisation of the region.
The construction of the Hijaz Railway, inaugurated in 1903, partially solved 
this problem. Pilgrims from the Empire, Europe and western Russia would have 
a viable alternative to using the sea lanes after its completion. This would also 
take the pressure off the Ottoman government to fully give in to international 
pressure, since they would exercise their own sovereignty over the routes. Yet 
the Ottomans would not abandon their newly found faith in prophylactics and 
medical inspection, as this could be used to help further consolidate their control 
over the distant province. The government could indeed implement public health 
reform by increasing its policing powers to regulate buildings, sanitation, water 
supply and medical facilities. There would be growing opposition to such meas-
ures by local interests who wished to limit this intrusion. The Bedouins would 
resist such efforts, vandalising newly constructed waterways in much the same 
way they tried to sabotage the new railway.
The Ottomans had come nearly full circle. When they established the 
quarantine in 1838, they followed standard European practices. Their action, 
however, provoked the European powers – particularly the British and the 
French – to declare that sanitary measures, which did not interfere with free 
trade by implementing government control, were far more effective in combat-
ing plague. These measures allowed the British and French to consolidate their 
economic and political hold on Egypt, which transformed over the nineteenth 
century from an Ottoman province to a European colony. This is best sym-
bolised by the European takeover of the Suez Canal in 1869. Some thirteen 
years later, after the declaration of the country as a British protectorate, the 
Europeans were able to take over Egypt’s public health institutions. By the 
1890s, the British and other European powers, increasingly aware of an anti-
colonialist backlash against them in Egypt and elsewhere in the Islamic world, 
decided to use the quarantine facilities established at the Suez to regulate those 
Muslims going through the Canal Zone on their way to the annual pilgrimage 
to Mecca. The result was a series of rules and regulations which discriminated 
against the pilgrims, defi ning Europeans as hygienic and civilised, and Muslims 
as poor and unsanitary. Some Muslims believed that they were being humili-
ated much in the same way as the poor captive patients who Clot-Bey and 
Aubert-Roche had subjected to experiments for their seminal 1846 study that 
had defi ned infectionism in the fi rst place. The Ottoman quarantine authorities 
now sought to embrace these same infectionist methods but use them for their 
own ends.
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Plague, Sanitary Administration and 
the End of Empire
Introduction
The Ottomans had fully embraced a new vision of plague and quarantines in 
the wake of the 1894 and 1897 International Sanitary conferences. This vision 
of disease indeed accepted Alexander Yersin’s 1894 discovery of the bubonic 
plague bacilli in Hong Kong as valid for justifying hygienic measures that 
sought to eliminate the ultimate cause of the disease: the fi lthy, unsanitary living 
conditions of ‘unmodernised’ societies. The only way the disease in question 
could be defeated was through governmental action. This meant establishing a 
sanitary administration that would not only establish hospitals to treat the sick 
through vaccinations and other modern treatments, but also constantly police the 
impoverished and marginal. As seen in the previous chapter, the Europeans after 
1838 often saw Middle Eastern Muslims – particularly the people of Egypt – as 
the uncivilised bearers of infectious disease. Such a view helped to support the 
long-term British and French aim to colonise the country, given the implication 
that only the Europeans were civilised enough to establish an effective sanitary 
administration of the area.
The Ottomans, convinced by developments towards the end of the century 
– the establishment of the European-dominated Suez Canal in 1869, the British 
defeat of Urabi Revolt and the establishment of a protectorate in 1882, and the 
International Sanitary Regulations of 1894 and 1897 – had now decided to adopt 
an infectionist view of plague and other epidemic diseases.
A 1908 Ottoman imperial edict declared that they could not limit their activi-
ties to policing ports and the docks, granaries and storehouses connected to them 
through the maritime quarantine. The government was also now empowered to 
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inspect, repair and rebuild sewers and even private homes: ‘Above all we must 
get rid of the fi lth that allow rats into a city.’1 This meant above all to police the 
poor:
Patients who have come down with plague are to be sent for quarantine to 
prison-like cells for solitary confi nement. Their clothes and undergarments will 
be destroyed or put inside metallic boxes encased in solution . . . [Their houses 
must also] be emptied . . . The houses should be burned along with their furniture 
if they are of little value. Their prior inhabitants should be sent far away and 
examined in tent-hospitals. There their goods would be subject to disinfection 
procedures. [Even if the houses are of value], no one can live [there] for two 
months; the municipal or state government will have to provide a place for the 
inhabitants to live.2
These measures were implemented in urban areas throughout the empire. 
Hospitals, vaccination centres, sewers, plumbing and building codes were, of 
course, established in Istanbul – the capital of the empire, which over the course 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was fi lled with recent Muslim 
refugees from the wars that bedevilled the Balkans and Caucasus.
Yet an even more remarkable effort was made in the Middle Eastern 
provinces, particularly Ottoman Iraq and the Hijaz, where the policing efforts 
involved social and religious groups that historically were only partially 
 integrated into the Ottoman state.
Iraq was of growing international importance. Its southernmost province 
of Basra was envisioned to be the terminal station of the famed Berlin to 
Baghdad Railway, a project which would have allowed both the Ottomans 
and their German sponsors to bypass the Suez Canal by a new rail route. The 
Ottomans and Germans, as well as their British rivals, were also increasingly 
aware of Iraq’s untapped petroleum resources – vital to nearly every aspect of 
the industrial age. The railway, begun in 1903, was only in its initial stages of 
construction, and the Ottomans sought alternative means to try to consolidate 
rule in the distant province. These efforts were complicated by the Shiites of the 
region, who travelled to southern Iraq each year on an annual pilgrimage to the 
holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. The Ottomans, perhaps fearful that their local 
Shiite minority would become increasingly restive in their desire to unite with 
their numerous foreign co-religionists, called on sanitary measures to control the 
incoming Shiite pilgrims – especially from Persia.
The Ottomans were also greatly concerned with the Hijaz, the western 
Arabian province that was home to the two holiest cities of the Islamic world, 
Mecca and Medina. They faced growing criticism by foreign observers that 
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plague was running rampant there. One British physician noted hundreds of 
deaths from plague in outbreaks between 1906 and 1908 and urgently called for 
international action to stem further outbreaks.3 His criticism was painful, given 
the geopolitical realities of the time. Britain, having declared a protectorate over 
Egypt and the Suez, had nearly complete naval dominance over the Red Sea 
and eastern Mediterranean. British infl uence was bound to grow, especially in 
the Hijaz port cities of Jeddah (64 km from Mecca) and Yanbu al-Bahr (164 
km from Medina). By 1900, the Ottomans felt compelled to embark on another 
railway project – the Hijaz Railway – to link the province by rail to the rest of 
the empire. The British and other European powers repeated their earlier con-
cerns about the threat of epidemic disease, especially as it related to the annual 
Muslim pilgrimage. The Bedouins of the province were also worried that the 
railway would diminish their incomes, as they collected annual subsidies from 
the Ottoman government and fees from the pilgrims for providing goods and safe 
passage. While the Ottomans completed the Damascus–Medina stage in 1908 
and planned to extend the railway to Mecca, they also sought other means to 
consolidate rule in the cities of the Hijaz: the sanitary administration.
The leading Ottoman sanitary administrative offi cial for both of these 
projects was Kasım İzzeddin (1858–1926). From 1894 until 1912 İzzeddin was 
involved with the quarantine and sanitary efforts in Mecca, as well as in Baghdad 
and Basra, and was appointed to a variety of posts during this time, including 
Inspector General of the Ottoman Sanitary Administration, Director of the Hijaz 
Sanitary Administration and Chief Sanitary Offi cer of the Quarantine at Baghdad, 
Basra, Damascus and Sinop. It was no accident that the bulk of these posts were 
in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. İzzeddin was a Lebanese Sunni 
Muslim, very much concerned that his home province, like Palestine, Syria and 
Iraq faced the threat of colonisation by the British and the French. Such feelings 
were revealed in the 1911 International Sanitary Conference held in Paris, where 
he, as Ottoman representative, raised the issue of religious equality. If a sanitary 
administration was necessary for the Muslim pilgrimage in the Hijaz on the prin-
ciple that such meetings of pilgrims from faraway places could introduce new 
epidemic diseases, he asked, why should sanitary administration not be necessary 
for every pilgrimage? Thus, in his opinion, the Ottomans should run a sanitary 
administration not just in the Hijaz for Sunni Muslims, or in Najaf and Karbala 
for Shiite Muslims, but also in Jerusalem for Jewish and Christian pilgrims. He 
followed this up with arguments to tighten international restrictions on vessels 
approaching Ottoman ports in the eastern Mediterranean from ‘infected ports’ – 
which would allow the Ottomans to medically inspect and detain boats of Jewish 
immigrants and pilgrims from Russia.4 Although İzzeddin’s effort to change 
the regulation was unsuccessful, it was likely appreciated by other key Ottoman 
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sanitary administrative offi cials, such as Ruhi Al-Khalidi (1864–1913), a leading 
Arab Young Turk supporter from a prominent Palestinian family, who was one 
of the fi rst to call attention to the increasing Zionist presence in his homeland. 
Khalidi’s insistence that the newly-created Hijaz Sanitary Administration be 
directly controlled by the Ottoman central government through the Interior 
Ministry was also a telling moment. Khalidi, like İzzeddin, invested his hopes 
in centralising rule in the region, since the Ottomans then would be even more 
committed to retaining sovereignty in the north-eastern Arab provinces, as they 
linked Anatolia to both Iraq and the Hijaz.5 Opposition to the sanitary reforms 
carried out by İzzeddin would be quite sharp, particularly on the part of local 
Shiites and Bedouins.
The British had a very curious reaction to these developments. Dr Frank 
G. Clemow, the British Representative to the Constantinople Superior Health 
Council and the Crown’s Delegate to the 1911 International Sanitary Conference, 
often applauded İzzeddin for adopting an infectionist understanding of plague 
and other epidemic diseases, and supported many of his sanitary reforms. These 
reforms would often involve new technologies, such as water supply and fumiga-
tion, that would potentially increase Ottoman dependency on London for both 
fi nance, technological know-how and even energy dependence on coal supplies. 
His attitude, like that of the British Empire, would only change during the First 
World War, when the British cut their support and started to foment rebellion 
among the Shiites and Bedouins.
The following chapter will examine the continuing dialogue İzzeddin and 
Clemow had on sanitary reform in both Iraq and the Hijaz from the beginning 
of the twentieth century until the outbreak of the First World War, and detail the 
consequences of the reforms during and after the ensuing confl ict.
The Ottoman Sanitary Defence of Iraq and the 
Persian Gulf
İzzeddin was not the fi rst Ottoman sanitary offi cial to face serious challenges 
on the Empire’s eastern frontiers with Persia and the Gulf. The Ottomans had 
fi rst set up quarantine stations to prevent the spread of plague and cholera after 
the 1851 Paris International Sanitary Conference. Ottoman offi cials had argued 
that epidemic diseases often passed into the empire through Persia, as witnessed 
by the 1831 plague outbreak there. Further epidemic outbreaks of plague and 
cholera occurred throughout the 1860s and 1870s, and Ottoman and Persian 
offi cials often blamed each other as the fi rst country to have the disease. Dr 
Bartoletti, who represented the Ottoman Empire at the International Sanitary 
conferences in the decades before İzzeddin took offi ce, accused the Persians in 
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1871 of turning a blind eye to plague cases in their country. He thought that a 
land cordon should be set up along the Ottoman–Persian border, and helped to 
supervise the establishment of two main stations at Khanikin, along the main 
southern Persian road to Baghdad, and at Bayazid in the mountainous north. 
He and the Ottoman government believed that the main carriers of the disease 
were the northern mountainous nomads and the Shiite pilgrims who made an 
annual trek to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, and also nearby Baghdad.6 
Representatives of the Persian authorities, such as Tholozan, the founder of the 
Persian Sanitary Council in 1868, claimed that the Ottoman nomads of north-
ern Iraq were to blame for outbreaks of plague and cholera. In his opinion, the 
Ottomans should cease their criticisms, and the needless land cordon, and work 
to improve sanitary conditions among the nomads instead.7
The Ottomans also set up two key maritime quarantine stations in the region 
after 1851. The fi rst was at Basra, the southernmost Ottoman port in Iraq, and 
also at the Hormuz, key to controlling access to the Persian Gulf. Indian Shiite 
pilgrims to southern Iraq – also declared a high risk group for plague and cholera 
– justifi ed the existence of these stations even into the fi rst decade of the twen-
tieth century. The 1903 Sanitary Convention directed that all ships entering the 
Gulf be subjected to medical inspection at Hormuz. Those entering the Ottoman 
Empire had to undergo a second inspection at Basra: any vessel which had previ-
ously docked at a port with confi rmed cases of plague or cholera was required to 
complete fi ve days observation before being allowed to go.8
Yet it was only during İzzeddin’s time that these arrangements funda-
mentally changed. İzzeddin and the Ottoman government set the tone when, 
under international pressure, they abandoned the quarantine station at Hormuz. 
Clemow claimed that British-run alternative quarantine stations in the Gulf ‘ren-
dered wholly unnecessary any special clauses in the conventions for the sanitary 
defences of the Persian Gulf’.9 This shift revealed Great Britain’s near total 
maritime domination of the Gulf.
İzzeddin thus limited his efforts to the Basra, Khanikin and Bayazid stations. 
Of these three, Basra was the most inconsequential. Between 1903 and 1913, an 
average of only 3,334 people entered the Ottoman Empire at Basra, compared 
with an annual average of 42,031 entering the Ottoman Empire from Persia.10 
The Khanikin station alone processed about two-thirds of the Persian traffi c to 
the Ottoman Empire. The station also played an important fi nancial role, since 
they charged a sanitary tax of 10 piastres for every Shiite pilgrim who crossed 
the border. The bulk of the foreign pilgrims were Persians, although a signifi cant 
number of Russian Shiites also passed.11
The greatest controversy concerning the pilgrim traffi c revolved around the 
pilgrims’ tradition of burying their deceased loved ones at Najaf and Karbala. 
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The Ottomans had generally restricted the practice to only those ‘dry’ corpses 
that had mummifi ed, since they suspected ‘fresh’ corpses of transmitting plague 
and cholera. The only exception to this rule was the bodies of those who had died 
only twelve hours prior to crossing the border. The Ottomans collected a sani-
tary tax of 50 piastres per corpse, fi ve times that for a live pilgrim. This resulted 
in a substantial amount of income, as evidenced by an annual average of 3,900 
bodies taken across the border at Khanikin between 1909 and 1914.12 These 
numbers peaked in 1912–13, when, under İzzeddin’s supervision, the Ottomans 
collected taxes on a record 7,558 corpses.
The tax was controversial. Clemow, for instance, dismissed Ottoman 
 concerns that the bodies might spread disease:
While disease has been repeatedly introduced and spread by the movements of 
the Shiite pilgrims, it is noteworthy that it has apparently never been so by the 
movements of the Shiah corpses. No instance could be traced in which either 
plague or cholera – the two diseases mainly dealt with under the international 
conventions – had been imported or diffused by these dead bodies.13
Clemow suspected that local Ottoman offi cials were seeking to exploit the pil-
grims for their own monetary gain, as seen in his own description of the practice 
in Najaf:
On arriving in the outskirts of Najaf the bodies are fi rst deposited in a small 
enclosure, or morgue, built in the desert near the town. Here the taxes are col-
lected; the bodies are removed from their outer wrappings or coffi ns, and placed 
in large coffi ns belonging to the defnieh department (the nature of which will 
be defi ned shortly). The other wrappings and coffi ns are burned by the health 
offi cials, in the desert near the morgue. The commission was consulted as to the 
necessity of continuing this system of incineration. The labads or shibna – that 
is, the shrouds around the coffi ns – are of considerable value, and the wood of the 
coffi ns would be precious in these regions, where trees are unknown and all wood 
has to be imported. The local authorities were anxious for permission to arrange 
for the preliminary disinfection of the coffi ns, which they then proposed to sell; 
the revenue thus obtained would, they claimed, enable the local health assembly 
to put up a steam disinfecting stove, in which the shrouds also be disinfected 
and afterwards sold. Some such form of disinfection was attempted a few years 
ago, but it led to serious abuses and was abandoned. The commission defi nitely 
condemned a return to the former system. The practical diffi culties in the way of 
properly disinfecting a large number of coffi ns and shrouds would be considera-
ble, and, for obvious reasons, incineration is the only proper fate of such objects.14
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The pilgrims and the local Shiite population subverted the Ottomans by 
 propagating a ‘sanitary contraband in dead bodies’:
It is not rare for corpses to be brought secretly, at night, accompanied by armed 
bands of Arabs or Kurds, numbering some scores or even hundreds, who buried 
corpses in the cemetery outside the town without any formalities being complied 
with. Such contraband will always exist, for it could only be met by using armed 
forces superior to the others, and in each instance many lives would probably be 
sacrifi ced. Contraband in fresh (and dry) bodies was largely exercised by persons 
in the holy cities who made a profession of the practice. It seems that all the prin-
cipal towns in Persia and Mesopotamia had representatives or commissioners 
in the Shiah cities; they were generally gravediggers, muleteers, khan-keepers 
[shopkeepers], khadims [pilgrim-guides], and even sayyids [descendants of the 
Prophet] and ulemas [Islamic theologians]. The bodies were addressed to such 
commissioners, who would go out into the desert to meet them and give the 
bearers of false certifi cates, testifying that death had occurred within the 12-hour 
zone.15
Clemow thus recommended that the Ottomans focus on the live pilgrims alone 
as the main concern of their medical inspections.
Moreover, he also drew attention to the poor hygienic state of affairs 
in Ottoman Iraq. Besides pointing out the endemic nature of the Tigris and 
Euphrates river valleys as their damp soils often caused putridity and disease 
among the houses and settlements there, he highlighted the need for better sani-
tary measures in central and southern Iraq. He remarked that ‘there [were] no 
drains in Karbala or Najaf’. Most of the houses had cesspools and, in his opinion, 
‘it [was] not surprising that many diseases are rife in [these] cities’.16 To him, 
Basra was also highly problematic, as water supply for this town of 50,000–
60,000 people was directly from nearby creeks contaminated by surface pollu-
tion. There was no municipal drainage system, and this muddied the unpaved 
streets with sewage.17
Basra was also in dire need of modern building codes. The city’s ‘sunburned 
and kiln-burned brick’ houses were in bad repair. They were allegedly also badly 
ventilated and overcrowded. Some dwellings even had strange underground 
cellars:
In all the larger houses are found underground chambers, or serdabs, where the 
inhabitants may escape from the great heat of the summer; many are forty or 
fi fty, and some even eighty or 100 feet below the ground. If reports be true, these 
cellars are often the scenes of unspeakable vices.18
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İzzeddin largely concurred with Clemow on the need for sanitary reform 
in these cities. After being assigned as the Chief Sanitary Offi cer of Baghdad 
in 1905, he established a main offi ce in that city, as well as the major towns of 
Najaf, Karbala and Kiazimein. Satellite branches were also established at Ali-
El-Gharbi, Amara, Bugheila and Gourna on the Tigris, and Kufa, Museyyib, 
Samawa and Shenafi eh on the Euphrates. They were staffed by sanitary doctors, 
police and administrative offi cials under the supervision of the Ottoman Interior 
Ministry and the Constantinople Superior Health Council.19 İzzeddin did not just 
‘report to Constantinople [on] the appearance of plague or cholera in their dis-
trict’, and enforce the tax codes and regulations on the pilgrims and the traffi c in 
corpses, as Clemow supposed. He also established major hospitals and enforced 
new housing regulations in Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala.20
İzzeddin also agreed with Clemow that poor sanitary conditions often 
involved lawlessness. For instance, he blamed the notables of Najaf and Karbala 
for their involvement in the contraband trade in corpses. He also was concerned 
that the infl ux of poor pilgrims from Persia disturbed genuine pilgrims.21 This 
revealed a new attitude among the Ottoman authorities towards outbreaks within 
the realm. Enacting sanitary policing measures led to social discrimination 
against the poor and religious discrimination against non-Sunni Muslims.
İzzeddin was frustrated by budgetary and logistical concerns, however. The 
Ottoman government was forced to foot most of the bill for the sanitary reforms, 
since the Constantinople Superior Health Council – a nominally international 
body – could not use the income from the Shiite pilgrim taxes without the 
consent of its foreign members. Getting up-to-date equipment for the projects, 
and bringing in suffi cient numbers of engineers and construction crews, was 
also a problem since the railway project was nowhere near to being completed 
– it remained some 563 km away from Baghdad in 1918, long after İzzeddin’s 
service in Iraq had ended.22
Nevertheless, İzzeddin did manage to worsen relations with the local popula-
tion. Local Shiites and pilgrims resented higher taxes and regulation. This was 
often aggravated by the fact that a number of the medical offi cials were non-
Muslims hired from abroad. Lamec Saad, a German-born quarantine offi cial who 
worked at the Khanikin border station in the early twentieth century, was accused 
by one Persian Shiite who complained that: ‘We are Muslims and not infi dels. 
We do not want to go in quarantine and pay the money.’23 This complaint much 
recalled that of İbrahim Rifat Pas ̧a, the Egyptian general who protested at the 
humiliation of Sunni Muslim pilgrims by Greek doctors at the Tor quarantine by 
the Suez Canal. Such humiliations prompted action against the quarantine and 
the government who ran it. The only difference was that this time the Ottomans 
were on the receiving end, an ominous sign for rebellion in the years ahead.
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Sanitary Reforms in the Hijaz
Issues about quarantine, medical inspection and sanitary administration was 
be on a much greater scale in the Hijaz. This was refl ected in the 1911 Paris 
International Sanitary Conference, where İzzeddin and Clemow represented 
the Ottoman and British sides, respectively. The Ottomans and British sought 
to reach accommodation on several key issues; fi rst and foremost, how the 
Conference’s sanitary regulations related to the Hijaz Railway project. The Hijaz 
Railway greatly concerned the British after 1908, since it allowed pilgrims from 
the Empire and beyond to bypass the British sanitary controls at the Suez Canal. 
Clemow and his government feared that the annual number of 12,000–20,000 pil-
grims that used the route could spread cholera and plague to the Hijaz, elsewhere 
in the Ottoman Empire, Europe and beyond if adequate medical inspection facili-
ties were not implemented along the route. Austro-Hungarian, French, Dutch 
and Italian delegations shared the British concerns since they, too, had many 
Muslim colonial subjects of their own who used the route. Yet the Ottomans 
fi rmly resisted any formal international sanitary control over the railway. As Ali 
Mukhtar Bey, İzzeddin’s fellow countryman, related at the Conference: ‘The 
Ottoman government considers the Hijaz Railway as an interior line and does not 
believe it is more dangerous than rail lines found in other countries.’ Clemow and 
the majority of the Conference conceded that the Ottoman Empire had the right to 
run its own sanitary administration within the borders of the country.24
This quick approval was the result of a joint Ottoman–British effort to 
achieve international consensus on the subject. The British sought to infl uence 
Ottoman policy on the Hijaz Railway and the Ottomans needed to get Great 
Britain’s consent to use sanitary tax revenues to develop a sanitary administra-
tion in the area. İzzeddin began this cooperation in 1908 when he helped form 
a joint ad hoc committee with Clemow to select a new quarantine station on the 
railway line. Clemow and the other foreign powers agreed to fund the effort 
temporarily, pending discussion at the Conference. They set up their temporary 
quarantine at Medain-i Salihi, a town roughly 350 km to the north of Medina. 
The Ottomans recommended the site as it was situated on the northern border 
of the Hijaz, and would thus fi t well within current administrative divisions. 
İzzeddin, the committee and the local Ottoman sanitary offi cials established a 
makeshift medical camp, and work was done to supply food, water and shelter 
to the 12,933 pilgrims who were inspected that year at the station for plague and 
cholera. Cholera was diagnosed in 101 pilgrims, fi fty-seven case of which were 
fatal. İzzeddin felt that despite improvisations, awkward planning and occasion-
ally mismanaging these infections the mission was ultimately successful, as ‘the 
disease did not spread [from the Hijaz] to Syria’.25
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Clemow raised doubts about choosing Medain-i Salihi as the permanent site 
of the railway quarantine. He argued that the water supply to the town was too 
poor and was very vulnerable to sandstorms – factors that forced the committee 
to establish the quarantine 10 km away from the railway, causing further delays 
for the travellers. He was also worried about resistance from local Bedouins to 
reforms. He saw this fi rsthand when: ‘On the day of our arrival there was a serious 
attack made on the head of the [rail] line and in the fi ght which followed some 
forty Bedouins were said to have been killed.’26 To him, the Bedouins’ resistance 
to the quarantine stemmed from their belief that the Prophet Muhammad himself 
had forbidden outsiders to stay in the town:
Medaini Salih is, to those Muslims who know the legend that gives it its name, 
more or less under a ban . . . As far as can be gathered the legend is not known 
to the bulk of the pilgrims and it did not apparently lead to any overt objection 
on their part to the choice of Medaini Salih for the temporary lazaret in the last 
two seasons. Possibly it might not lead for many years to come to any diffi culties 
in connection with a prominent lazaret here. But there would always be the risk 
of its doing so someday. Pilgrims in any case admit unwillingly to a quarantine, 
and should any fanatic among them choose to recall the legend (which is referred 
to frequently in the Koran) and incite the other pilgrims to rebel against being 
quarantined here, a very serious condition of affairs might be brought about. It 
might easily become impossible to force the pilgrims to remain here and quite 
possibly they would take the law into their hands and destroy the buildings. As it 
is intended to spend large sums in installing the new lazaret, it would be foolish 
to run this risk, more particularly as the transfer to another side of a lazaret, once 
built, is as costly (indeed it would practically mean) its rebuilding anew.27
Clemow argued that the Ottoman quarantine station should instead be 
established in Tebouk, a town also on the Hijaz Railway roughly 283 km north 
of Medain-i Salihi. He believed that the town had a much safer water supply, 
better quarries and was less prone to sandstorms. He also argued that the quar-
antine station at Tebouk could be established much closer to the railway than 
at Medain-i Salihi. In his opinion, the place was also a strategic location, as the 
Bedouin tribe, Beni Attiyeh, had a good working relationship with the Ottoman 
authorities there.28
İzzeddin concurred. He agreed that water could easily be brought to the 
Tebouk station and did not foresee any great administrative diffi culties for 
the Ottoman sanitary administration. Although he did not explicitly mention the 
issue of the Bedouins, he was no doubt aware that the Bedouins around Medain-i 
Salihi violently protested the quarantine station out of fear that the government 
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would soon interfere with their tribal affairs.29 From İzzeddin’s viewpoint, 
moving the station to Tebouk would cause fewer possible complications, as 
the Bedouins there were much more amenable to the increased governmental 
presence.
The Ottoman quarantine station was quickly constructed in Tebouk the fol-
lowing year in accordance with Clemow’s recommendations. İzzeddin noted 
that in 1909 there were only three cases of cholera seen in Tebouk and that the 
disease again did not spread to Syria.30 Clemow and İzzeddin had basically 
worked out an arrangement on the Hijaz Railway station before they arrived at 
the Conference. İzzeddin would follow Clemow’s instructions on how and where 
to establish the station, but the Ottoman sanitary offi cials would run it, partially 
funded by the sanitary taxes. The Conference merely ratifi ed this arrangement.
The Ottomans also faced considerable pressure from the Europeans to make 
sanitary reforms in the major towns of the Hijaz, particularly Mecca and the 
adjacent Red Sea port of Jeddah. Proust complained about Jeddah after 1894 
that:
One should note the fi lthiness of the town. The Ottoman government does not 
take responsibility, as pilgrims who disembarked from [the Ottoman quarantine 
at] Kamaran are crowded into rooms of more than thirty people. Garbage was 
strewn throughout the streets, and then never cleaned. The government collects 
municipal taxes of fr.175,000 per year but no work is done.31
Proust saw İzzeddin’s efforts at that time to send professional medical 
teams, restore water pipes and build fumigation stations in Jeddah, construct 
a 1,400-bed guest house and three hospitals in Mecca and clean the streets of 
Medina as laudable, but ultimately unsuccessful.32 In May 1895 ‘local Bedouins’ 
assassinated Abdur-Razzack, the British Vice Consul for Pilgrimage Affairs in 
Jeddah, and wounded the British, French and Russian consuls in protest at the 
measures.33 Thereafter the municipal sanitary workers neglected their duties and 
the local Muslims of Jeddah allegedly polluted the new water supply when they 
performed ablutions and washed their linen.34
İzzeddin himself conceded that his early efforts were not enough. He agreed 
that the local municipal government could not handle these efforts on their own, 
as ‘epidemic diseases occur during the pilgrimage’, affecting far more than just 
the provincial population. The locals also did not have either suffi cient funds 
or capable offi cials to administer the reforms. He documented this with a May 
1910 report from Zihni Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of the Hijaz to the Ottoman 
Interior Ministry. The Governor mentioned that Hussein Bin Ali (1854–1931), 
the Sharif of Mecca, could only raise 50,000 paistres as sanitary tax, and that 
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nothing more could be expected from them or the local Bedouins whom he 
represented:
Everyone is thirsty and hot, both during the pilgrimage – when the blessed 
die – and during the off-season [when the region] is continually crowded with 
more than 100,000 people. [The Hijaz] is truly a gathering place for the entire 
Islamic world, no matter what time. Only the Ottoman state can maintain order 
for the Muslim pilgrims who come from every end of the earth. It must do so 
with its funds and personnel as agriculture and industry do not exist, and trade 
is limited.35
In İzzeddin’s eyes, the Ottoman government should assume direct control 
since state treasury funds would be involved. In fact, the Ottoman government 
approved a budget of 3,184,703 paistres – roughly comparable to that of the 
Hijaz Railway.36 It expended 1,275,280 paistres from the central treasury to pay 
for the sanitary reforms, a far higher amount than the 50,000 paistres taken from 
local taxes, or even the 130,000 paistres it raised from foreign pilgrims. The 
government’s fi scal commitments underscored its claim that the reforms were 
its holy duty: ‘The administration of the pilgrims’ sanitary affairs is incumbent 
upon the exalted government and the Islamic Caliphate.’37
İzzeddin and his co-administrators elaborated these arguments when they 
launched the Hijaz Sanitary Administration in 1910:
The Hijaz Sanitary Administration is providing great service to the Islamic 
world. There is no doubt that the people who have died in the Hijaz surpasses 
many times over the casualties of great battles . . . Consequently, it is neces-
sary for the Hijaz Sanitary Administration to undertake such a holy duty to help 
the sick, like the wounded on the battlefi eld . . . It is natural that the number 
of pilgrims will increase as long as we protect their health and well-being. If 
we do so, Muslims will joyously come here to fulfi l their sacred duties. We 
will be rewarded for this in the next world . . . We have a responsibility to the 
more than 300 million Muslims of diverse nations and tribes who gather here in 
brotherhood. We need to advance their health, social and economic well-being, 
and show the superiority of Islam. This would demonstrate how knowledge, 
civilisation and the economy could be used to achieve God’s will. But how is 
that possible when 100,000 Muslims come here without food, drink, shelter, and 
are unprotected and unclean? In short, they lack sanitary precautions and thus 
help spread contagious disease. The building of more residences for the pilgrims 
worsens the situation. Only the Hijaz Sanitary Administration can address these 
problems and gradually improve living conditions.38
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The new administration embarked on a variety of reforms, including the estab-
lishment of sanitary police and engineers, medical personnel, permanent hospi-
tals, tent-hospitals, pharmacies, fumigation stations, administrative buildings, 
shelters for poor pilgrims, new sewage, water supplies, and new building and 
food regulations for all four major cities in the Hijaz (Mecca, Medina, Jeddah 
and Yanbu).
The Hijaz Sanitary Administration had now become another branch of 
the Ottoman central authority. İzzeddin, the Director of the Hijaz Sanitary 
Administration, worked in the name of Talat Pasha (1874–1921), the Interior 
Minister, much like the Director of the Hijaz Railway did. The directors of the 
Hijaz Sanitary Administration and the Hijaz Railway both tended to clash with 
Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, whom İzzeddin ironically thanked for running 
the Jeddah sanitation efforts prior to his arrival. His dismissive attitude towards 
Hussein’s municipal authorities – the local notables and Bedouins – was telling. 
New regulations required Hussein not only to obey İzzeddin as the Director of 
the Hijaz Sanitary Administration, but also to send him an annual report on how 
İzzeddin’s reforms were implemented in the province.39
İzzeddin and Clemow discussed sanitary measures in Jeddah in some detail, 
particularly regarding the establishment of new hospitals and water supplies. The 
European powers paid great attention to Jeddah, since it was the major port of 
the region, and, as such, had the strongest foreign presence. Clemow complained 
that Jeddah’s one working hospital was ‘quite inadequate to the needs of the 
place’:
There is a small municipal hospital situated inside the wall that completely sur-
rounds the town on its eastern side and not far from the Mecca gates. It is a one-
story structure built against the town wall. It contains two wards for twelve and 
eight patients respectively; the wards have no fl ooring, their fl oors being a beaten 
earth. Close by is a wooden shed in bad condition used for dysentery patients; 
it is almost entirely without furniture. In brief, this hospital – though those in 
immediate charge of it have apparently done their best with limited means placed 
at their disposal – is altogether too small and too primitive for a town like Jeddah, 
with its vast fl oating population. The inspection commission in its report conse-
quently urges the Turkish government to build a large general hospital capable of 
150 or 200 patients and suggests a suitable site where it might be built.40
İzzeddin apparently received far harsher criticism from other foreign offi cials:
There was . . . no hospital in Jeddah, except for the city hospital, which foreign 
embassies complained about numerous times. One stated: ‘The Jeddah hospital is 
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only a single wooden barrack. There are no hospital attendants, food or water. It 
has wooden stumps for beds, with holes in it for the patient to relieve themselves. 
For this reason, human excrement has piled up on the fl oor. The place is like a 
dunghill. Your patients suffer from various diseases like smallpox and dysentery. 
The place simply spreads disease among the patients’. The Consul sent a picture 
of the hospital where six patients – three with smallpox – were lying down on 
a wooden stump. There also was a picture of a funeral of a man who died a 
day ago. The procession was covered with fl ies, and one could see the human 
 excrement under the wooden stumps.41
İzzeddin worked quickly to address these concerns. Two hospitals, one a 100-bed 
military barracks facility, and the other a forty-bed tent-hospital were established 
within the fi rst year of the Hijaz Sanitary Administration.42 İzzeddin’s success in 
establishing the hospitals without incident was remarkable given the assassina-
tion of Abdur-Razzack in 1895 in protest against fumigation stations that were 
erected in the city.43
The establishment of new water facilities in Jeddah proved to be more dif-
fi cult. The city had suffered a drought in 1906, when Clemow had inspected the 
facilities. Water in Jeddah at the time he visited was basically limited to rain 
water, which individuals in Jeddah had collected in tanks and cisterns throughout 
the city, and numerous wells which had been dug near the city walls. The water 
from both of these sources was extremely poor in quality, and quite unhealthy to 
drink – especially the brackish well-water. There were four other springs outside 
the city, but only one of them, Ayn Bariman, was able to provide the city with 
any water. Ayn Bariman’s water was carried ‘by petroleum cans on the back of 
a camel or donkey’. The other three springs, Ayn Farraj, Ayn Hamidiye and Ayn 
Veziriye, had water pipes to the city, but they were constantly sabotaged.44
Clemow cited local opposition against water supplies as the main obstacle 
to reform. He suspected ‘certain citizens of Jeddah’, [who] own the majority of 
the water tanks’, were the ones actually behind the Bedouin attacks. Led by local 
notables like ‘Hadrami – a very infl uential man who opposes all efforts made in 
order to improve the situation’, these interests had damaged the water pipes in 
an attempt to retain their monopoly over the cistern water and the Ayn Bariman 
springs.45
Clemow proposed establishing water-distilling machines to process local 
well and rainwater. This would alleviate the need to rely on the local cistern 
interests, and would avoid the nearly impossible task of securing pipelines to the 
wells outside the city – since they would remain vulnerable to attack. Though 
the distilling machines were presumably safe behind the guarded walls of the 
medical facilities, the Ottomans were still wary of further opposition:
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Vested interests are extremely strong; the owners of tanks will do all they can to 
prevent the sale of distilled water, if they do not actually attack the machines. The 
people themselves, strongly conservative by nature, will take time to get accus-
tomed to distilled water in place of the other waters they have been used to drink-
ing. In time, however, there should be no question of the distiller or distillers, 
under proper management, yielding a handsome annual profi t. This aspect of the 
question is, however, in truth, one of secondary importance in comparison with 
the real necessity, on sanitary and humanitarian grounds, of providing Jeddah 
with a certain, abundant, and safe water supply.46
Clemow felt, however, that popular suspicion of the distilled water could be 
overcome in time, especially given its higher quality and cheaper price. He cited 
his own government’s success in establishing a similar machine in Oman, where 
the locals fought over the distilled water once they had tasted it.47
İzzeddin followed up on Clemow’s suggestions by buying a water distiller 
(100 tons per day), and a large ice-maker (2,000 kg per day), along with the 
electrical cables and equipment to run both machines.48 He also accessed a new 
water source only 5 km to the north of Jeddah to supply the distillation and ice 
machines. They were secured within his sanitary compound.49 Much of the city 
celebrated:
In January 1329 [1911], they completed installing the ice machines and electricity 
generators [in Jeddah]. The government offi cials held a ceremony with the con-
sulates of the foreign powers, local notables and steamboat agents. They slaugh-
tered rams and prayed that the Caliphate of Islam’s glory may be increased. They 
also wished for the prosperity of the Hijaz Sanitary Administration. The opening 
day of the ice and electric generators was a joyful one for the people of Jeddah. 
They opened the doors of the factory to the public and all the people around came 
to see the machines and were happy.50
Such successes were key to convincing both the foreign powers and the 
local population that the Hijaz Sanitary Administration’s programme of social 
and political centralisation was there to stay. Yet foreign support – particularly 
that of the British – was vital. İzzeddin had followed Clemow’s suggestions 
on nearly every matter brought to him – be it for the railway quarantine station 
or Jeddah’s hospitals and water supply. İzzeddin also imported the distillation 
and ice machines from Great Britain over naval routes largely controlled by 
Great Britain. The coal he required in Jeddah to provide the electricity for the 
machines also had to be shipped in – as this bulk good could not be brought over-
land since the railways from Medina to Mecca and Jeddah were not complete. 
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Unsurprisingly, the British even suggested that the Ottomans use Cardiff coal 
instead of domestic coal from Zonguldak on the Black Sea coast. The British 
claimed that the coal burned cleaner and provided more energy.51
Yet the celebratory scene over ice in Jeddah, reminiscent of similar festivities 
for the Hijaz Railway,52 conveyed sovereignty in a concrete way that the pil-
grims and the local population were bound to appreciate. The Ottomans under 
İzzeddin sought to further express this sovereignty in the district through their 
new-found social disciplinary powers as medical and sanitary inspectors.
Poverty, in İzzeddin’s opinion, was a ‘diffi cult social disease for the holy 
pilgrimage’ that bred epidemic disease, and degraded the sanitary and moral 
climate for everyone in the region. Two beggars had allegedly begun a cholera 
outbreak in the Hijaz after travelling from Mecca to Medina on foot in 1909. 
They were not the only ones who caused problems, according to İzzeddin. Poor 
pilgrims, who numbered approximately 20 per cent of Muslim visitors, often 
‘began begging and annoying other pilgrims after arriving in the Hijaz’ by going 
from Jeddah to Mecca with their bowls:
They infringe upon the health of the pilgrims and do things which spread disease. 
When the diseases abound, there are twice as many dead among them than 
among the other pilgrims. These people do not come to the Hijaz in order to 
perform the pilgrimage . . . You cannot call them by the title Hajji. They do not 
deserve the respect the real pilgrims do.53
İzzeddin’s fi rst initiative to deal with the problem apparently ended in failure:
When we formed the Mecca Sanitary Administration in 1312 [1895] we tried 
very hard to ameliorate the situation for the beggars. We brought them to our 
hospitals and gave them food and clothing but this did not satisfy them. Instead, 
the beggars began to act in a hostile manner. They did not know what goodness 
means. They pretended to be sick and wanted money from those who passed. 
They did not like it when the Sanitary Administration picked them up from the 
streets and sent them to the hospitals.54
When İzzeddin used a former barracks to house the poor pilgrims after he 
became General Director of the Hijaz Sanitary Administration in 1910, the 
beggars continued to resist. Münir Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hijaz 
Division, informed him that: ‘None of the poor pilgrims wanted to stay in the 
former barracks, saying that it was very far away from the city and the holy 
places . . . But the guesthouse was only two kilometres away [from the city 
centre].’55
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İzzeddin approved of measures the Europeans had taken at the 1894 Paris 
International Sanitary Conference. The French, Austro-Hungarians and Dutch 
strongly supported travelling restrictions, as all three had substantial Muslim 
colonial populations. Proust, the main French delegate to the conference, ‘men-
tioned that only 60 per cent of the Muslims from Java, 50 per cent of Bosnian 
pilgrims and only a few thousand French pilgrims returned home’. The Austro-
Hungarians, no doubt infl uenced by the fact that up to one-third of the Bosnian 
Muslim population had left for the Ottoman Empire after the 1878 occupation,56 
sought to use an internal passport system for the pilgrims. The Dutch fol-
lowed suit by closely examining returning pilgrims with local Javanese Islamic 
authorities. If the returning pilgrim could not pass a ‘test’ about his visit, he was 
 subjected to a monetary penalty.57
The British also tried to restrict the traffi c of their Egyptian pilgrims as much 
as possible. As Clemow related:
An Egyptian desirous of making the pilgrimage must secure a special passport 
from the Mudir of his district or the governor of his town. This passport contains 
a detailed description of the individual and spaces for receipts for quarantine fees 
and caution money deposited by the pilgrim. The man must then visit the sani-
tary inspector of his district, who satisfi es himself that the passport is in order, 
so that he will be able to identify the individual on his return. Later, the passport 
must be signed by the passport offi cer at Suez on his outward journey, who again 
satisfi es himself that all is in order before embarkation. On his return journey the 
passport offi cer at Tor forwards the document directly to the sanitary inspector of 
the pilgrim’s district. On emerging from Tor the pilgrim is given a voucher which 
enables him to land at Suez and he is then instructed to proceed direct to his home 
and present himself daily to the sanitary inspector who at the end of seven days 
hands back to him this passport duly signed in order that he may be able to with-
draw his caution money from the local authority. This system may sound a little 
complicated but it works extremely well in a country where the people are accus-
tomed from time immemorial to obey the orders of the government offi cials.58
Nevertheless, the British were reluctant to adhere to international regulation 
of Indian Muslims, as this would imply outside interference in their own internal 
affairs. They thus referred the question to the Ottomans, saying that they would 
agree to the restriction only if ‘the Sultan, acting as the Caliph, [ordered] that no 
one should go to Mecca from any part of his Empire without obeying this rule’.59 
The Ottomans, represented at the 1894 conference by Turhan Pasha, maintained 
that poor pilgrims should not be hindered from performing their religious duty. 
Nevertheless, Turhan Pasha was willing to refer the question to his government 
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for further consideration, since Islamic legal scholars had confl icting positions 
on the topic.
İzzeddin, the Ottoman Delegate to the 1911 Paris International Sanitary 
Conference, reversed the previous Ottoman position: he now supported forcing 
pilgrims to purchase a return ticket prior to their departure to the Hijaz, as well 
as pressuring wealthy Muslims who sent substitutes to perform the pilgrimage 
to provide adequate money for the journey. İzzeddin also advocated greater 
policing measures once the pilgrims reached the Hijaz, since ‘leaving the poor 
pilgrims who came to do their sacred duty on the streets is contrary to Islam 
and the Caliphate’.60 Quarantine offi cials were to medically inspect the pilgrims 
before and after arrival, and sanitary police made sure that pilgrims were clean. 
They also would keep ‘beggars’ off the streets, and inspect the pilgrim’s food 
and accommodations.61
İzzeddin’s discriminatory statements about the poor in the Hijaz and the 
policies he took towards them confi rm similar sentiments he had shown in Iraq. 
Acting as a leading sanitary administrative offi cial, İzzeddin made a major 
departure from earlier Ottoman views on the plague and other major epidemic 
diseases. He showed that the Ottomans were now willing to use existing social 
divisions to further their own governmental power.
Yet İzzeddin’s sanitary policies confl icted with the local population just as 
much as they did with poor foreign-born pilgrims. Clemow spoke of this issue 
when he talked about the spread of plague in the Hijaz in 1907:
It is a remarkable fact that, with the single exception of a fatal case of plague in a 
Javanese pilgrim, the outbreak in Jeddah has been strictly confi ned to the native 
inhabitants of the town . . . I am inclined to attribute this relative immunity to the 
fact . . . that most of [the pilgrims] live in homes specially built for the purpose, 
which are surveyed, cleansed and whitewashed and put into order before the 
arrival of the pilgrims; and that those who are too poor to stop in houses camp out 
in the open air, where they are little exposed to the infection of the plague either 
from contact with the inhabitants of the town or with rats.62
Clemow blamed the local Arabs for resisting the sanitary reforms:
There seems to have been much diffi culty in applying measures for the suppres-
sion of the outbreak. The Arab inhabitants dreaded European interference more 
than the disease; the large majority of cases have only become known to the 
authorities after death and it is certain that many that recovered were brought 
to the knowledge of the latter. Scarcely any of the cases have been removed 
to hospital. When a death from plague has become known the house where 
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it occurred has been disinfected . . . Shortly after the revival of the disease in 
January it was proved beyond a doubt that rats were dying from plague and 
were in all probability the main channel by which the infection was being 
spread. Small rewards, of the value of one penny, were offered for the bodies of 
dead rats, but there is no evidence at present that this measure led to any sub-
stantial results. The medical staff of the town was strengthened and an ample 
supply of prophylactic was furnished to them, but the latest reports showed 
that it was almost impossible to induce the people to allow themselves to be 
inoculated. In some cases the opposition to the authorities took a more active 
form and violence was used. In one case a native woman – possibly interpreting 
too literally the injunction to keep coals of fi re on the other’s head – poured a 
torrent of hot ashes from a window onto the head of a disinfector who attempted 
to enter the house.63
Clemow implied here that the only solution to the problem was to use the sani-
tary police and a centralised command structure to enforce the reforms – exactly 
the same path that İzzeddin followed some three years later when he created the 
Ottoman sanitary administration.
Still, İzzeddin sometimes ran into diffi culties even with his strong insti-
tutional presence in the region. This was particularly clear when he tried to 
regulate the sale, butchering and disposal of sacrifi cial rams, which the pilgrims 
bought annually at Mena on the outskirts of Mecca:
The problem in Mena is due to the slaughtering of rams and the overcrowding 
of the streets. The pilgrims stay in Mena for only three days, but they slaughter 
hundreds and thousands of rams. Mena is located in a valley, and the pilgrims 
reside in tents. The majority of pilgrims stay there since the houses are few and 
very expensive. Unfortunately, the tents are not set up in an orderly fashion and 
often are set up between the houses. This situation annoys the pilgrims and leads 
to unhealthy conditions. Thus, the streets should be enlarged and the tents set up 
in an orderly fashion. The tentmakers should have a map of the places where they 
should put up their tents. The [campground] should not house more than 1,000 
pilgrims and it should be surrounded by a high wall.64
He believed that this was an essential task to prevent disease given his claim 
that there were somewhere between 200,000 and 1 million carcasses to deal 
with each year at Mena. He recommended that soldiers ‘form a cordon between 
the slaughterhouse and the pilgrims’ residences at dawn on the fi rst day of the 
festival . . . [in order to prevent] the slaughter of rams in the pilgrim’s tents. 
Furthermore, he required that ‘the sanitary police and physicians inspect the 
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rams’ before they were sold at a secure slaughterhouse, also supervised by sani-
tary administrative offi cials.65
The locals, however, balked at the measures, as regulating and taxing their 
trade in sacrifi cial rams would lessen their income. In 1910, İzzeddin enforced 
the new rules only because he ordered Fazil Bey Efendi, the son of Hussein, the 
Sharif of Mecca, ‘to send the Bedouins away with their sheep’.66 The next year 
he was not so successful:
It was amazing to see the hostility [of locals] towards Muslim pilgrims and 
the sanitary services in 1911. Because of this precautions could not be taken 
against cholera . . . Some [newspapers in Istanbul] condemned the attack . . . 
[It occurred] after a quarrel between soldiers and Bedouins broke the cordon 
established by the divisional general Münir Pasha. The Bedouins then brought in 
herds of sheep to the pilgrims who slaughtered them. We were not able to bury 
the rams, and this increased the cholera deaths.67
Conclusion
İzzeddin and the Ottoman sanitary reforms soon went into a fatal tailspin. British 
mechanical support and supplies of coal – so vital to maintaining Jeddah’s 
and Basra’s water and electricity – were effectively cut off after the Ottoman 
entrance into the First World War on behalf of the Central Powers in November 
1914. The railway projects to Baghdad and the Hijaz were incomplete, and 
suffi cient supplies and military reinforcements could not reach the sanitary 
administration due to the British domination of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. 
The local population, once enthusiastic about technological improvements, now 
had to suffer through depravity. The weakness of Ottoman government was on 
full display. The British replaced Clemow, their friendly representative to the 
Ottoman Empire, with the likes of Lieutenant J. T. Lawrence (‘Lawrence of 
Arabia’) and other British agents, who stirred animosities between the Ottomans 
and the disaffected Bedouins.
Sharif Hussein and his sons, once İzzeddin’s reluctant agents of reform, now 
worked with Lawrence to stir up the Bedouins, who themselves were embittered 
by İzzeddin’s treatment of them as a diseased people who could be taxed in the 
name of centralising sanitary reform.
The Arab Revolt of 1916–18 eventually led to political power for Sharif 
Hussein’s progeny: his sons Faisal and Ali took power in Iraq and the Hijaz, 
respectively. Now it was their turn to run the sanitary administration. Ironically, 
they both largely followed in the footsteps of their Ottoman predecessors. 
In Iraq, Faisal passed the Corpse Traffi c Law (1924), which followed earlier 
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Ottoman controls by severely restricting the pilgrim’s import of ‘moist corpses’. 
They were allowed in from outside the country only if they were in ‘hermetically 
sealed . . . coffi ns lined with iron, lead or zinc to the satisfaction of the inspecting 
doctor at the town of entry’ and had a ‘certifi cate from the foreign authorities or 
from an Iraqi consular offi cer . . . that the corpse had not died from an infectious 
disease’. In addition, the Iraqis only permitted ‘moist corpses’ to cross the border 
between 1 November and 31 March.68
Ali tried to re-establish the Abu Saad quarantine station and the facilities in 
Jeddah, Mecca, Medina and Yanbu, but soon felt the brunt of European disdain:
No effective measures of general sanitation have been taken within the [Hijaz] 
Kingdom or at the sacred cities, and there is no medical service which in modern 
eyes could be considered satisfactory. In regard to the ports of the Hijaz, Jeddah 
and Yanbu, the position is worse than formerly. While the sanitary measures at 
these ports were undertaken by the Superior Board of Health of Constantinople, 
they could be applied with due reference to the measures taken in, and informa-
tion received from, other ports and quarantine stations directed by that board, 
notably Kamaran. This is not now the case.69
He replied in frustration to such reports that he could ‘fumigate just as well as 
the English’.70 This was a bad sign for Ali’s and the Sharif’s supporters in the 
Hijaz. Their Saudi rivals would soon take over the region after Hussein claimed 
the title of Caliph in 1924.
The Turks faced similar pressures. The British occupied Istanbul after the 
Ottoman surrender in October 1918. Clemow, who returned with the forces, 
reported that plague had broken out soon after their arrival:
In Constantinople plague reappeared, after a long absence, in September, 1919. 
The source of infection was unknown; but the fi rst cases occurred in connection 
with the granary. Between September and 19 January 1920, fi fty-four cases, with 
nineteen deaths, were registered. After a plague-free interval the disease broke 
out again in April, and since 24 April, fi fty-six cases have been recorded.71
A League of Nations commission sent to study the outbreak highlighted the 
need for the British to take action:
Constantinople town and port itself presents special dangers of epidemic diseases 
which might have a widespread effect in many countries with which it has sea 
or land communications. The town and all its outlying parts at the present time 
are overcrowded, and contain a large alien population, most of which is in a state 
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of destitution and malnutrition. Its internal sanitation and health administration, 
before the war and until the armistice, were entirely in Turkish hands and gener-
ally unsatisfactory. The exceptional conditions which arose in Constantinople 
after the armistice created a very serious state of affairs as regards public health. 
Since the Allied occupation a number of emergency measures have been taken 
under the direction of an international committee, and they have been executed 
under the supervision of a medical offi cer of one of the Allied forces. Good 
results have been obtained in several directions. In regards to epidemics, vigor-
ous action has been taken to deal with plague, which appeared in 1919 and still 
occurs sporadically, and also with epidemics such as smallpox and typhus. For 
plague, smallpox and cholera, vaccination or preventative inoculation has been 
carried out on a very large scale. So far as the limited resources and personnel 
have permitted, attention has been given to the formidable task of sanitary sur-
veillance of refugees. The whole population, estimated at well over 1 million, 
however, is still without an infectious diseases hospital, without cleansing sta-
tions and baths which can deal with typhus and relapsing fever, and without 
many other primary sanitary requirements.72
These claims that the Ottomans neglected ‘sanitary affairs and health admin-
istration’ contrasted sharply with Clemow’s praise just before the war for Dr 
Cemil Pasha (1858–1968), who was head of the sanitary efforts in Istanbul:
The energetic prefect of the city, Dr Djemil Pasha, is not only enlarging the 
streets and embellishing the quarters of Istanbul, Pera and Scutari, but he is also 
doing his best to improve the sanitary and hygienic conditions of our metropolis. 
The municipal authorities did well to elect for this supervising offi ce a capable 
and travelled physician with studied Western ways and is in touch with modern 
ideas. His chief plan for the present is to erect a number of new municipal hospi-
tals worthy of the capital, and to enlarge and improve those already in existence. 
He has prepared a very extensive report on the matter, and hopes to realise this 
project in the course of fi ve years.73
The League of Nations ignored earlier reports of progress and recommended 
that the remaining Turkish quarantines be ‘internationalised’ in much the 
same way as the Suez Canal and Red Sea quarantine systems had been. This is 
evident in the following article they drafted for a proposed International Sanitary 
Conference on the subject:
Measures at Constantinople and the Black Sea Ports: . . . If and when a port sani-
tary authority having an international character is established at Constantinople, 
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such authority shall make regulations of a similar nature to those authorised in 
the case of the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt . . . subject to 
their acceptance by the powers represented on the authority. The sanitary author-
ity may also take measures in regard to ships from the Black Sea ports which 
pass through the Bosporus, bound for the Mediterranean, similar to those author-
ised . . . in the case of ships coming from the south through the Suez Canal and 
bound for the Mediterranean. In pursuance of these duties this sanitary authority 
shall provide at a suitable station, or stations, near the northern entrance of the 
Bosporus, all necessary accommodation for medical examination, disinfection, 
isolation of sick and observation of contacts.74
The Turkish independence movement, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
(1881–1938), was in no mood to accept such terms. Turkish nationalist forces 
entered Istanbul in 1923, signalling the end of any signifi cant British presence 
in the Straits and Anatolia. The British public may have been sympathetic to 
local Greeks and the initial occupation of the city, but they were loath to main-
tain any troop commitments after the long and bloody war. Atatürk and the 
new Turkish government sensed this weakness, and sent İsmet Inönü, Ataturk’s 
right-hand man, to the Lausanne Peace Conference (1923) to draw up a peace 
treaty between the new state and the victors of the First World War. Inönü suc-
cessfully defended Turkey’s right to run its own quarantine facilities, and even 
 nationalised the Constantinople Superior Health Council.
The Ottoman Empire’s eighty-year experiment in quarantines and sanitary 
administration had ended with mixed results. The Istanbul quarantine was con-
sistently successful in defending Ottoman interests in the Straits through the gov-
ernment’s control of the Constantinople Superior Health Council and the popular 
support reformers like Hamdan and Ahmed Midhat had garnered. But İzzeddin’s 
sanitary administration’s attempt to cement Arab–Turkish ties could not ulti-
mately subjugate the Bedouins of the Hijaz and the Shiites of southern Iraq. 
Clemow and the British withdrew their support for these efforts after the war 
broke out and rebellions ensued. Thus, the Ottomans had learned a bitter lesson 
about quarantine reform: it could help consolidate a republic but not an empire.
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Towards a New Understanding of 
Plague and Quarantines in the 
Ottoman Empire
This book argues that Hamdan Bin El-Merhum Osman Hoca was indeed a 
pivotal fi gure in the history of plague in the Ottoman Empire, as his vision of 
quarantine as an instrument of national sovereignty had the most lasting political 
impact on the Ottoman medical reforms about epidemic disease.
Before his time the Ottomans had an essentially premodern view of plague 
and other epidemic diseases. Although the Ottomans traditionally conceived of 
plague and health in ways that that did not contradict their ruling Islamic faith, 
they reacted to the Black Death and later outbreaks of plague much in the same 
way as their medieval European counterparts. Many of their most prominent 
writers (Al-Yahudi, Bitlisi and Taşköprüzade) generally thought that plague 
began with a miasmatic corruption of the air that killed humans and animals 
alike by causing a fatal elemental imbalance. They prescribed cures and methods 
of fumigation that were virtually identical to that of their northern neighbours. 
Some even shared Boccaccio’s and Fracastoro’s belief that the plague was 
spread by contagion. Yet only Venice and a small number of Italian city-states 
used the idea of contagion to justify the building of maritime quarantines in the 
late fourteenth and fi fteenth centuries. Still, almost all plague treatise writers, 
Ottomans and Europeans included, believed that their readers should undertake 
whatever medical, spiritual and magical precautions and cures they could to 
combat the disease. The writers most often felt their task was to add to their 
knowledge, regardless of whether it was medical or not.
This pattern changed when the European maritime powers began their 
commercial and colonial overseas expansion. The British, the most success-
ful of these powers, were instrumental in the further development of quaran-
tine practices. They used the idea of contagion to justify banning textiles and 
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peoples from ‘suspected’ countries – often a convenient policy for English 
entrepreneurs, who wished to sell domestic textiles instead of that of their Dutch 
and French rivals. Contagionist beliefs also often legitimised greater controls 
against the poor, minorities and immigrants from abroad. Controversies about 
the policies often had a political tinge that refl ected social, religious and colonial 
divides among the body politic. Debates about these measures were discussed 
in an emerging press culture that transformed both author and audience. The 
author – who previously wrote for small, courtly circles of patrons – now had 
to tailor his message to meet the needs of a large, commercial elite. As a result, 
English plague treatises revolved much more around commerce and quarantine 
policy than they did about previously popular magical or spiritual ‘cures’ for 
the plague. Those who persisted faced likely persecution as religious dissidents 
or even witches.
The Ottomans began to change their views of plague and quarantine in the 
decades after Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. It was only after this fi rst 
attempt by Europeans to colonise the Middle East that the Ottomans realised that 
they would have to adopt quarantine as part of a greater modernisation project. 
Hamdan, the medical architect of the reforms, saw this threat fi rst-hand when 
the French invaded his native Algeria in 1830. He supported the adoption of an 
Ottoman maritime quarantine system as a mercantilist tool to resist outside inter-
vention in the Empire’s commercial, social and political affairs. He also called 
for the quarantine and other public health issues to be discussed in print.1 This 
wish became reality after Hamdan wrote his treatise, as an emerging Ottoman 
press published works on plague from that time onwards.
Importantly, Hamdan refused to accept the social disciplinary aspects of 
quarantine reform. He did not blame the poor, religious minorities or ethnic 
groups for spreading plague. These views might only be partially explained by 
Hamdan’s abhorrence for colonialism and the European medical institutions 
that helped to rationalise them. They also fi tted fully within the general Ottoman 
philosophy to adopt only those parts of modernising reform that could be recon-
ciled with their governing philosophy and faith. Hamdan’s successors would not 
implement major medical policing measures within the Empire until the Paris 
International Sanitary Conference in 1894, when they were pressured to do so by 
the European powers.
The British and French reacted to Hamdan by revising their notions of 
plague. They supported a seminal 1846 study of plague in Egypt by Clot-Bey 
and Aubert-Roche, which posited that plague was infectious, spread by poor 
hygiene and environmental factors rather than contagiously spread by human 
to human contact. They found that only unclean and undeveloped countries 
were endemic with the disease. In their eyes, European ‘civilised nations’ 
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should not fear plague spreading to them through international travel and trade. 
The Europeans supposedly combated the disease abroad by promoting public 
health and other sanitary improvements in the underdeveloped world. These 
conclusions validated further English and French commercial penetration of 
the Middle East, the colonisation of Egypt and the construction of the Suez 
Canal.
The establishment of a new infectionist-based medical inspection quaran-
tine system at the Suez Canal and the Red Sea was an even greater humili-
ation for the Ottomans than the internationalisation of the Constantinople 
Superior Health Council in 1838. The Ottomans still dominated the Council 
and its affi liated quarantines in Istanbul, the Black Sea and much of the eastern 
Mediterranean, but they began to lose control of their Arab provinces, particu-
larly the Hijaz.
The Ottomans reacted by adopting infectionism, especially the idea of medi-
cally policing the social and religious marginal groups of the Empire. Kasım 
İzzeddin, the head of Ottoman sanitation efforts in Iraq and the Hijaz from 1894 
to 1912, hoped to consolidate the Arab provinces of the Empire by targeting 
the poor, the Bedouins and the Shiites as risk groups for plague and other epi-
demic diseases. İzzeddin, a Lebanese Arab, provides interesting contrasts with 
Hamdan, the earlier Ottoman reformer, who also came from the Arab frontiers 
of the Empire. Both inaugurated their reforms in the hope of avoiding impend-
ing colonisation, but their policies were strikingly different. Whereas Hamdan 
successfully convinced a sceptical domestic audience to support the quarantine, 
İzzeddin gained international support – especially from the British – but embit-
tered the Hijaz Bedouins and Iraqi Shiites in the process. Hamdan rejected sani-
tary policing measures as colonialist, but İzzeddin tried to use medical inspection 
along with new technologies (railways, urban improvements, water distilling and 
ice machines) to consolidate the empire.
The British were key to İzzeddin’s success as they provided the coal, water 
distilling and ice machines, and much-needed transportation. Yet the outbreak 
of war in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central powers against 
Britain and her allies, effectively doomed İzzeddin’s project. The British ended 
their shipments of coal and supply, started shelling the Hijaz ports, and provoked 
rebellion among the Bedouins. Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca and leader of the 
Hijaz Bedouins, no doubt felt that İzzeddin’s medical inspections, sanitation 
and technological developments were part of the greater Ottoman attempt to 
 ‘colonise’ the Arabian Peninsula.
Only the Ottoman quarantine in Istanbul would emerge intact from the First 
World War. The British would temporarily take over the quarantine facilities 
and administrative headquarters on the Golden Horn, but this bred resentment 
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among the Turks – now themselves a marginal group who wished to reassert 
their sovereignty. When Inönü – Atatürk’s plenipotentiary at the Lausanne Peace 
Conference – won the concession that the Republic of Turkey would control the 
quarantine, Hamdan’s dream had come true at last.
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Milroy, Gavin, Quarantine and the Plague: Being a Summary of a Report on these 
Subjects Recently Addressed to the Academy of Medicine in France: With Introductory 
Observations, Extracts from Parliamentary Correspondence and Notes (London: Samuel 
Highley, 1846).
BULMUS PRINT.indd   185 06/03/2012   16:35
186 Plague, Quarantines and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire
Ministère des affaires étrangères, Conférence sanitaire internationale de Paris: 7 Novembre 
1911–17 Janvier 1912: Procès-verbaux (Paris: Impremerie nationale, 1912).
Montagu, Lady Mary Wortley, Turkish Embassy Letters, eds Anita Desai and Malcolm Jack 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia, 1993).
Morgan, Thomas, A Common Prayer-Book, according to the Plan of the Liturgy of the Church 
of England, with Suitable Services (Exeter: Printed by T. Brice, 1791).
Mordtmann, Bartoletti and Stécoulis, Drs, Le Pèlerinage de 1883 et la Quarantine de 
Camaran: Rapport au Conseil Supérior de Santé (Constantinople: Typographie et 
Lithographie du Journal ‘La Turquie’, 1883).
Moulton, Thomas, This is the Myrrour or Glasse of Helth Necessary and Nedefull for Euery 
Person to Loke in, That wil Kepe their Bodye from the Syckenesse of the Pestilence, and it 
Sheweth howe the Planettes do Raygne in euery Houre of the Daye and Nyghte, with the 
Natures and Exposicio[n]s of the xii Sygnes, Deuyded by the. xii. Monethes of the Yeare, 
and shewed the Remedies for many dyuers Infi rmities and Dyseases that hurteth the Bodye 
of Mann (London: T. Colwell, 1561).
Muhiddin, Dr, Sıhhat ve Hayat-ı İslam (İstanbul: Dersaadet, Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1907).
Müstakimzade, Sa’deddin Süleyman bin Muhammed Emin, Cihazü’l-Macun fi ’l-Halas 
Mine’t-Taun, Süleymaniye Library: Esad Efendi: 1329, 1780.
Newton, Benjamin, Sermons on Several Occasions. In Two Volumes (London: A. Bettesworth 
and C. Hitch, 1736).
Noyan, Abdülkadir, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla Savaşlarım (Ankara: Son Havadis 
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Rifat Paşa, İbrahim, Mir’atü’l Harameyn bir Generalin Hac Notları, trans. Lütfüllah Yavuz 
(İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2010).
Russell, Alexander, Natural History of Aleppo, 1742–1744, vol. 2. (London, 1756).
Russell, Patrick, A Treatise of the Plague: Containing an Historical Journal, and Medical 
Account, of the Plague, at Aleppo, in the years 1760, 1761, and 1762 . . . (London, 1791).
Saad, Lamec, Sechsen Jahre als Quarantänearzt in der Türkei (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 
1913).
Simpson, William J., A Treatise on Plague dealing with the Historical, Epidemiological, 
Clinical, Therapeutic and Preventative Aspects of the Disease (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1905).
Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Collier & Son, 1909).
Süreyyā, Mehmed, Sicill-i Osmanī (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996).
Süreyyā, Mehmed, Sicill-i Osmanī, İstanbul, 1308/1890–1315/1897 (Westmead: Gregg 
International Publishers, 1971).
Tahsin, Rıza, Mirat-i Mekteb-i Tibbiye (İstanbul: Dersaadet Kadir Matbaası, 1910).
BULMUS PRINT.indd   186 07/03/2012   17:07
 Bibliography 187
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